Aristotle, the Father of Philosophy.

THE SCIENCE-HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSE

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THE SCIENCE-HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSE

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THE SCIENCE-HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSE

VOLUME X

SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY

By PROFESSOR CHAS. GRAY SHAW

SOCIOLOGY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

By LEONARD D. ABBOTT

ETHICS

By FRANCIS ROLT-WHEELER

INTRODUCTION

By PROFESSOR HUGO MUNSTERBERG

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INTRODUCTION

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

THE proud development of psychology is perhaps the most significant feature in the philosophical movements of the last half century. It suggests a careful revision of the whole philosophical field. Indeed, any systematic understanding of philosophical problems to-day must demand full clearness as to their position with reference to psychology. All the philosophical parties of our day can be grouped by their different attitudes to psychology. The relation of psychology to philosophy is thus truly the central problem.

Psychology is the science which describes and explains our inner life. It is perhaps a fashion to exaggerate the newness of our modern efforts along this line and to set the "new psychology" in contrast with the knowledge of the mind in the preceding two thousand years. There is nowhere a sudden break but a continuous growth. Not a little of our modern knowledge may be traced back to Aristotle, and certainly the writings of the great philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the works of Descartes and Spinoza and Leibnitz, of Hobbes and Locke and Hume, contain abundant psychological material. Nevertheless there is reason enough for contrast-

ing the modern science of the mind with its earlier stages.

Too much of the older psychology was not only intertwined with philosophical arguments, but completely controlled by philosophical speculations. A general conception of the soul was the starting point, and the particular facts came to be deduced from the characteristic features of the soul. This general conception of the soul, on the other hand, was adjusted to religious and metaphysical demands. The demand for moral freedom and religious immortality of the soul influenced the psychological theory more than the study of the given facts. Moreover, where the concrete mental experiences were the material of inquiry, they were essentially taken with reference to their meaning and purpose. The ideas and thoughts were not so much studied as mental facts which we find in our consciousness, but as means to furnish us with the truth concerning the world. And again the will acts and feelings were disentangled, but primarily with reference to their goals and aims. Secondary motives were the interest in the curious aberrations of the human mind and the search for mystical connections. Much in the older psychology was accordingly related to our modern science not otherwise than astrology to scientific astronomy or alchemy to chemistry.

All that has fundamentally changed. The model of modern psychology has been the natural science of the physical universe. If mental experiences are really to be described and to be explained, they must be treated with the same cool neutrality and the same objective attitude with which the physicist and chemist, the botanist and zoölogist, approach the stones and the trees and the beasts.

This demands in the first place a careful analysis; that is, the mental experiences must be divided into their parts and those parts must be analyzed further, just as a zoölogist would dissect an animal into its various tissues and then analyze those tissues under the microscope until he finds the cells. In this way the zoölogist can describe the whole organism as an aggregate of cellular units, and the chemist may even go further and seek the molecules and the atoms; in short, those ultimate parts which cannot be analyzed any further. The great French psychologist, Condillac, the pioneer of modern positivism, and the German realist Herbart, a hundred years ago contributed from very different standpoints more than any predecessors toward such a resolution of the mental states. Our perceptions and thoughts came to be understood as combinations of mental elements.

But if psychology was to imitate the natural sciences, the mental material not only had to be described but to be explained. The psychologist must understand why under certain conditions certain mental states arise and why they disappear or linger and how they are connected with each other. In this respect it became of decisive importance that the nineteenth century recognised more and more clearly the intimate interdependence of the mental functions with special parts of the brain. Even the old Greek physicians were not unaware of the relations between mind and brain; and Descartes placed the soul in the pineal gland of the cerebrum. The general correlation between brain diseases and mental disturbances, between inhibition of the growth of the brain and mental idiocy, between the complexity of the animal's brain and the differentiation

of the animal's mind have also been known for a long time.

But that mental elements are related to and dependent upon special localized brain processes was a new, fundamental conquest. It was preceded by the vagueness of phrenology, which correlated large brain centers to complex mental functions and thus diagnosed special emotions and talents from special development of the skull. No progress was to be reached in this way, as psychology could not acknowledge such mental states as love for poetry or achitecture as simple units; psychology had learned that every such idea is composed of many elements. The decisive progress was rather made when the physicians discovered the pathological destruction of certain parts of the brain in the case of certain mental disturbances; for instance, the destruction of a definite field in the left half of the brain when the patients had suffered from aphasia, that is, inability to speak. The speech center was then discovered. Such medical observations were paralleled by the studies of physiologists who found that the stimulation of certain parts of the brain surface of animals produced movements characteristic of the expression of certain ideas and that extirpation of the same centers made the animals unable to pass through those mental experiences.

This growing insight into the parallelism between mental functions and brain processes fell into a period of human thought which was controlled by the discovery of the law of conservation of energy and by Darwin's "Origin of Species." The conservation of energy demanded as one of its consequences that all physical processes be completely determined by foregoing physical causes.

Therefore, there can be no intrusion of mental facts in the chain of physical processes. Whatever man is doing or speaking must accordingly be determined by the constitution of his organism and the totality of the experiences and changes which have gone on in his brain. No mental impulse, no psychical will or intention or feeling or thought could change the stream of physical events, unless it were itself accompanied by a physical brain process. Hence the theory must demand that every mental state be the accompaniment of a change in the brain processes; and that constitutes the theory of psychophysical parallelism which has become the basis of our modern psychological thinking. This does not mean that the psychologist is always interested in the physical basis of the mental facts; his interest belongs much more to the psychical side, but he takes it for granted and considers it as the fundamental theory which controls his whole work that every causal connection of mental life is ultimately understood through the connection of the brain processes.

Darwinism, on the other hand, opened an understanding of the development of this psychophysical apparatus. The Darwinian theory demanded that only those characteristics of the organism which serve the individual or its progeny be conserved in the struggle for existence. From this point of view the brain with its mental functions was easily recognised as a most useful part of the body. It is the central part of that physiological arc which begins with the sense organs, leading through the sensory nerves to the brain and from the brain through the motor nerves to the muscles. This complex arc system has the definite function of adjusting the organism by its movements to the

this way the total knowledge of modern psychology represents a real unity, no longer held together by a theory of the soul, but by the interest in the concrete facts of experience. The conception of the soul has been replaced by the conception of consciousness. Consciousness is in a way the spectator which becomes aware of those mental phenomena. Unlike the metaphysical soul, consciousness in the system of modern psychology cannot do anything; it is simply the subject for which all the mental phenomena are objects of experience. Consciousness knows those inner ideas and memories and imaginations and emotions and volitions as it knows the things of the outer world, and those ideas and volitions and all the other mental states pass through consciousness like a procession. In this sense we call the mental phenomena contents of consciousness. Yet on the other hand it is not infrequent to use the word consciousness in a wider sense and to indicate by it the spectator and the procession of which it is aware. Consciousness then means the totality of inner life.

This view of mental life must be of fundamental importance for the understanding of human life in its position in the world. If we draw the consequences of such a scientific view of mental experience, we must find them in every realm of human interest. All the so-called mental and moral sciences—history, with all its branches, of political and economic, of artistic and scientific, of legal and religious development—are then only specific forms of the mental processes which have resulted from the causal interplay of the psychophysical mechanism. Man has become a part of the course of nature. The history of hu-

man experiences has become a part of the biological development. Every effect was completely determined by the foregoing causes, every event resulted from the synergy of outer nature and brain cells, every thought, the wisest as well as the most foolish, every deed, the noblest as well as the crime, is the outcome of causal laws determined by the inherited disposition of an individual organism and the totality of impressions, reproductions, habits and training, associations and inhibitions, going on in the cells of the cerebrum. Human freedom has by no means become meaningless, but its meaning is the dependence of the action upon conditions which lie in the individual psychophysical apparatus and its normal working. The insane man is not the free creator of his actions because his brain is out of gear, but the thinker and the hero no less than the insane or the hypnotized are creating their actions through the causal necessities of the given instrument.

If we focus our interest on those consequences of empirical psychology which refer to the great fields of traditional philosophical endeavor, the results must be clear. The fundamental problems of the history of man's striving for ultimate reality clustered about the ideas of truth, beauty, morality and religion. If science has shown that our inner life is nothing but a combination of psychical elements causally connected and determined by biological conditions, we have no right to make inconsistent exceptions for our logical thought which seeks the truth, for our esthetic imagination which aims toward beauty, for our ethical will which strives for the morally good, for our religious emotion which longs for the world of eternity. We should be disloyal to the spirit of science if we allowed

double bookkeeping there, giving a higher value of an inspired character to those mental experiences which are related to ideals. These ideals themselves are then nothing but ideas surrounded by emotions, while those emotions and ideas alike must be considered as causal products of the psychological mechanism. The ultimate claim of truth and beauty and morality and religion is thus confined to the fact that they are merely mental experiences which have arisen in the biological development of mankind. They have come to our minds as mental facts not otherwise than memories come in the daytime and dreams at night. It would seem to be a crude illusionism, if we were to give to them any suprapsychological character. They are phenomena which must be grouped in line with the other phenomena which we observe in nature, and it would be fantastic mysticism to accredit them with a kind of higher value or to see in them more than passing ideas. The laws of nature are responsible for the growth of these human imaginations.

This by no means involves that scientific psychology is blind to the value which the ideas of truth and beauty, of morality and religion, may have for the development of mankind. From a psychological point of view, to be sure, the good is no more important than the bad, just as from a strictly chemical point of view the food is no more interesting than the poison. But just as the chemist may very well follow up the effects of the poison which destroys the organism and the effects of the food which builds it up, in the same way the social psychologist may examine the effects of those psychological processes. He will easily find that, for instance, the so-called true ideas

show themselves in the chain of causes and effects more efficient as causes for the upbuilding of human life than the errors. In the same way the beautiful imaginations are more comforting to the social organism than discord and disharmony. The ideas of morality and religion have likewise a very useful effect on the harmonious organization of mankind. And thus the social psychologist can very well determine how the moral actions help the social organism and how the infamous actions interfere with the normal development of society. This offers a broad, convenient and frequently welcomed platform for a general philosophy. Such philosophy proclaims that we call true those ideas which are helpful and useful for the practical life of the individuals, beautiful those which are pleasing and in harmony with individuals, moral those which help toward the fulfilment of individual interests. Such philosophy would even be able to organize these various effects of the psychological processes in a systematic way and to hold them together by the idea of an ultimate effect of highest possible usefulness for the greatest possible number of individuals. The final truth is then the system of those ideas in which the greatest possible number of individuals would have an interest to agree and the goal of morality would be an organization of action by which the greatest possible satisfaction should be brought to the greatest possible number of individuals. Philosophy of this type may easily emphasize sometimes more one, sometimes more another factor. If the chief emphasis is laid on the biological and physiological basis of these mental processes, we have the philosophy of materialism in the form in which nowadays, for instance, the popular writ-

ings of Haeckel are carrying so-called philosophy into the widest circles. If, on the other hand, the psychical side is emphasized and the physiological aspect more or less ignored, we have psychological positivism, nowadays frequently called psychologism, which is characteristic of the larger part of the empirical philosophy of our day.

But can the richness of the empirical material deceive us about the fact that in such a view of the world the real meaning of truth, beauty, progress, morality and religion is lost? We have a psychology of the thinking process and a sociology of the human endeavors of thought, but from that starting point we can never come to any ideal of truth which has absolute character. We may call truth those ideas which are helpful for certain purposes and which satisfy us, but any truth of that kind is necessarily relative. It never excludes the possibility that others under other circumstances may prefer the opposite. In short, every true judgment would theoretically allow that the opposite is just as true. An absolute standard would be impossible. And yet does not the truthseeker understand as his goal something which is final? He may be doubtful whether he has reached the full truth, but he remains convinced that a truth exists which finally might be reached. In the same way all relativistic morality must fall short of the real ethical consciousness of the moral spirit. We may recognise on such psychologistic grounds that certain volitions lead to a result which satisfies the greatest number of human interests, but why are we to acknowledge it as our duty to fulfil such a volition, if it interferes with our own advantage? Why are we to sacrifice ourselves for the satisfaction of the interests of others? No psycho-

logical ethics can lead us to a point where the individual becomes obliged to act morally. We may understand that the psychological feeling of obligation develops for biological reasons, but as soon as we have recognised it as such a merely mental appendix, we ought to feel free to act without reference to that feeling, and it could never be understood why we should not neglect the discomfort of that psychological feeling, if the immoral act promised us much greater advantages and satisfactions. In whatever direction we progress, everywhere we discover that the philosophy of such a psychological view of the world remains in a system of mere descriptions and explanations and can never furnish us with any controlling ideal, with any ultimate standard, with any eternal value. Philosophically the outcome is therefore a discouraging skepticism. We find a world of passing individuals with fugitive interests and desires and satisfactions, but there is no eternally valuable ideal good, no absolute truth or morality. It is a relativism which seems to be endorsed by the anthropological and ethnological studies, which of course show that that which has been called knowledge and beauty, law and morality and religion at any one time among any people have always been contradicted by other periods in other parts of the world. The truth of one age is the error of the next, the moral prescription of one part of the globe is antipodal to the ethical ideas of other countries. That there is no truth then appears to be the only certain dogma; and yet if we think consistently, even that dogma cannot be true, as it would proclaim for itself at least that absolute character of truth which it denies by its own proclamation.

But what else does this skepticism which is skeptical of itself express, if not that it is contradictory in itself? No skepticism and no relativism can really be carried to a consistent end without demonstrating their own contradictoriness. Where lies the mistake? Are the descriptions and explanations of physics and psychology not true? Certainly they are perfectly true. The fundamental mistake lies only in the claim that their truth can ever be accepted as an ultimate theory of the reality of life. The whole world of psychology and natural science, the whole material of a positivistic view is confined to the mental and physical facts which we find as objects of experience. They are the given facts which we have to describe and to explain. The narrowness of psychologizing philosophy sets in, if we overlook the central truth that this consciousness of objects itself involves complex problems and cannot under any circumstances be accepted as the starting point of human thought. To say that objects are given, that they have objective existence, already presupposes a will which submits to them, a subject who acknowledges them. To have real objective existence means much more than merely to be perceived, it means to be recognised as real and to be accepted as true; and all this demands a subject who takes attitude toward its objects. And if this is the case even with the existence of the simplest object, it becomes still more evident if we speak of any true relation or connection between the objects. We accept such a connection as really going on, but this acceptance then belongs to a will which subordinates itself to a system of experience. In short, it is an illusion if we think that our ultimate account of the world can

really start from the existence of objects. As soon as we speak of the existing objects we are really relying on the deeds of a subject who not only finds those objects, but who acknowledges the obligation which the objects enforce on its will. The subject and its will are the primary act, and all the so-called existence of objects is dependent upon the deeds of this will in us. The whole system of knowledge, of physical and of psychological knowledge, thus represents not something which has a reality independent of the will of subjects, but is a system shaped through the demands and postulates and acknowledgments of subjective, purposive will. Man thinks the material of his experience in the shape of a causal connected system of existing objects in order to satisfy certain demands of his will, but this will, which is then the real lever of our world, therefore ultimately comes in question for us not as a psychological phenomenon; that is, it is not itself a mental object, but it must be recognised in its immediate purposive character.

As soon as we have freed ourselves once for all from the dogma that the physical and psychological objects are the ultimate reality, we recognise at once the true situation. Then we must see that the whole account which psychology offers to us is indeed nothing but a certain reconstruction of inner experience and in no way an account of our immediate life experience. It is a reconstruction similar to that by which the physicist reconstructs the outer things when he forms the conception of atoms. The things are not in an absolute reality made of atoms, but we must think them as composed of atoms in order to satisfy our demand for a causal connection; that is, in

order to understand every change as the result of foregoing changes. In a similar way we must think of our inner experience as a system of psychological phenomena made up of sensations and determined by brain processes, if we want to conceive mental life, too, as a part of a causal world and in that way to satisfy our will for causal connectedness. But it remains an entirely artificial attitude.

In immediate life reality not only is our will never an object for us, but neither are the ideas at all that which the psychologist makes them be for the purposes of the causal system. To point to the latter problem first, we may say that the objects of our real life are not the ideas in the sense of the psychologist. Indeed, when we see the moon, the psychologist tells us that it is the moon perception in us which makes up the psychological idea, while the physical moon is far from us in the sky. But if we abstract from such theoretical school knowledge and turn to the reality of life, we cannot doubt for a moment that we do not experience this doubleness, but that our perceptive idea of the moon and the moon itself are immediately the same for us. We do not find a moon without and a moon within. That which we perceive is never felt as being in us, but we perceive the moon there directly in the sky. It is quite true that if we aim toward a causal system, we are quickly led to that artificial division; we separate in our perception of the moon that which we accept as the common object for all of us and call it the physical moon, distinct from that aspect of the moon which is our private individual property. We all see the same physical moon, while the idea of the moon in one man

can never be the idea of his neighbor. Hence we construct a system of objects considered in so far as they belong to individual subjects and project those individual objects into the organism of the individual man. Therefore I say that the idea of the moon as psychological phenomenon goes on in my body, in my head, in my brain. In real life we start with an experience of objects which are not yet differentiated into physical and mental things. In reality, I remember the past objects. It is an artificial abstraction, if the psychologist separates my present memory idea from that real past object to which my attention is turning.

A reconstruction of a very different kind has set in in that other case, in the case of the will. We saw that the psychologist must describe and explain the will, too, as a content of consciousness belonging to the causal chain of events. But in our immediate reality of life we never find our will as such a content of which we are simply aware. For us our will is not an object, but we get hold of its reality in an entirely different way. We do not perceive it like colors and tones, but we will it, we live through it, we feel it as a part of ourselves. It is not an objective becoming acquainted with it; it is a subjective passing through it. If we want to give account of the reality of the will, we have no right to describe it as a phenomenon after the pattern of psychology, and therefore we have no reason to link it with any causes. For us in immediate life it is a doing and deciding and demanding which has its relation points not in causes, but in purposes. In living through our will act we refer it exclusively to aims and ends. In other words, in our life reality

our will is not a causal process, but a purposive one and can be understood in its real meaning only as long as it is conceived as such a purposive deed. The psychologist has a good right to translate this purposive subject function into the terms of an objective phenomenon and then to link it with causes and to analyze it into its elements, but then the real fundamental meaning of the will has disappeared. It can no longer be seen from that new point of view. If we look on our will as an object to be described and to be explained, we take the only possible point of view which can come in question for a scientific psychology, and if it is logically valuable to reconstruct experience in the terms of causal science, such a psychological view of the will is justified and is scientifically true. But the distance from the reality of life here becomes extreme and from this standpoint, it becomes evident that such a psychologistic account of the will can never furnish a philosophy that would do justice to the ultimate reality of life.

If we seek philosophy, we must go down to a deeper layer than to that of the artificial constructions of physics and psychology. The ultimate meaning of life can be expressed only in the purposive terms in which we meet life. We first know ourselves as purposive subjects. This purposive will is not a psychological phenomenon, because it is not an object at all, but an attitude and a deed. In this purposive life our objects are not mental phenomena because they are still undifferentiated things around us, not thrown by artificial construction into the consciousness of an individual. In this purposive life one fundamental purpose of ours is to bring order into the chaos of ex-

perience by conceiving of the objects as connected. In the service of this demand we construct the sciences, and among them the psychological science, and among its consistent constructions we finally conceive ourselves and our will as such a causal psychological mechanism.

But this turn from mere objects as the only ultimate facts to subjective, purposive will acts does not entirely liberate us from the shortcomings of relativism and skepticism. We saw that the skeptical denial of absolute ideals and values resulted from the fact that in the world of physical and mental objects we can never transcend the merely individual experiences. But it is evident that we might take the turn toward the real purposive view of life and will and yet remain in the narrow boundaries of an individualistic philosophy. We might say: Yes, man is will and must be understood in a purposive way, not as a product of causes, not as an effect of biological development, but as a subject who aims toward ends. Nevertheless we might add that these ends depend entirely upon the individual's personal intentions and interests, and that everything which is constructed and produced thus has value only with reference to such individual inclinations. From such a point of view it would be recognised that the particular truth is something of man's own making and constructing, and hence that knowledge is dependent upon the purposes which are aimed at. The anti-philosophical superficiality of the trivial positivism is then left behind. It is recognised that we cannot begin with the mere existence of given objects, and it is understood that those objects which we acknowledge as true have gained their logical shape by the will which needs their connec-

tion for its purposes. And yet as these purposes are confined to a preference of individual subjects, however many may agree in their preferences, we still would remain unable to acknowledge anything in the world as absolutely valuable. It would remain a world in which every good is relative. Instead of a phenomenonalistic relativism, we should now have a voluntaristic relativism; that is, not objects in their givenness, but subjects in their purposiveness are vehicles of reality, and yet it remains a reality without any positive reference to absolute standards. This last form of the view of the world is that which is most popular in our day under the title of pragmatism.

There is no doubt that pragmatism comes nearer to the reality of life than a merely objective positivism in the materialistic or in the psychologistic form. Its recognition of the purposive character of truth is the valuable core in its system, and pragmatism is therefore to be welcomed in the fight against the positive sciences when they begin to overstep their correct boundaries and to pose as a substitute for philosophy. Yet pragmatism itself cannot be accepted as the last word. It starts on the right track, but stops before it reaches the true philosophical problems. The voluntaristic direction of pragmatism is indeed prescribed by the reality of life. But we never come to a philosophy which can do justice to the totality of our experience, if we acknowledge only the demands of our will and not the rules to which it is subjected. And here is the point where the so-called critical philosophy, the great philosophical movement which started with Kant and Fichte, must offer the further guidance. Pragmatism must yield to idealism. The merely individualistic satis-

factions of the will must be embedded in a world of satisfactions which do not refer to individual desires, but which belong to an overindividual demand in us; that is, to a demand which has no reference to our particular personal interest, but which we must postulate as belonging to the will of every subject whom we can acknowledge as a subject of a world at all. The view of critical philosophy will never be accessible to the popular mind, as it demands concentrated and schooled philosophical thinking. The individualistic view in the voluntaristic or the positivistic form will always be more convenient, just as it is more convenient to think that the sun moves around the earth; and indeed there is no need that the man on the street thinks of the fact that the sun stands still and the earth is moving. And still less is there any need that the man of the street should conceive reality in a consistent system which really embraces the totality of human facts. Such a need would be imminent if the relativism and skepticism of pragmatic and positivistic philosophies should begin to undermine the life of the masses and should really deprive it of the belief in absolute ideals. But there are sufficient factors at work in the interest of social welfare to secure for mankind that living belief in the ideal values, and the human instincts are more effective than the acquired knowledge.

But if the effort is made to conceive reality in a closed system, the gigantic work of the Kantean philosophy and of his great successors can never again be ignored, just as astronomy can never go back to the days before Copernicus. Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' has shown to us that certain propositions concerning nature must be ab-

solutely true independent of particular observations. Moreover, all observations must be controlled by these true facts which we can express in judgments which precede observation and which therefore have a-prioristic character. For instance, the mathematical facts must hold for everything in the universe. He showed us the reason why it cannot be otherwise, inasmuch as he taught us that all possible knowledge refers to a world which is itself dependent upon the forms of our understanding. We cannot have any knowledge of anything which lies outside of the world of possible experience, and this world of possible experience must be bound and controlled by our own subjective conditions of experience. But these subjective conditions are not individual fancies and tendencies; they are those subjective factors in us which make experience possible at all and which we must therefore presuppose and postulate for every subject whom we are to acknowledge as a subject who is to share with us the world which we are discussing.

Before Kant the world imagined that it was the purpose of knowledge to present in the mind something which had a reality in itself independent of our thinking. The rationalists believed that we could find a picture of that independent world by mere rational thinking, the empiricists believed that we could get a picture of that independent world through our senses; but Kant showed to us that it is never the aim to get the picture of a world which is independent of our experience, but that the only world which is knowable is the world of our experience, which in its very constitution is thus determined by the thought forms of our understanding. Everything which results from these

thought forms of ours is therefore absolutely necessary for the world of knowledge. And the individual who tries to discover the world is thus bound by those absolute truths which his own subjectivity forces on the world for eternity. This subjectivity is not the chance individuality; it is the overindividual subject in us. If we translate that into the voluntaristic terms of our present-day thinking, we might say that our will constructs the particular truths. But our individual will must be bound by those rules of the world which result from the general character of our subjectivity. No other world but the world which our will builds up can have reality at all. The world which we are seeking to explore by our knowledge can never be anything but the world which our will builds up, but for which therefore all that which is determined by the general characteristics of our will must have a-prioristic character and therefore absolute value.

Here is not the place to develop the system of modern idealism. It was only necessary to point out that in spite of all psychological and pragmatic claims, a true philosophy which has learned from the greatest advance of philosophy since the days of Plato, proclaims with emphasis the absolute character of the ideals of the will. This absolute is never anything which has a ghostlike everlasting existence, but it is the eternal rule which binds every will which is to aim toward a real world at all. The absolute is not existing, but valid; it is not a thing, but an obligation which prescribes beforehand the standards and the ideals for every individual endeavor. It is the function of philosophical idealism to deduce from the character of the world-positing will the particular demands

which are binding for every possible search of truth, beauty, morality and religion. From such a point of view psychology does not lose anything of its high and important scientific value, but it has become one of the special sciences standing in line with physics and chemistry. There was a time among the old Greeks when the name philosophy covered the whole ground of theoretical knowledge, knowledge for knowledge sake. One branch after another became independent, one science after another became separated from the central mass of philosophy, as soon as it had reached a sufficient degree of expansion. Psychology has been the latest science to reach this independence and this dignity of a special science of its own. But just by making psychology now in our day such a self-dependent science with an abundance of material and with exact methods, the internal separation from philosophy is perfected, and philosophy can never tolerate that psychology should now present itself as if it were the real heir of philosophy. Philosophy, after sending out from her mother arms all the special sciences, remains more than ever that central purposive inquiry into that which gives meaning to knowledge and life, an inquiry into the ultimate, absolute values.

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PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

In its most general form, philosophy consists in an impulse on the part of the human mind to seek that which is fundamental in nature without and consciousness within itself. With special reference to the classes of problems that present themselves to the speculative understanding, philosophy may be said to investigate the ground of the world and the goal of human life. Ancient philosophy expressed this two-fold aim of reflection by distinguishing between the macrocosm and the microcosm; modern thought carries on its investigations in the fields of nature and humanity. In surveying nature, the human mind avails itself of the laws of logic for the sake of discovering the validity of its knowledge; in contemplating humanity, it employs the principles of ethics in order to determine the value of practical motives. Meanwhile, it is the same philosophic impulse that looks first toward the course of outer nature and then at the stream of inner consciousness.

In seeking the speculative ground of the world, philosophy reveals a peculiar desire of human nature, philo-sophia, or love of wisdom, as the Greeks styled it. It is plain that man is not satisfied with the world as it is given to his senses in the form of impressions, for he endeavors to arrange these in groups which he calls "things," and these

he adjusts to one another according to some principle of relation. The world of sense is made up of phenomena-like colors and tones, while it consists of events, taking place without any apparent plan. These impressions are given in the form of space; the events take place in time. With these outer impressions and events as his experience, man seeks to reduce them to fundamental principles like substance and casuality. That is, he seeks to discover what really is, and what actually takes place. He asks himself whether the ground or substance of the world is something material or something mental, like himself. He desires to know whether events take place mechanically or according to some plan.

In addition to this speculative impulse of the mind, man exhibits practical interest concerning his own welfare and the conduct of life. Having asked, What is the ground of all that exists and takes place? he inquires further, What is the goal of man's life? Just as outer impressions fail to satisfy the understanding, so immediate impulses refuse to content the will. Man is not ready to affirm that his genuine life consists in obeying instinct or in pursuing pleasure. His reason persuades him that there must be something fundamental in nature, and now it suggests that his life may contain something final. This may consist in happiness or in virtue; it may assume the general form of contemplation, whereby one becomes an intellectualist, or it may have to do with conquest, making man an activist. Therefore, as metaphysical philosophy by reacting upon experience seeks to adjust the mind to the world, moral philosophy aims to relate it to man himself.

Human philosophy does not proceed in any desultory way when it seeks to ascertain the validity of knowledge and the value of action. It organizes its data, classifies its problems and thus arise certain philosophic disciplines, or sciences—logic and ethics, esthetics and religion. Of these four the first pair study nature and humanity abstractly by way of analysis; the second pair proceed

constructively and make use of synthetic judgments. In spite of these distinctions, the same philosophic questions are taken up by these special sciences. Thus logic and esthetics combine their abstract and concrete principles for the sake of ascertaining the speculative form of the world, while ethics and religion effect a similar union with the aim of organizing the practical life-forces of human nature. It is the same human mind surveying nature and analyzing consciousness for the purpose of laying down principles of thought and aligning ideals for action.

Where philosophy now distinguishes between nature and humanity, ancient thought found it possible to develop such a unified view of things that the difference between man and the world was ignored. There was one world—a macrocosm without, a microcosm within; hence the modern conflict between realism and idealism, optimism and pessimism was practically unknown. The sharp dualism of reason and reality did not infect this harmonious system which, as Parmenides expressed it, found "thinking and being the same." This complacent consciousness asserted itself again in esthetics, where sense and spirit were intuited as one and the same human activity. Where the moderns observe the painful disruption of the outer impression and the inner ideal, classicism found only harmony and consistent beauty.

This spirit of complacency did not depart when Greece assumed the responsibility of the life-problem. Ethics found man at home in the world and secure in his own humanity: for this reason, the ethical problem did not assume the form of a sharp contrast between virtue and pleasure, but consisted of a unified view of life whereby duty and desire were felt to be in unison. Even the Stoics and Epicureans did not fail to find this harmony of the ideal and real. With respect to politics, ancient theories of the state were able to adjust man to society without feeling the stress of the modern conflict between rights and law, individual and society. "Man," said Aristotle, "is by

nature a political animal," and Plato found in humanity a plastic material from which the philosopher could mold an ideal Republic. Altogether, the speculative problem concerning the ground of the world was met and solved directly upon an idealistic basis, while the practical question concerning the goal of human life was answered in terms of 'eudæmonism.'

With such idealistic and optimistic elements in his nature, the Greek set about developing a view of man and his world; as a result, Greek philosophy passed through three characteristic periods—'naturistic,' 'idealistic' and 'humanistic.' (1) From Thales (600 B.C.) to the Sophists, Greek thought busied itself with the nature and form of the outer world. (2) From Socrates (400 B.C.) to the death of Aristotle (322 B.C.), it investigated the nature of thought and knowledge. (3) From the rise of Stoics and Epicureans (about 320 B.C.) it began to inquire concerning the conduct of life. While wanting in the fierce party strife of modern philosophy, ancient thought did not fail to accentuate its problems by means of contrasts. Thus the problem of being was discussed contrarily by Parmenides and Heraclitus; the problem of knowledge revealed the contrast between Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum; while the problem of life was one thing in the Stoa of Zeno, another in the Garden of Epicurus.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF BEING

In the first period of Greek philosophy, the problem of being assumed three distinct forms: (1) The early Ionian thinkers presented it naïvely by identifying the ground of the world with certain natural phenomena, such as water, air, ether. (2) The systematic thinkers, Parmenides and Heraclitus, discussed its form as being or becoming. (3) The 'reconcilers' sought to do away with the conflict set up by Parmenides and Heraclitus, by returning to the earlier school, whose principles it restated more critically. At the same time, they developed the atomic theory.

The Milesian Philosophy of Nature, therefore, is to be regarded as inaugurating early Greek philosophy. These primitive thinkers agreed in regarding the world as tho it were made up of some refined form of matter. Thales (about 600 B.C.) calls it water; Anaximander (about 575 B.C.) regards it as boundless ether; Anaximenes (about 550 B.C.) looks upon this ether as air. The problem of mind was not taken up directly by these physicists, yet they tended to regard all nature as having a psychic function. This resulted in 'hylozoism,' a theory that all matter is possessed of life.

Aristotle gives the following account of Thales' philosophy of nature: "Thales, the originator of this kind of philosophy, declares it to be water. (And this is why he said that the earth floats on water.) Possibly he was led to this opinion by observing that the nourishment of all

things is moist, and that heat itself is generated and kept alive by moisture. And that from which all things are generated is just what we mean by their first principle. This may be where he got his idea, and also from observing that the germs of all things are moist, and that moist things have water as the first principle of their nature."

The more advanced naturism of Anaximander may be seen from the account of it made by Theophrastus. "Among those who say that the first principle is one and mobile and boundless," he says, "is to be reckoned Anaximander of Miletus, the son of Praxiades, the successor and follower of Thales. He said that 'the boundless' was the first principle and element of the things that are, being the first to make use of this term in describing the first principle. He says it is neither water nor any of the other elements now recognised, but some other and different natural body which is boundless; and from it arise all the heavens and all the worlds which they contain."

"Anaximenes of Miletus, son of Eurystratos, an associate of Anaximander, agreed with him in holding that the substance of nature was one and boundless," affirms Theophrastus; "but he did not agree with him in holding tnat it was indeterminate, for he said it was air. But it differs in rarity and density with different things. When it is very attenuated fire arises; when it is condensed wind, then cloud, then, when more condensed, water, earth, stones; and other things come from these. He, too, holds the movement eternal by which the changes arise."

Other ancient authorities add the following opinions concerning the form of nature, as understood by Anaximenes:

"Just as our soul which is air holds us together, so it is breath and air that encompasses the whole world.

All things are generated by a sort of rarefaction and condensation of air.

The earth is flat like a table top.

The earth is flat and floats on the air.

The stars are fixed like nails in the crystalline vault."

The second period of Greek philosophy witnessed a change of method, as well as a spirit of great analytical intensity. Abandoning the naïve hylozoism of the Milesians, the Eleatic school began to investigate the form of nature. The mysterious conception of a soul-life diffused throughout nature gave way to a more sedate view, the elaboration of which caused the advanced thinker to break with the religious traditions of the Homeric epics. On the one side the Eleatic school, headed by Xenophanes (about 530 B.C.), systematized by Parmenides (about 500 B.C.), and popularized by Zeno (about 465 B.C.), insisted upon the static principle of being, while the Ephesian thinker Heraclitus negatived being in favor of becoming.

Among the Eleatics, Xenophanes prepares the way for the metaphysical notion of the "All," by turning from polytheism to monotheism, whence the development of monism was no difficult undertaking. From the "Fragments," the following selections will indicate the spirit of the first of the Eleatic school:

"1. There is one God, supreme among gods and men; resembling mortals neither in form nor in mind.

2. The whole of him sees, the whole of him thinks, the whole of him hears.

3. Without toil, he rules all things by the power of his mind.

4. And he stays always in the same place, nor moves at all, for it is not seemly that he wander about now here, now there.

5. But mortals fancy gods are born, and wear clothes, and have voice and form like themselves.

6. Yet if oxen and lions had hands, and could paint with their hands, and fashion images, as men do, they would make the pictures and images of their gods in

their own likeness; horses would make them like horses, oxen like oxen.

7. Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all deeds that are a shame and a disgrace among men: thieving, adultery, fraud.

8. From earth to earth—the beginning and end of all things.

9. We all sprang from earth and water.

10. All things that come into being and grow are earth and water."

Profiting by the philosophical spirit that Xenophanes had introduced into the discussion of being, Parmenides attempts to describe the form of reality in terms of 'permanence,' by which being maintains its identity, and of thought which affords it content. He words it thus:

"What are the sole two paths of research that are open to thinking?
One path is: That Being doth be, and Non-Being is not:
This is the way of Conviction, for Truth follows hard in her footsteps.
Th' other path is: That Being is not, and Non-Being must be;
This one, I tell thee in truth, is an all-incredible pathway.
For thou never canst know what is not (for none can conceive it),
Nor canst thou give it expression, for one thing are Thinking and Being."
. . . And now there remains for discussion
"One path only: That Being doth be—and on it there are tokens
Many and many to show that what is is birthless and deathless,
Whole and only-begotten, and moveless and ever-enduring:
Never it was or shall be; but the all simultaneously now is,

One continuous one; for of it what birth shalt thou
search for?
How and whence it hath sprung? I shall not permit
thee to tell me,
Neither to think: 'Of what is not,' for none can say or
imagine
How Not-Is becomes Is; or else what need should have
stirred it,
After or yet before its beginning, to issue from nothing?
Thus either wholly Being must be or wholly must not be."

Parmenides has already declared thinking and being to be the same; now he emphasizes this principle as such, and adds to it the idea that by sense-impression, or 'opinion,' man mistakes the unity of the world for the manifold:

"One and the same are thought and that whereby there
is thinking;
Never apart from existence, wherein it receiveth ex-
pression,
Shalt thou discover the action of thinking; for naught
is or shall be
Other besides or beyond the Existent; for Fate hath
determined
That to be lonely and moveless, which all things are but
a name for—
Things that men have set up for themselves, believing
as real
Birth and decay, becoming and ceasing, to be and to
not-be,
Movement from place to place, and change from color
to color."

Zeno adds to the doctrine of being a certain touch of doubt which affords a point of transition to the opposed doctrine of non-being or becoming, as upheld by Heraclitus. In a more definite manner, Zeno tries to point out the unreality of space and the impossibility of motion:

"If space 'is,' it will be in something; for everything

that 'is' is in something; and to be in something is to be in space. Space then will be in space, and so on 'ad infinitum.' Therefore space does not exist."

The Paradoxes of Motion are closely reasoned:

"(1) You cannot traverse an infinite number of points in a finite time. You must traverse the half of any given distance before you traverse the whole, and the half of that again before you can traverse it. This goes on ad infinitum, so that (if space is made up of points) there are an infinite number in any given space, and it cannot be traversed in a finite time.

"(2) The second argument is the famous puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise. Achilles must first reach the place from which the tortoise started. By that time the tortoise will have got on a little way. Achilles must then traverse that, and still the tortoise will be ahead. He is always coming nearer, but he never makes up to it.

"(3) The third argument against the possibility of motion through a space made up of points is that, on this hypothesis, an arrow in any given moment of its flight must be at rest in some particular point."

With Heraclitus begins the negation of permanent 'being' by means of the category, 'becoming.' At the same time there arises the enduring distinction between the 'static' and 'dynamic' types of first principles. Of the two categories, 'substance' and 'causality,' Parmenides claimed the first, Heraclitus the second as his metaphysical ideal. This contrast between passive and active forms of speculation reappears in Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus and Augustine, Aquinas and Scotus, Spinoza and Leibnitz, Herbart and Hegel.

In contrast to the Eleatic school, Heraclitus of Ephesus (about 500 B.C.) upholds 'change' and 'appearance' in place of 'permanence' and 'thought.' The philosophy of Heraclitus finds only becoming in the world, and opinion, or sense-impression, in the mind. From the 'Fragments'

the following aphorisms serve to indicate the Heraclitian method of speculation; they reveal the fact that the philosopher's favorite method of representing the form of the world was by means of the figure of a stream, while the world-process is identified with the phenomenon of fire:

"All things flow; nothing abides.

"One cannot step twice into the same river.

"Into the same rivers we step and we do not step; we are and we are not.

"This universe, the same for all, no one, either god or man, has made; but it always was, and is, and ever shall be an ever-living fire, fixed measures kindling and fixed measures dying out.

"The transformations of fire are, first of all, sea; and one-half of the sea is earth and half the stormy wind. . . . The sea is dispersed and keeps its measure according to the same Word that prevailed before it became earth.

"God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger. But he assumes various forms, just as fire when it is mingled with different kinds of incense is named according to the savor of each.

"Fire lives the death of air, and air the death of fire; water lives the death of earth, and earth the death of water.

"All things are exchanged for fire and fire for all things, just as wares are exchanged for gold and gold for wares."

Like nature, humanity reveals this same law of change:

"Man is kindled and put out like a light in the night time.

"One and the same thing are the living and the dead, the waking and the sleeping, the young and the old; the former change and are the latter, the latter change in turn and are the former.

"Opposition brings men together, and out of discord comes the fairest harmony, and all things have their birth in strife.

Yet within these changes in macrocosm and microcosm, something abides, if only the ever-changing fire. Heraclitus seems to postulate a principle of reason or the word which governs all forms of change.

"This Word is everlasting, but men are unable to comprehend it before they have heard it or even after they have heard it for the first time. Altho everything happens in accordance with this Word, they behave like inexperienced men whenever they make trial of words and deeds such as I declare as I analyze each thing according to its nature and show what it is. But other men have no idea what they are doing when awake, just as they forget what they do when they are asleep.

"One ought to follow the lead of that which is common to all men. But altho the Word is common to all, yet most men live as if each had a private wisdom of his own."

The conflict between the claims of 'being' and 'becoming' was not to be endured indefinitely, and the third stage of the preliminary period of ancient speculation witnessed several attempts at a reconciliation. It became necessary to seek something permanent in the form of unchanging atoms, as well as something dynamic by way of moving, or organizing, principle. Thus in a system of moving or combining elements there appeared in a reconciled form the opposite principles of Parmenides and Heraclitus. Nevertheless, these "reconcilers" departed from Eleatic traditions by the introduction of the many in place of the one, but this pluralistic reshaping of naturism was done in obedience to the dictates of common experience, which reveals a manifold to the senses, just as it was urged in behalf of an independent theory of Atomism.

This third group of naturists included Pythagoras (circa

530 B.C.), Empedocles (circa 450 B.C.), Anaxagoras (circa 460 B.C.), Leucippus (circa 440 B.C.), and Democritus (circa 420 B.C.).

While Pythagoras lived about the year 530 B.C., the number-philosophy seems to have connected itself with a school rather than with a person. In the character of 'reconcilers,' they account for the 'many' by means of 'numbers' considered as the elements of all things that exist, while they derive 'motion' from the principle of 'harmony.' Says Aristotle: "At this time and even earlier the so-called Pythagoreans applied themselves to mathematics and were the first to advance this branch of knowledge, and spending all their time in these pursuits they came to think that the first principles of mathematics were the first principles of all things that exist. And inasmuch as numbers are what is naturally first in this field, and since they thought they discovered in numbers a great many more similarities with things that exist and that arise in the processes of nature than one could find in fire or earth or water, they thought, for example, that such and such a property of numbers was justice, another the soul and reason, another opportunity, and in the same way of practically everything else; and inasmuch as they saw in numbers the properties and proportions of the different kinds of harmonies, and since all other things so far as their entire nature is concerned were modeled upon numbers, whereas numbers are prior to anything else in nature—from all this they inferred that the first elements of numbers were the first elements of all things that exist, and that the whole heaven was a harmony and a number."

To account for the dual truth of 'permanence' and 'change,' Empedocles (about 450 B.C.) assumes the existence of four material elements—fire, water, earth, air, and two organizing principles—love and hate. The effect of love is to unite these four kinds of things in a sphere; hate tends to scatter them abroad.

"Twofold is the truth I shall disclose. At one time

things grew to be one alone out of many; and then again [this] fell asunder so that there were many from the one—fire and water and earth and the endless height of the air; and, apart from these, baneful Strife, with equal weight throughout, and in their midst Love, equally distributed in length and breadth. Let thy mind's gaze rest upon her, nor sit with dazed eyes. It is she that is held to be implanted in the parts of mortals; it is she who awakens thoughts of love and fulfils the works of peace. They call her by the name of Delight and Aphrodite. No mortal man has searched her out as she swirls around in the elements. . . . When Strife had fallen to the lowest depth of the vortex, and Love had come to be in the center of the whirl, all things came together in Love so as to be one only—not all at once, but coming together at their pleasure, one from this quarter, one from that. And as they came together Strife retired to the outermost boundary."

Anaxagoras (about 460 B.C.) sought to settle the differences between being and becoming by assuming the 'many' as also by postulating a ruling principle of 'mind.' He said:

"In everything there is a portion of everything except mind. There are some things in which there is mind also.

"All other things contain a portion of everything, but mind is infinite and self-ruled and is mixed with nothing. For if it did not exist by itself, but were mixed with anything else, it would contain a portion of all things. For in everything there is a portion of everything, as I have said above. And in that case the things mixed with it would prevent it from having power over anything else such as it now has, being alone and by itself. For it is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it possesses all knowledge and the greatest power. And whatsoever things are alive, the

largest as well as the smallest, over all is mind the ruler. And over the whole revolving universe mind held sway, so that it caused it to revolve in the beginning. The revolution first began in a small area; now it extends over a larger space, and it will extend still further. And mind knows all things, whether mixed together, or differentiated and separate. Mind also regulated all things—what they were to be, what they were [but are not now], and what they are; and mind regulated the revolution in which revolve the stars, the sun and the moon, and the air and the ether that are differentiated."

Leucippus inclined toward the Parmenidian side of the controversy over 'being' and 'not-being,' yet he shows his independence by introducing notions of the 'atoms' and the 'void.' The atoms served to express his idea of being, regarded as many instead of one, the void wherein they moved was identified with not-being. Theophrastus gives the following account of Leucippus and his atomic restatement of the Eleatic problem: "Leucippus, the Eleate, or the Milesian (for he is described in both ways), at first agreed with the philosophical views of Parmenides. But he did not follow the same path as Parmenides and Xenophanes in his account of the things that are, but, apparently, just the opposite. For whereas they made the 'all' one, immovable, uncreated and limited, and did not permit inquiry into that which is not, he began by assuming an unlimited number of elements, the atoms, which were always in motion. And he supposed them to have an infinite variety of forms, because there was no reason why they should have one form rather than another, and because he observed that the process of birth and change was unceasing. He further believed that that which is, does not more truly exist than that which is not, and that both alike are causes of the things that come into being. For he assumed that the substance of the atoms was solid and full; and he called them 'what is,' and that they

moved in the void, and he called that 'what is not,' and he said that it was no less real than that which is."

Leucippus showed how mechanical was his philosophy when he said:

> "Nothing comes into being without a reason, but everything arises from a specific ground and driven by necessity."

As Anaxagoras had found the principle of movement in 'mind,' so Democritus placed the 'soul' in the same dynamic capacity. In the particular development of his theory, his atomic and materialistic tendencies inclined him toward Leucippus. As Aristotle describes his theory: "Democritus, whose view agrees with that of Leucippus, consequently maintained soul to be a sort of fire and heat. For as the forms of the atoms are as the atoms themselves unlimited, he declares that those which are spherical in shape constitute fire and soul, these atoms being like the so-called motes which are seen in the sunbeams that enter through doorways, and it is in such a mixed heap of seeds that he finds the elements of the whole natural world. The reason why they maintain that the spherical atoms constitute the soul, is that atoms of such configuration are best able to penetrate through everything, and to set the other things in motion at the same time as they are moved themselves, the assumption here being that the soul is that which supplies animals with motion. This same assumption led them to regard respiration as the boundary with which life was coterminous. It was, they held, the tendency of the encircling atmosphere to cause contraction in the animal body and to expel those atomic forms, which, from never being at rest themselves, supply animals with movement."

From these inquiries concerning the soul it was but a step to the problem of knowledge. Here Greek thought reaches its apex.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

THE first period of Greek philosophy was not so devoted to the question of being that it did not make room for the problem of knowledge. Parmenides pursued it when he turned away from opinion to thought, while Heraclitus had it in mind when he sought in reason something more enduring than the ever-changing impressions. What was needed, however, was a speculative system which should discuss the problem according to principles of logic, and thus put thought upon an independent basis. While the preliminary step in this direction was taken by the Sophists, the development of Grecian idealism was due to the great triumvirate—Socrates (——399 B.C.), Plato (428-347 B.C.), and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.).

The Greeks themselves never appreciated the important step taken by the Sophists (440-400 B.C.). They saw in the new movement nothing but the rhetorical trickery of mercenary teachers bent upon purely verbal victories. Emerging from the mist of Sophistry appears the colossal figure of Socrates, offering striking contrast to his inferior associates. Moreover, the great teacher was ever on his guard lest he be taken for a mercenary Sophist, as he was often supposed to be. He said:

> "No, there is no truth in any of these charges. And if you have heard any one say that I set myself up as a teacher of men and exact a fee for my services, there's no truth in that either."

The modern German, not the ancient Greek, was to be the true connoisseur of the Sophist movement, and from Hegel on, philosophy has been in the habit of regarding the Sophist as the forerunner of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Turning the attention from nature in general to human nature in particular, Sophistry made possible the Problem of Knowledge.

Protagoras, still retaining a reminiscence of the Eleatic 'being' and 'non-being,' but making the whole question internal and humanistic, says:

> "Man is a measure of all things, of things that are, that they are; and of things that are not, that they are not."

The inherent weakness of this doctrine appears in the logical subjectivism and ethical egoism of the Sophist who finds in "man" only the individual. In the Theœtetus, Plato makes Socrates discuss the question, as follows:

> *Socrates*—Well, you have delivered yourself of a very important doctrine about knowledge; it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing it. Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are not. You have read him?
>
> *Theœtetus.*—Oh, yes, again and again.
>
> *Soc.*—Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?
>
> *Theœt.*—Yes, he says so.
>
> *Soc.*—A wise man is not likely to talk nonsense. Let us try to understand him: the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold?
>
> *Theœt.*—Quite true.
>
> *Soc.*—Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us, but absolutely, cold or not; or are we to say, with

Protagoras, that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not?

Theæt.—I suppose the last.

Soc.—Then it must appear so to each of them?

Theæt.—Yes.

Soc.—And 'appears to him' means the same as 'he perceives.'

Theæt.—True.

Soc.—Then, appearing and perceiving coincide in the case of hot and cold, and in similar instances; for things appear, or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives them?

Theæt.—Yes.

Soc.—Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?

Theæt.—Clearly.

Soc.—In the name of the Graces, what an almighty wise man Protagoras must have been! He spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, like you and me, but told the truth, 'his Truth,' in secret to his own disciples.

With true Sophistic art and with reference to the Eleatic philosophy of being, Gorgias introduces a triple form of intellectualistic nihilism, involving 'being,' 'knowledge,' and the 'communication of truth.' In his work 'On Nature, or the Non-Existent,' he (Gorgias) arranges his discussion under three heads: First, nothing exists; second, if anything did exist we could never know it; third, if perchance a man should come to know it, it would remain a secret, since he would be unable to describe it to his fellow-men.

Since Socrates is clearly detached from Sophistry as a spurious form of philosophy, no harm can come to his great name if he be spoken of as participating in the Sophist question of knowledge viewed humanistically. Where Protagoras made man the measure of all things, Socrates gave commandment, "Know thyself." Where the

Sophist had looked to man in his individual, Socrates regarded him in his total, capacity. Thus he unites the standpoints of the Protagorean 'man' and the Anaxagorean 'mind.'

But with his disdain for physical speculation, he turned away from Anaxagoras, who did not seem to give him any just conception of mind. Thus it is related of him in Plato's Phædo:

> "When I was young, I had a prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called the investigation of nature; to know the causes of things, and why a thing is and is created or destroyed appeared to me to be a lofty profession. Then I heard some one reading, as he said, from a book of Anaxagoras, that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was delighted at this notion, which appeared quite admirable. What expectations I had formed and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities."

The service of Socrates was two-fold: he made logic and ethics possible as sciences. On the one hand, he developed the concept, or general notion; on the other, he made virtue philosophically conceivable and, as he thought, communicable. Said Aristotle: "There are two things that one would rightly attribute to Socrates: inductive reasoning and universal definition. And in fact these two things are the very foundations of knowledge. But Socrates did not give his universals, or his definitions, separate existence. Others, however, did, and called such reals 'ideas.'"

As the scientific Aristotle discovered the logical in Socrates, Xenophon, the man of affairs, found in him the moralist. Thus, he is quoted: "When some one asked him what object of study he thought best for a man, he

replied, 'Good conduct.' When he asked him again whether he thought 'good fortune' an object of study, he answered, '"Fortune" and "Conduct" I think entirely opposed; for, for a person to light on anything that he wants without seeking it, I consider to be "good fortune," but to achieve anything successfully by learning and study, I regard as "good conduct"; and those who make this their object of study appear to me to do well.'"

With this dual service, Socrates preserves the unity of his philosophic principle, by using the general idea to define virtue, and by describing virtue in terms of knowledge. Socrates' conception of virtue, as well as his method of instructing a disciple by revealing his ignorance, appears in the following selection from the Meno-dialogue:

> *Socrates.*—By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; altho I have been just saying that I have never found anybody who had.
>
> *Meno.*—There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. Let us take first the virtue of a man—he should know how to administer the state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends and harm his enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm himself. A woman's virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also be easily described: her duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue; there are virtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates.
>
> *Socrates.*—How fortunate I am, Meno. When I ask you for one virtue, you present me with a swarm of

them, which are in your keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer me?

Meno.—O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are casting your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to answer you; and tho I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and to many persons—and very good ones they were, as I thought—at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is.

Just as Socrates was introduced by the Sophists, so he was followed by the Socratics, Aristippus, the Cyrenaic (435 B.C.), and Antisthenes, the Cynic (444 B.C.). According to the account given by Sextus Empiricus, "The Cyrenaics said that the feelings were the criteria of truth, that they alone could be apprehended and were not misleading. On the other hand the causes of the feelings, one and all, are incomprehensible and the source of false opinion. For whenever we experience a white color or a sweet taste we can speak without fear of being misled or refuted; but what it is that causes the feeling white or sweet, that we cannot tell."

As the Cyrenaics had emphasized pleasure, the Cynics

upheld virtue. From Diogenes Laertius we have the following account of Antisthenes: "The doctrines he adopted were these: He used to insist that virtue was a thing which might be taught; also, that the nobly born and virtuously disposed were the same people; for that virtue was of itself sufficient for happiness, and was in need of nothing, except the strength of Socrates. He also looked upon virtue as a species of work, not wanting many arguments, or much instruction; and he taught that the wise man was sufficient for himself; for that everything that belonged to any one else belonged to him. He considered obscurity of fame a good thing, and equally good with labor. And he used to say that the wise man would regulate his conduct as a citizen, not according to the established laws of the state, but according to the law of virtue."

Both in person and philosophic character, Plato rather than Socrates was to become the Greek ideal. A free, creative thinker, who combined artistic constructiveness with ethical criticism, he deserves the extraordinary tribute of Emerson: "Plato is philosophy, and philosophy is Plato." The sources of Plato's philosophy may be retraced to the first period of Greek speculation. From Parmenides he learned to look for the permanent in thought, while he shares with Heraclitus the distrust of ever-changing impressions. The Pythagoreans taught him that as things might exist through imitation of numbers, so they might be conceived of as existing by participation in the "ideas." It was Socrates' principle of definition which led him to formulate his doctrine of the idea as real, while the Megarian school showed him how the good could be regarded as the highest form of reality. The method of division adopted by Plato's school affords the best means of outlining his doctrine: it was dialectics, physics, ethics.

Plato's idealism, expressed in the form of dialectic, arose in connection with the 'erotic,' or doctrine of philo-

sophic love, described in the 'Symposium,' as also in the 'Phædrus.' Thus, in the 'Symposium,' Socrates asks:

"What then is Love?" I asked. "Is he mortal?"

"No."

"What then?"

"As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two."

"What is he, Diotima?"

"He is a great spirit (dæmon), and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal."

In developing his doctrine of ideas, Plato builds upon the Socratic principle of definition. According to Socrates, if man is to have knowledge of virtue, he must have general definitions, or concepts. Plato argued that these definitions must have objects corresponding to them, for there could be no general notion or concept of objects of sense which are in a constant flux. The objects of the general notions he called 'ideas,' and as Socrates had claimed, if man is to have knowledge he must have general definitions, Plato adds: If these concepts are to be valid they must also be real. In the 'Timæus' he argues:

"Thus I state my view: If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and apprehended only by the mind; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm them to be distinct, for they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; the one is implanted in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by true reason, the other is without reason; the one cannot be overcome by persuasion, but the other can; and lastly, every man may be said to share in true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods and of very few men. Wherefore also we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is

always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is granted to intelligence only. And there is another nature of the same name with it, and like to it, perceived by sense, created, always in motion, becoming in place and again vanishing out of place, which is apprehended by opinion and sense."

But how may be explained the existence of particular things perceived by the senses? Plato seeks to account for the particular by making it participate in the universal idea. Thus Parmenides inquires of Socrates:

Parmenides.—But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; that similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity; and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful because they partake of justice and beauty?

Socrates.—Yes, certainly; that is my meaning.

Parmenides.—Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea? Can there be any other mode of participation?

Socrates.—There cannot be.

This "participation" is further explained in terms of 'imitation' and 'assimilation.'

Parmenides.—Then, if you say that everything else participates in the ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of thoughts, and that all things think; or that they are thoughts but have no thought?

Socrates.—The latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous one. In my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and other things are like them, and resemblances of them

—what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.

In the development of his idealism, Plato advances beyond the doctrine of universal idea and the participation therein of the particular, by a theory of intuition which finds the universal in the particular, as also by a theory of memory whereby it is claimed that we possess knowledge of ideas in the form of memories of impressions received in a previous state of existence.

The two apparently distinct topics of physics and ethics may be treated together, inasmuch as Plato, like Hobbes and Spencer, discusses the physico-political problem according to a common principle in nature. With Plato, this is a principle of division. Since the world was modeled according to man, it reveals 'body,' 'soul,' 'mind,' which correspond to 'appetite,' 'desire,' 'reason.'

Such is the triple world-plan of the Timæus, wherein is said:

> "Now the deeds of the best could never be or have been other than the fairest; and the Creator, reflecting on the things which are by nature visible, found that no unintelligent creature taken as a whole was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole; and that intelligence could not be present in anything which was devoid of soul. For which reason, when he was framing the universe, he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, that he might be the creator of a work which was by nature fairest and best. Wherefore, using the language of probability, we may say that the world became a living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence by the providence of God."

On the ethico-political side, practically the same principle of division reappears. Aside from the universal principle of justice, three virtues arise in correspondence with the three parts of man: the bodily virtue of 'temperance,' the soul virtue of 'courage,' the rational virtue of 'wisdom.'

Upon this tripartite basis, Plato arranges men into so many classes of the 'Republic':

Plato.—Then it would seem, my friend, that to do one's own business, in some shape or other, is justice. Do you know whence I infer this?

Glaucon.—No; be so good as to tell me.

Plato.—I think that the remainder left in the state, after eliminating the qualities which we have considered, I mean temperance, and courage, and wisdom, must be that which made their entrance into it possible, and which preserves them there so long as they exist in it. Now we affirmed that the remaining quality, when three out of the four were found, would be justice. . . . Here then, after a hard struggle, we have, tho with difficulty, reached the land; and we are pretty well satisfied that there are corresponding divisions, equal in number, in a state, and in the soul of every individual.

Glaucon.—True

Plato.—Then does it not necessarily follow that, as and whereby the state was wise, so and thereby the individual is wise?

Glaucon.—Without doubt it does.

Plato.—And that as and whereby the individual is brave, so and thereby is the state brave; and that everything conducing to virtue which is possessed by the one, finds its counterpart in the other?

Glaucon.—It must be so.

Plato.—Then we shall also assert, I imagine, Glaucon, that a man is just, in the same way in which we found the state to be just.

Glaucon.—This too is a necessary corollary.

Plato.—But surely we have not allowed ourselves to forget, that what makes the state just, is the fact of each of the three classes therein doing its own work.

The doctrine of Aristotle completes the triology begun with Socrates, expounded with Plato, and now perfected

by the Peripatetic School. Where Socrates used insight and Plato systematization, Aristotle made the application of philosophy to the rich content of Hellenic civilization and culture.

As a philosophic personality, Aristotle affords a striking contrast to Plato, yet this must not be applied so uncritically that, as in Raphael's cartoon, "The School of Athens," Plato's forefinger shall point to the skies, while Aristotle's hand shall stretch out toward the earth. Both are idealists, and while the difference between them is marked, it consists of the academic and technical. In Plato is observed the power of reflection, in Aristotle the influence of research. Where Plato follows a single dialectical line of speculation, Aristotle's encyclopedic method embraces the varied data of science and art. In logic Plato employs the concept, or idea; Aristotle makes use of the judgment. In metaphysics, Plato adopts the static principle of Parmenides and exalts 'substance'; Aristotle follows the dynamic tendency of Heraclitus and introduces 'causality.' Psychologically compared, Plato is an intellectualist while Aristotle inclines toward voluntarism.

In the theory of idealism the figure of two triangles, placed base to base, affords graphic representation of the three schools. Socrates, who begins with the particular, starts at the upper point and proceeds downward to general definition, at the base of the upper triangle. Plato establishes this common base-line of the two triangles by making the universal definitions real ideas. Aristotle begins with the universal and, by a process of inference, returns to the particular at the lower point of the second triangle. In this manner Aristotle seeks to intellectualize the world of sense-impressions. "All philosophy," said Aristotle, "is either theoretical, practical or esthetical."

Aristotle criticises and then reconstructs the theory of ideas as it came from the school of Plato. In his own words:

"With regard to the philosophers who introduced ideas as causes, we have in the first place this objection to offer, that in seeking to find an explanation of the things that exist they have introduced other realities equal in number; just as if one should try to count a number of objects and should suppose that he could not do so if the number were small, but that he would have no difficulty if he made the number larger.

"The second objection we have to offer is that of all the proofs which we bring forward for the existence of ideas there is no real evidence, for in the case of some of our arguments the conclusion does not necessarily follow, and in the case of others, ideas are also proved to exist for things for which we do not assume the existence of any ideas.

"But the most serious objection of all is this: What in the world do the ideas contribute to the things of sense, either to those that are imperishable or to those that arise and perish? For they are not the cause of any motion or change in them. On the contrary, they help us not a whit toward the knowledge of things other than themselves (for they are not the substances of those things, else they would be present in them), nor do they explain their existence, not being present in the things that participate in them. To call the ideas 'patterns,' and to say that other things 'participate' in them, is to use words void of meaning or to talk in poetical metaphor."

Upon the metaphysical side Aristotle emphasizes the place of causality in the world and thus distinguishes four kinds of causes:

"One meaning of the word cause is the matter from which anything comes into being. For example, bronze is the material cause of the statue. . . . A second meaning is form and pattern. This is the same as the essential notion. . . . In the third place

cause means the principle which produces change or puts a stop to it. For example, one who gives advice is cause in this sense, or the father is cause of the child. Finally cause is used as meaning end or purpose—*i.e.*, as that for the sake of which anything is done."

Like Greek ethics in general, Aristotle's system was 'eudæmonistic,' inasmuch as it made happiness the best thing in the world. In developing this notion of the highest good, the "Nichomachean Ethics," Aristotle finds virtue-happiness, as it may be called, to consist in 'activity,' whose essence is 'moderation,' as its highest form is that of 'contemplation.' The elements of well-being follow from the nature and function of man. Hence Aristotle inquires:

"But can we suppose that, while a carpenter or a cobbler has a function and a business of his own, man has no business and no function assigned him by nature? Nay, surely as his several members, eye and hand and foot, plainly have each its own function, so we must suppose that man also has some function over and above all these.

"The good of man is exercise of his faculties in accordance with excellence or virtue."

The activism of this general view of man's life Aristotle carries over into his view of happiness, whose nature consists, not in pleasure, but in activity. Happiness is "an energy of the soul according to the best and most perfect virtue in a perfect life. Energy promotes pleasure, but pleasure perfects energy."

Human activity is to be qualified by moderation if it is to become excellence, and thus arises the 'Golden Mean' as the criterion of virtue:

"Virtue is a mean state between two vices, one in excess, the other in defect. Now on the subject of fear and confidence, courage is the mean state. Of the persons who are in the excess, he who is in the

excess of fearlessness has no name, but there are many cases without names, and he who is in the excess of confidence is called rash; but he who is in the excess of fear but in the defect of confidence is cowardly. On the subject of honor and dishonor, magnanimity is the mean; the excess a vice called empty vanity, the defect meanness of spirit."

The highest form of activity consists in the excess of mental rather than moral activities, wherefore he says:

"But if happiness be the exercise of virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it will be the exercise of the highest virtue, and that will be the virtue or excellence of the best part of us.

"Now that part or faculty—call it reason or what you will—which seems naturally to rule and take the lead and to apprehend things noble and divine—whether it be itself divine or only the divinest part of us—is the faculty the exercise of which, in its proper excellence, will be perfect happiness.

"As far, therefore, as contemplation extends, so far does happiness, and whoever have more capacity for contemplation have more happiness."

Aristotle's esthetical philosophy is determined according to ethical principles, as the following quotation from his 'Poetics' will show.

"Tragedy, therefore, is an imitation of a worthy or illustrious and perfect action possessing magnitude, in pleasing language, using separately the several species of imitation in its parts by men acting and not through narration through pity and fear effecting a purification from such like passions."

By means of such ideas of art and happiness Aristotle conducts Grecian thought to its final form as a philosophy of life. From the Academy and Lyceum philosophy passes to the Stoa and Garden.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF LIFE

With the death of Aristotle, Greek philosophy entered into a period of decadence, incident upon the decline of Athenian civilization and culture. But, as periods of depression and doubt are often productive of spiritual ideals, as shown in the instances of Buddhism, of Hebrew prophecy and of Christianity, so these final schools of speculation among the ancients evoked humanistic ideals unknown among the earlier and greater thinkers. With Stoicism was this especially true and the history of philosophy must note the use of such ideals as 'conscience,' 'duty,' 'humanity,' 'natural rights,' 'world-citizenship.' Indicating a general return to the ethical philosophy of Socrates, the Stoics and Epicureans carried on the work begun by the Socratic schools of Cynics and Cyrenaics respectively. In the Stoa, or Porch, are found Zeno (born 340 B.C.) and Marcus Aurelius (121-180 A.D.). In the Garden of Epicureanism were found Epicurus (born 342 B.C.) and Lucretius (95-52 B.C.).

While Stoicism is usually associated with a characteristic life-doctrine, it did not fail to originate a method of investigating the world-ground. First with Heraclitus and then with the Sophists Greek thought had encountered the problem of scattered sense-impressions which seemed to forbid knowledge with its forms of universality and necessity. The Stoics discovered a way of viewing sensation in a sedate and consistent form, after the manner of modern empiricism.

The Stoics present a new view of knowledge when they show how the mind acquires impressions by perception, whence it passes to judgment. According to the account of Sextus Empiricus, "'Demonstration' they define to be a method by which one proceeds from that which is more known to that which is less. 'Perception,' again, is an impression produced on the mind, its name being appropriately borrowed from impressions on wax made by a seal; and perception they divide into perception which has convincing power and perception which lacks convincing power. Perception which has convincing power—and this they call the criterion of facts—is produced by a real object, and is therefore at the same time conformable to that object. Perception which lacks convincing power has no relation to any real object, or else, if it has any such relation, does not correspond to it, being but a vague and indistinct representation."

The Stoics laid down as their general principle in ethics that "man should live according to nature," as this is known to the mind in theoretical philosophy. This appears in the review of their philosophical views given by Diogenes Laertius. "Zeno was the first writer," he says, "who, in his 'Treatise on the Nature of Man,' said that the chief good was confessedly to live according to nature, which is to live according to virtue, for nature leads us to this point. And in like manner Cleanthes speaks in his 'Treatise on Pleasure' and so do Posidonius and Hecaton in their essays on 'Ends' and the 'Chief Good.' And again, to live according to virtue is the same thing as living according to one's experience of those things which happen by nature, as Chrysippus explains it in the first book of his 'Treatise on the Chief Good.'"

In a more definite fashion, Stoicism insists upon the 'unity of virtue,' an idea which tends to forbid any division of man into classes with their particular virtues, as urged by Plato in the 'Republic.' Says Diogenes Laertius again: "And they lay down the position that all offenses are equal,

as Chrysippus argues in the fourth book of his 'Ethic Questions,' and so say Persæus and Zeno. For if one thing that is true is not more true than another thing that is true, neither is one thing that is false more false than another thing that is false; so, too, one deceit is not greater than another nor one sin than another. For the man who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus and the man who is only one are both equally not in Canopus; and so, too, he who commits a greater sin and he who commits a less are both equally not in the right path."

Like the Cynics, they believed that virtue was sufficient, needing nothing in the way of knowledge or good fortune to render the life of man complete. Thus "another doctrine of the Stoics is, that there is nothing intermediate between virtue and vice, while the Peripatetics assert that there is a stage between virtue and vice, being an improvement on vice which has not yet arrived at virtue. For the Stoics say that as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust and cannot be more just than just or more unjust than unjust, and that the same rule applies to all cases." The virtuous man of Stoicism developed a character which ended in apathy, for in the possession of virtue he became indifferent to other advantages.

Like the Stoics, the Epicureans connect a theory of matter as the world-ground with a belief in pleasure as the goal of life. Epicurus (342-270 B.C.) and Lucretius (96-55 B.C.) uphold such a form of philosophy. In his letter to Herodotus, Epicurus discusses a sensational theory of knowledge which serves to introduce his materialistic theory of being and the mind. Therein he writes:

> "One must not forget that the production of images is simultaneous with the thought, for from the surface of the bodies images of this kind are continually flowing off in an insensible manner indeed, because they are immediately replaced. They preserve for a long time the same disposition and the same arrange-

ment that the atoms do in the solid body, altho, notwithstanding, their form may be sometimes altered. The direct production of images in space is equally instantaneous, because these images are only light substances destitute of depth."

Epicurus can offer only a materialistic explanation of the world of things and of persons, as the following selections from the letter to Herodotus will show:

"And, first of all, we must admit that nothing can come of that which does not exist; for, were the fact otherwise, then everything would be produced from everything, and there would be no need of any seed. And if that which disappeared were so absolutely destroyed as to become non-existent, then everything would soon perish, as the things with which they would be dissolved would have no existence. But, in truth, the universal whole always was such as it now is, and always will be such. For there is nothing into which it can change, for there is nothing beyond this universal whole which can penetrate into it and produce any change in it.

"Let us now return to the study of the affections and of the sensations, for this will be the best method of proving that the soul is a bodily substance composed of slight particles, diffused over all the members of the body, and presenting a great analogy to a sort of spirit, having an admixture of heat, resembling at one time one and at another time the other of those two principles. There exists in it a special part, endowed with an extreme mobility, in consequence of the exceeding slightness of the elements which compose it, and also in reference to its more immediate sympathy with the rest of the body."

At a later period Lucretius endeavored to account for movement in the world by advancing the idea of the "rain of atoms." This he worded in the following form:

"This point too herein we wish you to apprehend;

When bodies are borne downward sheer through void by their own weights, at quite uncertain times and uncertain spots they push themselves a little from their course; you just and only just can call it a change of inclination. If they were not used to swerve, they would all fall down, like drops of rain, through the deep void, and no clashing would have been begotten nor blow produced among the first-beginnings: thus nature never would have produced aught."

While Epicurus advanced a hedonism which finds life to consist of pleasure alone, he advances beyond the Cyrenaics by distinguishing between temporary and permanent enjoyment. Thus his hedonic calculation involves not only the attribute of 'intensity' but that of 'duration.' Thus he declares:

"And we must consider that some of the passions are natural and some empty, and of the natural ones some are necessary and some merely natural. And of the necessary ones some are necessary to happiness, others are necessary that the body may be exempt from trouble, and others, again, merely in order that life itself may be; for a correct theory, with regard to these things, can refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the imperturbability of the soul, since this is the end of living happily.

"For then we have need of pleasure when we grieve, because pleasure is not present; but when we do not grieve, then we have no need of pleasure; and on this account we affirm that pleasure is the beginning and end of living happily; for we have recognised this as the first good, being connate with us; and it is with reference to it that we begin every choice and avoidance; and to this we come as if we judged of all good by passion as the standard; and, since this is the first good and connate with us, on this account we do not choose every pleasure, but at times we pass over many

pleasures when any difficulty is likely to ensue from them; and we think many pains better than pleasure, when a greater pleasure follows them, if we endure the pain for a time."

With his materialistic view of the world and his hedonic estimate of life Epicurus believed justice to be purely relative, a view advanced by Hobbes at the beginning of modern philosophy. This is seen in the following aphorisms:

"Natural justice is a covenant of what is suitable, leading men to avoid injuring one another and being injured.

"Justice has no independent existence; it results from mutual contracts and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury.

"In a general point of view, justice is the same thing to every one, for there is something advantageous in mutual society. Nevertheless, the difference of place and divers other circumstances make justice vary.

"From the moment that a thing declared just by the law is generally recognised as useful for the mutual relations of men, it becomes really just, whether it is universally regarded as such or not.

"But if, on the contrary, a thing established by law is not really useful for the social relations, then it is not just.

"The just man is the freest of all men from disquietude, but the unjust man is a perpetual prey to it."

While this view was the opposite of the Stoical conception of rights, and while, indeed, the two schools pursued different methods, their conclusions as to life were practically the same. Stoicism sought as its ideal 'apathy' which should follow from the pursuit of virtue; Epicureanism urged itself on toward an 'ataraxy,' or a freedom from disturbance superior to all positive pleasure.

CHAPTER V

MEDIEVALISM

To DEPART from the usual method of dividing the history of philosophy into three periods—ancient, medieval and modern—makes necessary two observations: It must be pointed out that paganism and Christianity were so opposed that a great gulf is fixed between the ancient and medieval periods, and it must be shown that the most significant modern problems arose in the development of medievalism. Modernism really begins with the end of antiquity, and the very term 'modernus' traces back to the sixth century. Thus in the more liberal sense of the term, modern philosophy begins with the earliest Christian thinker who began to reason upon the basis of the modern contrasts of subject and object, spirit and matter, freedom and necessity, good and bad.

While it is customary to look to the Aryans, especially the Indo-Greco-Germans, for speculative principles, the Christian religion so detached itself from the practical trend of Semitism that it was able to furnish Europe with new ideas of the world-ground, as well as new ideals of the life-goal. Christianity's speculative principles centered in the ideas of the soul as a unity, the world as a world-whole and God as the absolute in and above both humanity and nature. The contrast between spirit and matter, fully appreciated by Descartes in the seventeenth century, was put in the form of a value judgment: "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?

Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" This distinction between inner and outer had the effect of establishing the unity and independence of the soul, whose psychological nature was to be discussed later by Augustine as also by Descartes. In the nineteenth century three distinct characterizations of Christianity were suggested by Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer respectively.

First.—The world of souls or persons whose intrinsic value and ethical destiny made them free constitute an independent realm, called the "Kingdom of God," not unlike Plato's ideal 'Republic.' It was the idea of the kingdom that Kant postulated as the central truth of Christianity. Since the days of Kant this idea has been systematized in the theology of Albrect Ritschl. The New Testament places the kingdom as the goal of human life and considers it the realization of the moral ideal of blessedness. The following precepts portray this aspect:

"Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

"Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted.

"Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.

"Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.

"Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.

"Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.

"Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.

"Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."

Second.—Just as Plato had looked upon the created world as the only-begotten of God, so Hegel found in the Fatherhood of God and the idea of the Son of God another form of the Christian religion. God was viewed as the

indwelling principle of the world, investing it with His Being, instructing man with His Spirit. The Gospel according to St. John opens with a statement concerning the relation of God to the world. It is stated thus:

"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

"The same was in the beginning with God.

"All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made.

"In him was life; and the life was the light of men.

"And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not."

Third.—From man's position in the divine Kingdom, as well as from his possession of a divine life, it follows that the life of man must be renounced and all resentment abandoned. The spiritual citizen of the Kingdom of God is thus raised to such a height that he is ready to deny himself in the flesh just as he breathes an atmosphere of unselfish love. In the recorded sayings it takes the following form:

"Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth:

"But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.

"And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also.

"And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain.

"Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away.

"Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy.

"But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you;

"For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's, the same shall save it."

Altho the speculative work of the Church Fathers was given up almost wholly to defining and defending the Christian faith, metaphysical elements did not fail to appear. The influence of paganism may have ended on the practical side, so that the virtues of the ancients were looked upon as "splendid vices," but the Church was not at all inclined to repudiate the speculative authority of classic philosophy. To both the fathers and schoolmen Plato and Aristotle were theological mainstays. Yet the strictly Christian tendency was not prevented by the theological adoption of Ancient Philosophy. With the Patristic Philosophy arose the ideals of "transcendence of being over the world" and the "inwardness of human consciousness." Plotinus (205-270 A.D.) excels Aristotle, Augustine (354-430 A.D.) advances beyond Plato.

Where pagan thought has been 'immanental,' finding reality within things, Christian philosophy became 'transcendental.' The speculative path to transcendence was poined out by Plotinus. Contrasting his own view with Plato's, he said:

"Plato says that the One is ineffable in spoken or written word. We speak and write of it, however, that we may dispatch our spirits toward it and rouse them from the contemplation of mere concepts to the vision of it." In pursuing this idea of the ineffable One, Plotinus is so heedless of paradox that he describes God as beyond thinking and being, beyond happiness and goodness.

"What now is the One? What is its nature? It is no wonder that we cannot easily say, in view of the fact that neither existence nor form is easily described. Yet our knowledge is based upon forms and concepts. But the more the soul proceeds into the formless, the more she becomes unable to comprehend it, because it

is indefinable and lacks the impress of variety. How the intellect can behold either what is prior to itself or its own nature or what comes after it. Pure is its own nature, but still purer and simpler what are or rather is prior to it. This is not intellect but prior to intellect. For intellect is something which exists. But this other nature is not something, but is prior to everything. It is not an existence, for what exists has the form of existence, and it is formless, even without intelligible form. I say this, because the nature of the One being the creator of all things is itself no one of them. So it is not a thing, nor quality, nor quantity, nor intellect, nor soul, nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in space, nor in time, but is the absolutely 'monoform,' or rather formless, prior to all form, prior to motion, prior to rest."

Altho the Neo-Platonist Plotinus speaks of 'creation,' his conception of God's relation to the world is one of emanation. Departing from the Old Testament notion that God created the world in time and in the spirit of St. John's Gospel, Plotinus formulates a view which reappears in Augustinian theology as 'eternal generation.' He says:

"The One is all things and yet no one of them. For the origin of all things is itself, not they, yet all things are in their origin, inasmuch as they may all be traced back to their source. It is better, perhaps, to say that in their origin they exist not as present but as future things. How then can they proceed from the One in its simplicity, in whose self-identity there is no appearance of variety or duality whatsoever? I reply, for the very reason that none of them was in the One, are all of them derived from it. Furthermore, in order that they may be real existences, the One is not an existence, but the father of existences. And the generation of existence is as it were the first act of generation. Being perfect by reason of neither seeking

nor possessing nor needing anything, the One overflows as it were, and what overflows forms another hypostasis. Thus fire heats and cold chills and drugs have their appropriate effects upon other things, and all things imitate their origins as they are able with a view to their everlasting self-perpetuation and goodness."

While the list of Nicene Fathers reveals the fact that Augustine was anticipated, it is to him that the quest must turn for the first clear statement of the soul as 'self-consciousness.' Like Descartes in modern times, Augustine found a sure way to inner experience by means of doubt. This appears in his "Soliloquies," wherein he says:

"Thou who wilt know thyself, knowest thou that thou art? I know. Whence knowest thou? I know not. Feelest thou thyself to be simple or manifold? I know not. Knowest thou thyself to be moved? I know not. Knowest thou thyself to think? I know. Therefore it is true that thou thinkest. True."

Augustine's view of God and the world stands midway between Plotinus' notion of a will-less emanation and the popular idea of creation in time. Augustine advocated belief in an eternal generation of the world.

The spirit of Scholasticism may be understood as an effort on the part of the Church to spread its doctrines abroad among undisciplined people. Having determined the essence of Christian faith, it became necessary to give reason for it. No longer was it possible to say, "I believe, because it is absurd." One must rather declare, "I believe, in order that I may understand." The various questions of Church and theology were discussed in connection with the problem of 'Realism' and 'Nominalism,' which was taken up in the earlier period of Scholasticism, as was also that of the supremacy of intellect or will, discussed later under the form of 'Thomism' and 'Scotism.' Scholasticism rises with the Carlovingian Empire, when Charlemagne appointed Alcuin (736-804) a teacher in his

palace school. The first systematic work of Scholasticism was carried on by Scotus Erigena, who lived between 800 and 900. Erigena's liberal theism was followed by Anselm (1035-1109), whose ontological proof of the Divine Existence established Realism. Among the Realists was William of Champeaux (1070-1121), among the Nominalists Roscellinus. Between the contending parties stands Abelard (1079-1142) with his 'Conceptualism.'

While the position of Scotus Erigena is scholastic as is also the pedagogical form of his work, 'Concerning the Division of Nature,' the dialectical side of his system seems to be turned toward the fathers before rather than the schoolmen after him. In general it was the fate of his system to further the transcendental idea of God that Plotinus had introduced into Christian philosophy, an idea reappearing in a more consistent form with the Augustinian theory of eternal generation whereby creation and preservation were regarded as one. For himself Erigena agrees with Augustine, but seems to lay most stress upon the opinions of Dionysius the Areopagite, who regarded the Deity in a negative manner as beyond being. Erigena identifies God with nature and turns away from the idea of the creation of the world in time. God Himself is the hyper-real, since no human category, not even that of 'being,' may properly apply to Him. God is not a 'this' in distinction from a 'that'; He is the All.

Erigena may entertain more traditional ideas of the Deity, but all such conceptions are subsumed under the mystic and pantheistic idea of the ineffable One. This will appear in his characteristic division of nature:

> "The division of nature is to be understood in four distinct forms. Nature is divided first into that which creates but is not itself created, then into that which is created and creates; thirdly, into that which is created and does not create; fourthly, that which is not created and does not create. Of these four divisions

two are mutually opposed, the third to the first, the fourth to the second."

The name of Anselm is closely associated with the ontological proof of the existence of God. Greek philosophy with Parmenides and Plato had connected thinking with being and Augustine had observed the relation between the idea of God and His existence. Anselm endeavored to prove that to deny the existence of the Deity, as the fool says in his heart, 'non est deus,' is to indulge in logical contradiction. In modern philosophy Descartes and the school of Leibnitz restated the ontological argument for which they were criticized by Kant. Anselm's 'Proslogium' uses the general argument that, since we have the idea of God, He must exist, otherwise we should not have the idea. In sharper logical fashion he asserts that a being which exists in understanding and in reality is more perfect than one which exists in understanding alone. Hence the idea of God as the most perfect being includes His existence as well as the idea of Him. Therefore he declares:

"Even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For when he hears this, he understands it. And whatever is understood exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone, then it can be conceived to exist in reality, which is greater.

"Therefore if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is One, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality."

The 'Monologium' speaks of the Deity as a certain Nature through which all things exist. His argument, which follows, is cosmological rather than ontological:

"Therefore not only are all good things such through something that is one and the same and all great things such through something that is one and the same, but whatever is apparently exists through something that is one and the same. For everything that is exists through something or through nothing. But nothing exists through nothing, for it is altogether inconceivable that anything should not exist by virtue of something."

The development of philosophy was not deepened to any great extent by the new life felt by modern science and art in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. As a movement the Renaissance reveals the method of medieval speculation, although the individualistic spirit of the former serves to prepare the way for modernism as such. Here was witnessed the study of "pure Platonism" and a contrast between the scholastic view of Aristotle and purified form of Aristotelianism. In the revival of these and other systems the Renaissance presents a picture of industrious research rather than one of consistent reflection, and its philosophy, if indeed such a thing existed, was a syncretism of antique principles. Where the way to a new form of speculation was opened by Paracelsus and Campanella in physics, by Machiavelli and Gentilis in politics, systematic thinking was carried on by Bruno (1548-1600) and Bacon (1561-1626).

The significant thing in Bruno's conception of the universe consists in an esthetical monism which finds God to be the indwelling and animating principle of the world. At the beginning of Christianity Plotinus had suggested the same truth with his theory of emanation. Augustine added to it in connection with the notion of eternal generation; Scotus Erigena furthered the principle when he postulated a "nature which neither is created nor creates." After Bruno it appeared in Schelling's romantic idealism. In his work, 'Concerning the Cause,' Bruno declares:

"The universal intellect is the most intimate, real

and essential faculty and effective part of the world-soul. By us this intellect is called the inner artificer, because it forms and shapes material objects from within, as from within the seed or the root is sent forth and unfolded the trunk, from within the trunk are put forth the branches, from within the branches the finished twigs and from within the twigs unfurl the buds, and there within are woven like nerves, leaves, flowers and fruits; and inversely, at certain times the sap is recalled from the flowers and fruits to the twigs, from the twigs to the branches, from the branches to the trunk and from the trunk to the root. Just so it is with animals; its work proceeding from the original seed, and from the center of the heart, to the external members, and from these finally gathering back to the heart the unfolded powers, it behaves as if again knotting together spun-out threads.

"Now, since we believe that even inanimate works, such as we know how to produce with a certain order, imitatively working on the surface of matter, are not produced without forethought and mind—as when, cutting and sculpturing a piece of wood, we bring forth the effigy of a horse: how much greater must we believe is that creative intelligence which, from the interior of the germinal matter, brings forth the bones, extends the cartilage, hollows out the arteries, breathes into the pores, weaves the fibers, forms the branching nerves and with such admirable mastery arranges the whole? I say, how much greater an artificer is He who is not restricted to one sole part of the material world, but operates continually throughout the whole. There are three sorts of intelligence—the divine, which is all things; the mundane, which makes all things, and the other kinds of spirits which become everything."

Like Bruno, Francis Bacon is to be considered a child of the Renaissance rather than of the Enlightenment. It

is true that he indicated the way to a new method of philosophical speculation, viz., 'induction,' but with respect to the actual problems of physics and politics he failed to adopt the advanced views of his friend Hobbes. According to Lombroso, Bacon refused to accept the Copernican astronomy and laughed at the application of mathematics to the problems of physics. On the political side Bacon was blind to the principles of natural rights, as these were upheld by Bodin, Gentilis and Grotius, and, as Lerminier has pointed out, the word 'jus,' in the sense of universal rights, is not once to be found in all the writings of Bacon.

While it is the fashion to regard Bacon as the founder of modern scientific method, it seems wiser to lend his influence to the question of 'culture,' a term introduced by Bacon in his 'Advancement of Learning' (1605). Like Aristotle, whom in many ways he affected to despise, Bacon upholds the man of thought rather than the man of action and finds the highest form of human activity to consist in the "work of contemplation." He affirms:

> "After the Creation was finished, it was set down unto us that man was placed in the garden to work therein, which work so appointed to him could be no other than work of contemplation; that is when the end of work is but for exercise and experiment, not for necessity."

Even in his scientific speculations Bacon employs imagery rather than the sedate language of experience, and in seeking to rid man of his prejudices he calls attention to certain false tendencies besetting the mind:

> "There are four classes of idols which beset men's minds. To these for distinction's sake I have assigned names, calling the first class Idols of the Tribe; the second, Idols of the Cave; the third, Idols of the Market-place; the fourth, Idols of the Theater.
>
> "The Idols of the Tribe have their foundation in human nature itself and in the tribe or race of men.

For it is a false assertion that the sense of man is the measure of things. On the contrary, all perceptions as well of the sense as of the mind are according to the measure of the individual and not according to the measure of the universe. And the human understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolors the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it.

"The Idols of the Cave are the idols of the individual man. For every one (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den of his own, which refracts and discolors the light of nature, owing either to his own proper and peculiar nature, or to his education and conversation with others, or to the reading of books and the authority of those whom he esteems and admires, or to the differences of impressions accordingly as they take place in a mind preoccupied and predisposed or in a mind indifferent and settled or the like.

"There are also idols formed by the intercourse and association of men with each other, which I call Idols of the Market-place, on account of the commerce and consort of men there. For it is by discourse that men associate, and words are imposed according to the apprehension of the vulgar. And therefore the ill and unfit choice of words wonderfully obstructs the understanding.

"Lastly there are idols which immigrated into men's minds from the various dogmas of philosophies and also from wrong laws of demonstration. These I call Idols of the Theater, because in my judgment all the received systems are but so many stage plays representing worlds of their own after an unreal and scenic fashion."

In the midst of his criticism Bacon does not spare the Empirical school, toward which he might be expected to be lenient. Note his denunciation:

"But the Empirical school of philosophy gives birth to dogmas more deformed and monstrous than the Sophistical or Rational school. For it has its foundations not in the light of common notions (which though it be a faint and superficial light, is yet in a manner universal and has reference to many things), but in the narrowness and darkness of a few experiments."

For himself Bacon selects a method midway between that of experience and reason:

"Those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like the ant; they only collect and use: the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance. But the bee takes a middle course; it gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and of the field, but transforms and digests it by a power of its own. Not unlike this is the true business of philosophy, for it neither relies solely or chiefly on the powers of the mind, nor does it take the matter which it gathers from natural history and mechanical experiments and lay it up in the memory whole as it finds it, but lays it up in the understanding altered and digested."

From these easy-going methods of the Renaissance philosophy passed on to the sedate discussions of physics and politics belonging to the Enlightenment.

CHAPTER VI

THE ENLIGHTENMENT—MATERIALISM AND RATIONALISM

THE difference between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment appears most clearly in connection with the term 'Nature.' Bruno and Bacon conceive of the natural order in a poetical fashion, and where the former finds in nature an indwelling principle the latter gives a figurative interpretation to its manifestations. In the Enlightenment Hobbes and Spinoza may differ in their particular methods, but they agree in looking upon nature as a manifestation of law. The Enlightenment saw in nature the features of reason, whether in the lower form of experience or the higher one of understanding. At the same time it was animated by the spirit of freedom, and just as the principle of reason gave it a new view of the physical order the ideal of rights afforded a new conception of the political one.

The way to the Enlightenment was opened by Hobbes with his 'Materialism.' In opposition to him appeared the school of 'Rationalism,' while that of 'Empiricism' was in sympathy with the views that he advanced.

Hobbes (1588-1679) distinguishes his philosophy from Bacon's and allies it with the Enlightenment by assuming a mechanical view of nature and society. Matter with its sole principle of force constitutes the world of things; material interest as felt by the isolated 'ego' guides man in organizing his state. This physico-political view of humanity was anticipated by Epicurus, but Hobbes reduced

it to systematic form, and so thoroly did he state the problem of ethics that the moral philosophy of England continued to feel his influence until the end of the eighteenth century.

In the philosophic system of Hobbes thought possesses no independence, but traces its origin back to some change in the body or some condition in the external world. His view of mind, then, is altogether sensationalistic. Such is the conception of man entertained in the 'Leviathan' (1651):

> "Concerning the thoughts of man, I will consider them first singly and afterward in train or dependence upon one another. Singly they are every one a representation or appearance of some quality or other accident of a body without us, which is commonly called an 'object.' Which object worketh on the eyes, ears and other parts of a man's body, and by diversity of working produceth diversity of appearances.
>
> "The original of them all is that which we call sense, for there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense. The rest are derived from that original.
>
> "The cause of sense is the external body or object which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in the taste and touch; or mediately, as in seeing, hearing and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inward to the brain and heart, causeth there a resistance, or counterpressure or endeavor of the heart to deliver itself, which endeavor, because outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call sense, and consisteth, as to the eye, in a light or color figured; to the ear, in a sound; to the nostril, in an odor; to the tongue and palate, in a savor, and to the rest of the body, in heat, cold, hard-

ness, softness and such other qualities as we discern by feeling."

Upon this basis of motion Hobbes seeks to explain not only consciousness, but conscious activity as well. He says:

"There be in animals two sorts of motions peculiar to them: one called vital, begun in generation and continued without interruption through their whole life, such as are the course of the blood, the pulse, the breathing, the concoction, nutrition, excretion, etc., to which motions there needs no help of imagination; the other is animal motion, otherwise called voluntary motion, as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That sense is motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, etc., and that fancy is but the relics of the same motion, remaining after sense, has been already said in the first and second chapters. And because going, speaking and the like voluntary motions depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way and what; it is evident that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion."

In the atmosphere of this sensationalistic view of man Hobbes endeavors to account for the origin of society. This he does by drawing a sharp distinction between the original condition of man when he lived a life of lawlessness and selfishness and his civil condition, the origin of which was due to artificial compact. It was this theory of social compact that was later to be advanced by Locke, whence it passed to France through the medium of Rousseau. According to Hobbes the primitive condition of mankind, or "state of nature," was a "state of war of all against all," due to the tendency on the part of the individual to seek his private advantage only. This egoistic theory is clearly stated:

"Hereby it is manifest that during the time men

live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war, as is of every man against every man. For war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known, and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together, so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace."

What seems to follow from human nature as such is further confirmed by experience, argues Hobbes:

"It may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things that Nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another, and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference made from the passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep he locks his doors; when even in his house he locks his chests, and this when he knows there be laws and public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has of his fellow-subjects when he rides armed; of his fellow-citizens when he locks his doors, and of his children and servants when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words?"

In this polemical state of nature there is neither justice nor injustice. Thus says Hobbes:

"The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have here no place. Where there is no com-

mon power there is no law, where no law no injustice. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude."

Where the natural state of man produces rights, his civil condition comes from the establishment of law, and where the dictate of rights is war that of law is peace. Society arises by means of social compact, and he defines these ideas concisely:

"The right of nature, which writers commonly call 'jus naturale,' is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life, and consequently of doing anything which in his own judgment and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

"A law of nature, 'lex naturalis,' is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For tho they that speak of this subject use to confound 'jus' and 'lex,' 'right' and 'law,' yet they ought to be distinguished, because right consisteth in liberty to do or to forbear, whereas law determineth and bindeth to one of them, so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

"Whensoever a man transferreth his right or renounceth it, it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act, and of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to himself. And therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood by any words

or other signs to have abandoned or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life, because he cannot be understood to aim thereby at any good to himself.

"The mutual transferring of right is that which men call contract."

While several different meanings may attach themselves to the term 'rationalism,' the philosophic import is adequately expressed by saying that it stands for the primacy of understanding rather than of experience, for the superiority of thought over perception. It was in the spirit of rationalism that Descartes said:

"I will now close my eyes, I will stop my ears, I will turn away my senses from their objects, I will even efface from my consciousness all the images of corporeal things; or at least, because this can hardly be accomplished, I will consider them as empty and false; and thus, holding converse only with myself and closely examining my nature, I will endeavor to obtain by degrees a more intimate and familiar knowledge of myself."

In contrast with the school of empiricism rationalism represents a twofold tendency. On the outside the understanding was employed critically as a means of discovering truth, on the other it was used constructively in the development of definite views of the world, as dualism and monism. This second advantage was one which the contrary school of empiricism did not enjoy. The leading members of the Rationalist school were Descartes (1596-1650), Spinoza (1632-1677), Leibnitz (1646-1716).

The fact that Descartes was the founder of modern philosophy in the restricted sense of the term 'modern' does not forbid his connection with medieval thought, and his system of rationalism acts as a bridge connecting the older and newer forms of the larger modernism. In his famous deduction of the ego from self-consciousness Des-

cartes imitated Augustine, while in his demonstration of the existence of God he followed Anselm's "ontological proof."

Descartes' own method was that of skepticism, and having resolved to accept as true only such propositions as should be demonstrable, he questions whether he should believe in his own existence, that of the world or that of God. Thus he guards himself:

> "I will suppose, then, not that Deity, who is sovereignly good and the fountain of truth, but that some malignant demon, who is at once exceedingly potent and deceitful, has employed all his artifice to deceive me; I will suppose that the sky, the air, the earth, colors, figures, sounds and all external things are nothing better than the illusions of dreams, by means of which this being has laid snares for my credulity; I will consider myself as without hands, eyes, flesh, blood or any of the senses, and as falsely believing that I am possessed of these; I will continue resolutely fixed in this belief, and if indeed by this means it be not in my power to arrive at the knowledge of truth, I shall at least do what is in my power, viz., [suspend my judgment] and guard with settled purpose against giving my assent to what is false and being imposed upon by this deceiver, whatever be his power and artifice."

The philosopher escapes from this dilemma by observing that, while the Deity may deceive him, He can never bring it about that he shall be nothing as long as he is conscious that he is something. His line of reasoning follows:

> "But how do I know that there is not something different altogether from the objects I have now enumerated, of which it is impossible to entertain the slightest doubt? Is there not a God, or some being, by whatever name I may designate him, who causes these thoughts to arise in my mind? But why sup-

pose such a being, for it may be I myself am capable of producing them? Am I then at least not something? But I before denied that I possessed sense or a body. I hesitate, however, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent on the body and the senses that without these I cannot exist? But I had the persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies. Was I not, therefore, at the same time persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that this proposition ('pronunciatum') I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind."

The fact of self-existence leads the thinker to determine the particular quality of his being; this is found in thought, so that the 'ego' may be defined as a "thinking thing," and from the famous 'cogito, ergo sum' (I think, therefore I am) he attains a further point:

"Thinking is another attribute of the soul; and here I discover what properly belongs to myself. This alone is inseparable from me. I am—I exist: this is certain; but how often? As often as I think; for perhaps it would even happen, if I should wholly cease to think, that I should at the same time altogether cease to be. I now admit nothing that is not necessarily true: I am therefore, precisely speaking, only a thinking thing, that is, a mind ('mens sive animus'), understanding, or reason—terms whose signification was before un-

known to me. I am, however, a real thing, and really existent; but what thing? The answer was, a thinking thing."

In seeking to demonstrate the existence of God, Descartes uses the same rationalistic argument that served to prove the existence of self. As in the first instance, he introduces his argument skeptically, and then proceeds to remove all vestige of doubt:

> "And in truth, as I have no ground for believing that Deity is deceitful, and as, indeed, I have not even considered the reasons by which the existence of a Deity of any kind is established, the ground of doubt that rests only on this supposition is very slight, and, so to speak, metaphysical. But, that I may be able wholly to remove it, I must inquire whether there is a God, as soon as an opportunity of doing so shall present itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must examine likewise whether he can be a deceiver; for, without the knowledge of these two truths, I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything."

When Descartes discovers that his mind possesses the idea of God, he asks himself whence this came. How can a finite mind have received the idea of an infinite one? The answer is, the idea must have been given by the Infinite Himself:

> "By the name God, I understand a substance infinite [eternal, immutable], independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing that exists, if any such there be, were created. But these properties are so great and excellent, that the more attentively I consider them the less I feel persuaded that the idea I have of them owes its origin to myself alone. And thus it is absolutely necessary to conclude, from all that I have before said, that God exists: for tho the idea of substance be in my mind owing to this, that I myself am a substance, I should not, however, have the idea of an infinite substance,

seeing I am a finite being, unless it were given me by some substance in reality infinite."

In distinction from Anselm, whose argument was metaphysical, Descartes employs a method which is psychological; thus it serves to demonstrate, not so much the reality of the idea in itself, as its validity in the mind of man. The following passage is typical of this viewpoint:

> "There remains only the inquiry as to the way in which I received this idea from God; for I have not drawn it from the senses, nor is it even presented to me unexpectedly, as is usual with the ideas of sensible objects, when these are presented or appear to be presented to the external organs of the senses; it is not even a pure production or fiction of my mind, for it is not in my power to take from or add to it; and consequently there but remains the alternative that it is innate, in the same way as is the idea of myself. And, in truth, it is not to be wondered at that God, at my creation, implanted this idea in me, that it might serve, as it were, for the mark of the workman impressed on his work; and it is not also necessary that the mark should be something different from the work itself; but considering only that God is my creator, it is highly probable that he in some way fashioned me after his own image and likeness, and that I perceive this likeness, in which is contained the idea of God, by the same faculty by which I apprehend myself."

In seeking to rid himself of his doubt concerning the existence of the external world, Descartes has no better argument than the theistic one just developed. Since God is perfect metaphysically, He must also be perfect morally; from which we may conclude that the Infinite is no deceiver, hence the idea of a world of things known to the senses must be valid, and the world accordingly real. Herein Descartes shows how all rationalism stands in need of empirical methods when the existence of the external order is called in question; his argument concerning the

reality of the world is the weakest of the three he propounds.

With regard to science, Descartes had much to do, however, in establishing physics upon a purely mechanical basis, just as his sceptico-rationalistic method of studying the self was influential in founding psychology, as the introspective study of consciousness. Having separated mind and body, as here a thinking thing, there an extended thing, Descartes finds it difficult to account for their relation and apparent interaction. Here he proposes a problem for Spinoza and Leibnitz, and one which is discussed to-day as a burning question.

Not only did Descartes seek to separate the psychical from the physical, but he endeavored to account for the relation existing between mind and body. This he admitted was actual, but beyond comprehension; that which is extended cannot affect that which is simply conscious, and vice versa. Wanting in a satisfactory explanation of this paradox, Descartes claimed that the interaction of the mental and the corporeal was due to the intervention of the Deity. This prepared the way for the Occasionalists: Geulincx (1625-1669) and Malebranche (1638-1715).

Geulincx sought to explain how psychical states like 'motives' could produce physical ones like 'movements' in the human body, and came to the conclusion that the former was, not the 'cause,' but the 'occasion' of the latter, the real causal efficiency being due to the work of the Deity. Mental states correspond to, but do not affect, bodily states in the same way that two clocks may be in constant agreement as to time, but not in conjunction as to their workings. Malebranche took up the other side of the problem, and thus sought to explain how man passes from outer physical stimuli to inner sensations. Like the physical order, the corporeal organization of man cannot have any influence upon what is so foreign to its nature as the mind; hence the apparent case of efficient

causality is only an instance of occasional causation, and instead of seeing things in their physical setting, "we see all things in God." From this double 'Occasionalism' it was but a step to the perfect monism of Spinoza.

Altho the title of Spinoza's chief work is 'Ethics,' the metaphysical aspect of the book seems to mask the moral side of it. Nevertheless, the extreme rationalism of Spinoza does not forbid his deducing an ethical principle from the pantheistic world-ground that he establishes, a fact which serves to show how genuine philosophy views the problem of the world and the purpose of life in one and the same speculative moment. Like Parmenides, Spinoza bases his philosophy on a single static principle, which is one and all; with Plato he exalts the intellect above the will. Affected as he was by Maimonides, Spinoza owes his real philosophic origin to Descartes. Opposed as his system was by Leibnitz, it affected the German mind in Lessing and Schelling, in Fichte and Schleiermacher. Our modern psychology, with its theory of the parallelism between mind and body, has made use of Spinoza's monism, so that Hoffding speaks of modern monistic theories as being "neo-Spinozism."

Spinoza's philosophic method was an advanced Cartesianism. Where Descartes had found two separate substances, mind and body, Spinoza found only one, manifesting itself in a mental and corporeal manner by means of the attributes thought and extension. Where Descartes had made use of the idea of efficient cause, Spinoza profited by the suggestion of the Occasionalists, that such causality was in reality only occasional, and considered all supposed cases of the transient cause as so many examples of the one immanent cause. Indeed, his whole philosophy, tends ever to substitute the static reason of things for the supposed cause of their interaction.

The basis of Spinoza's system is found in his doctrine of substance, attribute, mode. Of the one substance, or God, there are two attributes, thought and extension; of

the attributes there are many modifications, minds and bodies. Thus he declares:

"By 'substance,' I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

"By 'attribute,' I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.

"By 'mode,' I mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself."

Spinoza's doctrine of substance, expressed characteristically according to a geometrical method, advances the notion of a total Being whose essence constitutes the whole order of reality:

"Prop. I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.

Prop. II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common.

Prop. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.

Prop. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

Prop. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

Prop. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Prop. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substance.

Prop. VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Prop. IX. The more reality or being a thing has the greater the number of its attributes.

Prop. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.

Prop. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite

attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

Prop. XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.

Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Prop. XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways—that is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

Prop. XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by any one.

Prop. XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.

Prop. XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.

Prop. XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.

Prop. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute."

Having established such a monism, Spinoza now proceeds to relate the one substance to the manifold of things in the actual world. The reality of the two great classes of things cognitive, or minds, and things extended, or bodies, is due to their participation in the one substance, just as their apparent interaction is due to the parallel orders of their particular manifestations:

"Prop. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.

Prop. II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.

Prop. III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence.

Prop. IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.

Prop. V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.

Prop. VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute.

Prop. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Prop. VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.

Prop. IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected by a third idea, and so on to infinity.

Prop. X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man—in other words, substance does not constitute the actual being of man.

Prop. XI. The first element, which constitutes the

actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing.

Prop. XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other words, a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else.

Prop. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number of impressions.

Prop. XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary.

Corollary.— It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity."

After speaking of the "nature and origin of the emotions" and of "human bondage," Spinoza concludes his work by a discussion of "human freedom" wherein he seeks the realization of the ethical purpose running through the book. It is in this last part of his work that we encounter his discussion of "intuition" or "knowledge of the third order," of "the intellectual love of God," and the view of things "under the form of eternity":

"Prop. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions.

Prop. XVI. This love toward God must hold the chief place in the mind.

Prop. XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Prop. XVIII. No one can hate God.

Prop. XIX. He who loves God cannot endeavor that God should love him in return.

Prop. XX. This love toward God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a

Prop. XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what is past, while the body endures.

Prop. XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea, which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity.

Prop. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.

Prop. XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more do we understand God.

Prop. XXV. The highest endeavor of the mind, and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge [*i.e.*, intuition].

Prop. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires more to understand things by that kind.

Prop. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence.

Prop. XXVIII. The endeavor or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge.

Prop. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity.

Prop. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived through God.

Prop. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

Prop. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love.

third kind of knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as cause.

Prop. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

Prop. XXXIX. He who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal.

Prop. XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active and less passive; and, vice versa, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.

Prop. XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed to be attributable to courage and high-mindedness.

Prop. XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts."

The varied and rather unsystematic writings of Leibnitz relate him to the constructive rationalism of Descartes and Spinoza, as well as to the critical empiricism of Locke. In his 'Monadology,' Leibnitz advances beyond the monistic conception of substance developed by Spinoza; in his 'New Essays on the Human Understanding,' he endeavors to correct some of Locke's mistaken notions. In his own statement of rationalism, Leibnitz involves the principle of 'development,' whereby he was able to approximate to the modern theory of evolution with respect to both mind and matter. Many of Leibnitz's most important truths are expressed figuratively, and where his work excels in insight it is wanting in system; at the same time, it does not apply its theory of 'monads,' or spiritual atoms, to the problems of ethics. The pluralistic restatement of the problem of substance occupies the first portion of the Monadology:

"The Monad is merely a simple substance entering into those which are compound; simple, that is to say, without parts.

"Where there are no parts, neither extension nor figure nor divisibility is possible; and these Monads are the veritable atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things.

"There is thus no danger of dissolution, and there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can perish naturally.

"For the same reason, there is no way to which a simple substance can begin naturally, since it could not be found by composition.

"There is also no intelligible way in which a Monad can be altered or changed in its interior by any other created thing; since it would be impossible to transpose anything in it, or conceive in it any internal movement which could be excited, directed, augmented or diminished within, such as may take place in compound bodies, where there is change of parts. The Monads have no windows through which anything can enter or go forth."

On the mental side, substance does not assume the simple and static form of a thinking thing, as Descartes had described the soul, but appears in grades of consciousness, thus:

"This shifting state, which involves and represents multiplicity in the unit, or in the simple substance, is nothing but what we call Perception, which must be carefully distinguished from apperception, or consciousness, as will appear in the sequel. Here it is that the Cartesians have especially failed, making no account of those perceptions of which we are not conscious. It is this that has led them to suppose that spirits are the only Monads, and that there are no souls of brutes or other entelechies.

"If we choose to give the name of soul to every-

thing that has perceptions and appetites, then all simple substances or created monads may be called souls. But as feeling is something more than simple perception, I am willing that the general name of monads shall suffice for those simple substances which have perception only, and that the term souls shall be confined to those in which perceptions are more distinct, and accompanied by memory.

"For we experience in ourselves a state in which we remember nothing, and have no distinct perception; as when we are in a swoon or in a profound or dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not differ perceptibly from a simple Monad; but since this state is not permanent, and since the soul delivers itself from it, the soul is something more than a bare Monad.

"And as every present condition of a simple substance is a natural consequence of its antecedent condition, so its present is big with its future.

"Then, as on waking from a state of stupor, we become conscious of our perceptions, we must have perceptions, altho unconscious of them, immediately before awaking. For each perception can have no other natural origin but an antecedent perception, as every motion must be derived from one which preceded it."

Having devoted himself to the manifold in the universe, Leibnitz now seeks to return to the unified world-ground in God. It is to Him that all created beings are due; the monads relate to Him by virtue of their position in the world, for they are situated like mirrors around a market-place, which reflect the central activity with a perfection depending upon their position and proximity. Some of his conclusions follow:

"And thus the final reason of things must be found in a necessary substance, in which the detail of

changes exists eminently, as their source. And this substance we call God.

"We may also conclude that this supreme substance, which is unique, universal and necessary—having nothing outside of it which is independent of it—and which is a simple series of possible being, must be incapable of limits, and must contain as much of reality as is possible.

"Whence it follows that God is perfect, perfection being nothing but the magnitude of positive reality taken exactly, setting aside the limits or bounds in that which is limited. And where there are no bounds, that is to say, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.

"It follows also that the creatures have their perfections from the influence of God, but they have their imperfections from their own nature, which is incapable of existing without limits. For it is by this that they are distinguished from God.

"Now, as in the ideas of God there is an infinity of possible worlds, and as only one can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which determines Him to decide upon one rather than another.

"And this connection, or this adaptation of all created things to each, and of each to all, implies in each simple substance relations which express all the rest. Each, accordingly, is a living and perpetual mirror of the universe.

"And as the same city viewed from different sides appears quite different, and is perspectively multiplied, so, in the infinite number of simple substances, there are given, as it were, so many different worlds, which, nevertheless, are only the perspectives of a single one, according to the different points of view of each Monad."

In referring to created substances, Leibnitz speaks of

soul-life as the possession, not only of men, but of animals, plants and stones as well. For example:

"Whence it appears that there is a world of creatures, of living beings, of animals, of entelechies, of souls, in the minutest portion of matter.

"Every particle of matter may be conceived as a garden of plants, or as a pond full of fishes. But each branch of each plant, each member of each animal, each drop of their humors, is in turn another such garden or pond.

"And altho the earth and the air embraced between the plants in the garden, or the water between the fishes of the pond, are not themselves plant or fish, they nevertheless contain such, but mostly too minute for our perception.

"Thus there is no uncultivated spot, no barrenness, no death in the universe, no chaos, no confusion, except in appearance, somewhat as it might appear in a pond at a distance, in which one would see a confused movement and swarming, so to speak, of the fishes of the pond, without separately distinguishing the fishes themselves.

"We see, then, that each living body has a governing entelechy, which in animals is the soul of the animal. But the members of this living body are full of other living beings—plants, animals—each of which has its entelechy, or regent soul."

In other parts of his system, Leibnitz shuns the implication that the principle of soul-life applies to the lowest orders of matter, but this principle is implicit in his theory. By means of his theories of grades of consciousness and pre-established harmony, he sought to supply his world of the manifold with unity and system. One and the same life and influence were thus conceived of as persisting in the midst of infinite varieties in nature.

Leibnitz's theory of knowledge consists chiefly in a refutation of Locke's empiricism. Hence he comments:

"Perhaps our able author will not differ entirely from my opinion. For after having employed the whole of his first book in rejecting innate lights, taken in a certain sense, he nevertheless avows at the beginning of the second and in what follows, that the ideas which do not originate in sensation come from reflection. Now reflection is nothing else than attention to what is in us, and the senses do not give us that which we already carry with us. . . . I have made use also of the comparison of a block of marble which has veins, rather than a block of marble wholly even, or of blank tablets, that is to say, of what is called among philosophers 'tabula rasa.' For if a soul resembled these blank tablets, truths would be in us as the figure of Hercules is in marble when the marble is entirely indifferent toward receiving this figure or some other. But if there were veins in the block which should mark out the figure of Hercules rather than other figures, the block would be more determined thereto, and Hercules would be in it as in some sort innate, altho it would be necessary to labor in order to discover these veins and to cleanse them by polishing and by cutting away that which prevents them from appearing."

CHAPTER VII

THE ENLIGHTENMENT—EMPIRICISM AND CRITICISM.

THE real beginning of the empirical theory of knowledge was made by Locke (1632-1704). Bacon at the close of the Renaissance and Hobbes in the beginning of the Enlightenment, had observed the possibilities of sense-experience, but their respective methods were not sufficiently consistent to promote a self-contained empiricism. Bacon's view of nature was too vague, while Hobbes' conception of mind was too grossly materialistic to account for the series of sense-impressions that goes to make up our experience of the external world. Locke seeks to determine the condition of the mind prior to experience and then endeavors to account for the development of knowledge. His work bears the modest title, 'Essay on the Human Understanding.' The progress of empiricism was furthered by Berkeley (1684-1753), who developed an empirical idealism, and was brought to its culmination in Hume (1711-1776), who found in Locke a path to perfect skepticism.

The purpose of Locke's 'Essay' was both negative and positive; it aimed to reveal the inner nature of the understanding as well as the way human knowledge is acquired. While Locke's plan seems to involve among other things the question concerning the logical ground of knowledge, it is really confined to the point of the psychological origin of ideas. For himself he says:

"First. I shall inquire into the original of those

ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

"Secondly. I shall endeavor to show what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas, and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

"Thirdly. I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of faith or opinion; whereby I mean, that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge: and here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent."

The first and most significant part of Locke's work consists in his opposition to rationalism with its theory of innate ideas. It was in this connection that he sought to establish the logical status of an idea by its origin in consciousness; his arguments are as follows:

"The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate.

"General assent the great argument.

"Universal consent proves nothing innate.

"'What is, is,' and 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' not universally assented to.

"Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, etc.

"That men know them when they come to the use of reason, answered.—To avoid this, it is usually answered, that all men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason, and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer:

"Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any significance, go for clear reasons to those who, being prepossessed, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say.

"If reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate.

"It is false that reason discovers them."

Not only in the field of logic, but in the realm of ethics as well does this truth hold, argues Locke:

"No moral principles so clear and so generally received as the forementioned speculative maxims.

"Faith and justice not owned as principles by all men.

"Men have contrary practical principles.

"Whole nations reject several moral rules.

"Those who maintain innate practical principles tell us not what they are.—The difference there is among men in their practical principles is so evident that I think I need say no more to evince that it will be impossible to find any innate moral rules by this mark of general assent; and it is enough to make one suspect that the supposition of such innate principles is but an opinion taken up at pleasure, since those who talk so confidently of them are so sparing to tell us which they are."

The positive part of Locke's work is guided by the principle that all knowledge comes from experience. Under the head of such experience, he includes two particular sources of knowledge: "external sensible objects" and the "internal operations of our minds." In doing this, he does not seem to notice that the internal operations of the mind may include something of the logical activity previously rejected under the head of innate ideas.

"Idea is the object of thinking.

"All ideas come from sensation or reflection.—Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and

knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience. Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking.

"The object of sensation one source of ideas.

"The operations of our minds the other source of them.

"All our ideas are of the one or the other of these.

"The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations."

Locke's devotion to the cause of empiricism did not prevent him from making a dialectical distinction, which, in another form, was to reappear in Kant. This was the distinction between primary and secondary qualities whose nature are beyond the power of experience to determine:

Primary qualities.—Qualities thus considered in bodies are, first, such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what estate soever it be; and such as, in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, tho less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses; *e.g.*, take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has still solidity, extension, figure and mobility; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities: and so divide it on till the parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all those qualities.

Secondary qualities.—Such qualities, which in truth are

nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, *i.e.*, by the bulk, figure, texture and motion of their insensible parts, as colors, sounds, tastes, etc., these I call secondary qualities.

In summing his discussion of substances and the ideas, possessed of them, Locke seems still further to make overtures to the contrary school of rationalism. So he says:

> "First, That all our ideas of the several sorts of substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas, with a supposition of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist; tho of this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all.
>
> "Secondly, That all the simple ideas that, thus united in one common substratum, make up our complex ideas of several sorts of substances, are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection.
>
> "Thirdly, That most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances, when truly considered, are only powers, however we are apt to take them for positive qualities: *e.g.*, the greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of gold are yellowness, great weight, ductility, fusibility and solubility in aqua regia, etc., all united together in an unknown substratum."

In speaking of knowledge of reality, he refers to the ideas of the self, the Deity and the world, as follows:

> "We have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence; and a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of a God; of the existence of anything else, we have no other but a sensitive knowledge, which extends not beyond the objects present to our senses."

The term 'idealism' applies to Berkeley in a special sense only, for in his intense nominalism he is a bitter opponent of the usual forms of idealism from Plato to Aquinas. 'Empirical idealism' is what Berkeley's doctrine may be

called, for its basis is to be found in the process of perception rather than in the abstractions of the concept. Berkeley's point of departure is found in Locke, who endeavored to reorganize the world upon the basis of sense-experience. Locke himself approached the borders of subjective idealism, but found a way of escape in the distinction between the primary qualities of the thing itself and its secondary qualities in the mind of the perceiver. Berkeley does away with this arbitrary distinction, when he says:

> "It is evident that extension, figure and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is called 'matter' or 'corporeal substance' involves a contradiction in it."

Berkeley was also related philosophically to Malebranche; one argued that the Divine mind supported the world by His constant perception of it; Malebranche made man's perceptions participate in the mind of the Deity.

Adopting Locke's theory of sensation, Berkeley adds to it the idea of the self, or personal spirit. With the self and its ideas, he could then account for the whole world of precepts, whereupon he argues:

> "But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived—for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.
>
> "That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is

what everybody will allow. And to me it is no less evident that the various sensations, or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.—I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term exist, when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed—meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odor, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a color or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. Their esse is percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.

"It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing among men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but things perceived by sense? And what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations?"

The theistic, or pantheistic, view of the world aids Berkeley in fortifying this difficult contention:

"Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of

the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit —it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit.

"From what has been said it is evident there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives. But, for the fuller demonstration of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities are color, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., *i.e.,* the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction, for to have an idea is all one as to perceive; that therefore wherein color, figure, etc., exist must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or substratum of those ideas."

Positive in his idealism, Berkeley is in a position to oppose the traditional view of the world which bases its opinions of what exists and takes place upon a theory of matter. He says:

"But let us examine a little the received opinion.— It is said extension is a mode or accident of matter, and that matter is the substratum that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me what is meant by matter's supporting extension. Say you, I have no idea of matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, tho you have no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea of matter; tho you know not what it is, you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident support cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense—as when we say that pillars

support a building; in what sense therefore must it be taken?

"If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare themselves to mean by material substance, we shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being in general, together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents. The general idea Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but what that is they do not explain."

This indicates Berkeley's opposition to realism in the ancient-medieval sense, just as it serves to show how thoroly his theory depended upon the individualistic view of mind. Here appeared the chief weakness of empirical idealism. Perception, in distinction from conception, is individual; the ego sees, the ego hears, the ego feels. The result is the sophistical egoism of antiquity or what the modern calls 'solipsism' or 'ipsesism,' a view which demands that the individual ego alone shall be regarded as really existing. For the second time in the history of philosophy, man becomes the measure of all things.

Like Berkeley, Hume found his source in Locke's empiricism, but where the idealist denied the objective reality of things, the skeptic cast out the idea of necessary connection between things. Thus of the two great metaphysical idols, substance and casuality, Berkeley sought to destroy one, Hume the other. The two thinkers span the chasm between Locke and Kant, whose deaths were just a century apart—1704, 1804; Locke gives more to Berkeley than to Hume; Kant received more from Hume than from Berkeley.

Hume's theory of knowledge was a frank sensationalism which put the understanding at the mercy of sense, and

raised impression above idea. Between these two, Hume discovers, not a difference in kind, but a difference of degree; where impression is strong, idea is weak; and there is no inner idea which does not have its counterpart in the external world of sense. Hume's original and more complete presentation of the knowledge-problem is found in his 'Treatise of Human Nature' (1739). The 'Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding' (1748) restates the problem more briefly and with more definite reference to the question of casuality:

> "Every one will readily allow, that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterward recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates by his imagination. These faculties may copy the perceptions of the senses; but they can never entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sentiment. The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigor, is that they represent their object in so lively a manner, that we could almost say we feel or see it. But, except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable. All the colors of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landskip. The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.
>
> "Here, therefore, we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated 'Thoughts' or 'Ideas.' The other species want a name in our language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for any but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general

term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them 'Impressions'; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual."

To discover the validity of any idea, one must seek the sensation whence it was derived, declares Hume; it was this test that led him to doubt the reality of the idea of necessary connection:

"Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself, simple and intelligible; but, if a proper use were made of it, might render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure: the mind has but a slender hold of them: they are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas; and when we have often employed any term, tho without a distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to it. On the contrary, all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid: The limits between them are more exactly determined: nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them. When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but inquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality."

Altho he observes that the whole world of actuality is founded upon causality, Hume does not hesitate to doubt the validity of this idea:

"All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. By

means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man why he believes any matter of fact which is absent; for instance, that his friend is in the country, or in France; he would give you a reason; and this reason would be some other fact—as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises."

"I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Adam, tho his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him.

"This proposition, that causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason but by experience, will readily be admitted with regard to such objects as we remember to have once been altogether unknown to us; since we must be conscious of the utter inability, which we then lay under, of foretelling what would arise from them. Present two smooth pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy; he will never discover that they will adhere together in such a manner as to require great force to separate them in a direct line, while they make so small a resistance to a lateral pressure.

"But to convince us that all the laws of nature, and all the operations of bodies, without exception, are known only by experience, the following reflections may, perhaps, suffice. Were any object presented to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect which will result from it, without consult-

ing past observation; after what manner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this operation? It must invent or imagine some event which it ascribes to the object as its effect; and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. A stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls: but to consider the matter a priori, is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the stone or metal?"

Where Hume was skeptical concerning the speculative view of things, he exercised more practical belief when he entertained the problem of life. In ethics, he turned away from the egoism of Hobbes and endeavored to base ethics upon the feeling of sympathy. In philosophy of religion, he destroyed the foundations of English Deism and made possible the modern Science of Religion. Opposed by the Scottish school of "common sense" philosophy, his influence was more noteworthy in the case of Kant.

Immanuel Kant, this greatest of philosophers since the death of Aristotle, destroys with his left hand while he creates with his right. To him come rationalism and empiricism for judgment; from him spring transcendentalism and realism. As Socrates had reconciled the claims of Anaxagoras and Protagoras, so Kant unites the rationalism of Leibnitz with the empiricism of Locke; as Socrates fathers Plato and Aristotle, as well as the later ethical

schools, so Kant produces Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, as well as Herbart, Schopenhauer and other realists.

In reviewing the work of the Enlightenment, Kant did not decide for rationalism and against empiricism, or vice versa; he stood for both and for neither: his position was that of criticism. Empiricism had found knowledge to consist in something given to the senses; rationalism sought to produce it from within by means of the understanding's native powers. Where one began with strong sensation and ended with attenuated thought, the other began with clear thought and ended with obscure sensation. Their views, while contrary, were not contradictory. Both parties agreed that the difference between sensation and ideation was one of degree, not one of kind, and the only difference consisted in the point of view. Now Kant saw that these two processes were qualitatively distinct. For itself rationalism ended in dogmatism, and Leibnitz gave way to Wolff; empiricism fell into skepticism, when Locke was applied by Hume. Kant was neither dogmatic nor skeptical; he was critical. He appreciated the advantages of empiricism, the necessities of rationalism, as the fundamental question of the 'Critique of Pure Reason' (1781) will show: "How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?" The synthetic in knowledge gives increase and makes it possible for thought to advance scientifically from the known into the unknown; the a priori gives certainty and while it does not enrich our knowledge, it assures the understanding.

Now organized knowledge seems to consist in the rare combination of the synthetic and certain; at any rate one may ask with Kant, "(1) How is pure mathematics possible? (2) How is pure physics possible? (3) How is a science of metaphysics possible?" The first two questions find satisfactory answers, according to criticism. Mathematics and physics are synthetic and their principles are demonstrated by experience as well as by reason; metaphysics, however, possesses only abstract certainty, has not con-

tent, and cannot be tested by experience. The three ideals of metaphysics are the existence of God, the freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul. Kant, whose divisions are ever threefold or fourfold, further looks upon the problems of metaphysics as including: (1) Creationism, which limits the world in time and space; (2) Atomism, with its attempt to regard the soul as a monad; (3) Libertarianism, or freedom versus law; (4) Theism, or belief in an absolute.

Kant's epoch-making work he called 'Critique of Pure Reason'; in carrying out his plan, the author produces a critique of experience. He divides his "Critique" into four parts: (1) Transcendental Esthetic, based upon sense; (2) Transcendental Analytic, depending upon the understanding; (3) Transcendental Dialectic, with its attempt to construct the world from reason; (4) Doctrine of Method, forming the transition from the metaphysical to the moral.

The Transcendental Esthetic consists of a discussion of time and space as intuitions, whose nature is determined in accordance with Kant's doctrine of the beautiful. At the same time, the extraordinary doctrine of the esthetic, that time and space are subjective, seems to depend upon the later principles of the Antinomies, which reveal the contradiction involved in the idea of objective time and space. Expressed directly, space and time are ideas, formed neither empirically by induction nor rationally by deduction, but intuitively as a third form of knowledge, as Spinoza called it.

The intuitive nature of space is discussed as follows:

> "Space is not an empirical conception which has been derived from external experiences.
>
> "Space is a necessary a priori idea, which is presupposed in all external perceptions.
>
> "Space is not a discursive or general conception of the relation of things, but a pure perception.

"Space is presented before our consciousness as an infinite magnitude."

The discussion of time further reveals the intuitive in contrast to the empirical and rational.

"Time is not an empirical conception, which has been derived from any experience.

"Time is a necessary idea, which is presupposed in all perceptions.

"Time is not a discursive or general conception, but a pure form of sensible perception.

"The infinity of time simply means that every definite quantity of time is possible only as a limitation of one single time. There must, therefore, be originally a consciousness of time as unlimited."

The Transcendental Analytic concerns itself with a determination of the forms of knowledge within the domain of space-time. It seeks to discover the conditions of a possible experience. Kant has no faith in mere experience or in mere understanding; he raises one and lowers the other, so that they meet upon a common level where the philosopher can determine the categories of a possible experience. The following indicates his own standpoint:

"But, altho all our knowledge begins 'with' experience, it by no means follows that it all originates 'from' experience. For it may well be that experience is itself made up of two elements, one received through impressions of sense and the other supplied from itself by our faculty of knowledge on occasion of those impressions. If that be so, it may take long practice before our attention is drawn to the element added by the mind, and we learn to distinguish and separate it from the material to which it is applied."

The twelve categories are derived from the twelve forms of judgment:

"1. Quantity—Universal, particular, singular.

"2. Quality—Affirmative, negative, infinite.

"3. Relation—Categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive.

"4. Modality—Problematic, assertoric, apodictic."

By changing from the adjectival to the substantival form of expression, Kant has his categories:

"1. Quantity—Unity, plurality, totality.

"2. Quality—Reality, negation, limitation.

"3. Relation—Inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, community.

"4. Modality—Possibility, existence, necessity."

While this array of logical forms seems formidable, Kant's system is no exception to the rule that, from the days of Parmenides and Heraclitus, philosophy makes use of two principles: Substance and causality. With the intuitions of time and space the Critique now has four fundamentals, two of sense and two of understanding.

Kant's intense dialecticism forces him to give a "transcendental deduction of the categories." Expressed simply this consists of a self-conscious act like Descartes' famous 'cogito,' whereby the twelve radii of categories center in the "synthetic unity of apperception." This centralizing act of thought appears in three stages: (1) Synthesis of apprehension in perception; (2) synthesis of reproduction in imagination; (3) synthesis of recognition in conception.

Here appears the meaning of the term 'transcendental.' Instead of indicating something beyond sense and experience, it stands for a view directed downward toward the world of experience, as one photographs the landscape by means of a kite. Kant rises above the conditions of experience only to show that supersensuous knowledge is impossible.

> "Here transcendental and transcendent do not mean the same thing. The principles of the pure understanding, which we explained before, are meant to be only of empirical and not of transcendental application—that is, they cannot transcend the limits of experience. A principle, on the contrary, which removes these landmarks, nay, insists on our transcending them, is called transcendent."

In the Transcendental Dialectic Kant finds three sources of illusion. Reason produces ideas of the soul, the world and the world-soul without being justified by experience. Hence follow: (1) The paralogisms of pure reason; (2) the antinomy of pure reason; (3) the ideal of pure reason.

The "Paralogisms" consist of four propositions concerning the substantiality, simplicity, unity of the soul as well as its relation to the body. From the critical standpoint, however, one may not speak of the soul as an "I am," for this would be paralogical in that it would lead beyond experience which teaches only the "I think."

The antinomies arise as so many contradictions concerning the quantity and quality of the world, the freedom of man and the existence of God. According to Kant, reason carries so far beyond any possible experience that man must abandon all hope of solving his problems when he sees how it is possible to reason either pro or con about them. The following 'conflicts' present this difficulty:

FIRST CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

THESIS

"The world has a beginning in time and is limited also with regard to space.

ANTITHESIS

"The world has no beginning and no limits in space, but is infinite, in respect both to time and space.

SECOND CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

THESIS

"Every compound substance in the world consists of simple parts, and nothing exists anywhere but the simple, or what is composed of it.

ANTITHESIS

"No compound thing in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists nowhere in the world anything simple.

THIRD CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

THESIS

"Causality, according to the laws of nature, is not the only casuality from which all the phenomena of the world can be deduced. In order to account for these phenomena it is necessary also to admit another causality, that of freedom.

ANTITHESIS

"There is no freedom, but everything in the world takes place entirely according to the laws of nature.

FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS

THESIS

"There exists an absolutely necessary Being belonging to the world, either as a part or as a cause of it.

ANTITHESIS

"There nowhere exists an absolutely necessary Being, either within or without the world, as the cause of it."

Of the first two antinomies both thesis and antithesis are wrong; of the third both are right, since freedom exists in the noumenal world, casuality in the phenomenal; the fourth is further discussed under the head of the 'Ideal.'

The Ideal discusses Reason's vain attempt to reach the Absolute. Here Kant sets aside the usual theistic proofs, centering his attention upon the onotological arguments of Augustine, Anselm and Descartes. In this matter he declares:

"There are only three kinds of proofs of the existence of God from speculative reason. All the paths that can be followed to this end begin either from definite experience and the peculiar nature of the world of sense, known to us through experience, and ascend from it, according to the laws of casuality, to the highest cause, existing outside the world; or they

rest on indefinite experience only—that is, on any existence which is empirically given; or lastly, they leave all experience out of account and conclude, entirely a priori from mere concepts, the existence of a supreme cause. The first proof is the physico-theological, the second the cosmological, the third the ontological proof. There are no more and there can be no more."

In discussing the ontological proof, Kant shows that if one lay down the subject "God," he is not necessitated to add the predicate "existence," for, as a matter of fact, one need not have even the subject. Idea is one thing, reality another. He proceeds:

"Being is evidently not a real predicate or a concept of something that can be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the admission of a thing and of certain determinations in it. Logically it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, 'God is almighty,' contains two concepts, each having its object, namely, God and almightiness. The small word 'is' is not an additional predicate, but only serves to put the predicate in relation to the subject. If, then, I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (including that of almightiness), and say, 'God is,' or there is a God, I do not put a new predicate to the concept of God, but I only put the subject by itself, with all its predicates, in relation to my concept, as its object. Both must contain exactly the same kind of thing and nothing can have been added to the concept, which expresses possibility only by my thinking its object as simply given and saying it is.

"And thus the real does not contain more than the possible. A hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred possible dollars. In my financial position no doubt there exists more by one hundred real dollars than by their concept only (that is their possibility), because in reality the object is not

only contained analytically in my concept but is added to my concept (which is a determination of my state) synthetically; but the conceived hundred dollars are not in the least increased through the existence which is outside my concept."

The Method of Transcendentalism affords a means of passing from metaphysics to morality. Here Kant asks his three fundamental questions, "What can I know?" "What ought I to do?" "What may I hope?" Transcendental criticism is carried on in such a way as to "compel pure reason to surrender its exaggerated pretensions in the sphere of speculative thought and to retreat within the limits of its own domain—that of practical principles."

In his 'Ethics,' as also in his 'Philosophy of Rights,' Kant fails to show himself the uncompromising radical who creates epochs in both speculative and esthetical philosophy. Kant's morality is of the simple and traditional sort. In the 'Critique of Practical Reason' he endeavors to recover the ground lost in the 'Pure Reason'—belief in God, freedom and immortality. The great burden of the moral law is borne by the will in which alone the good is to be found, and just as Kant contends for speculative causality, he goes on to argue in favor of freedom. Where morality is based upon inclination, it is purely 'pathological,' where its ground is law, it is only 'legalistic'; freedom alone makes it ethical. Thus he says:

"In fact the sole principle of morality consists in the independence on all matter of the law (namely, a desired object), and in the determination of the elective will by the mere universal legislative form of which its maxim must be capable. Now this independence is freedom in the negative sense, and this self-legislation of the pure, and, therefore, practical reason is freedom in the positive sense. Thus the moral law expresses nothing else than the autonomy of the pure practical reason; that is, freedom; and this is itself the formal condition of all maxims, and

on this condition only can they agree with the supreme practical law."

Such a view yields the Categorical Imperative, a commandment which says:

> Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation.

To fulfil the demands of duty thus conceived, the ethical subject must follow the path of infinite progress toward perfection, which necessitates the idea of immortality of the soul as a "postulate of pure practical reason." He says:

> "Now this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The summum bonum then practically is only possible on the supposition of the immortality of the soul; consequently this immortality, being inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason (by which I mean a theoretical proposition, not demonstrable as such, but which is an inseparable result of an unconditional a priori practical law)."

Where, in the spirit of autonomy, man follows the categorical imperative, he sets aside all claim upon happiness; nevertheless, he postulates a 'summum bonum' wherein happiness and morality unite. To effect this reconciliation, practical reason postulates God:

> "There is not the least ground, therefore, in the moral law for a necessary connection between morality and proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as part of it, and therefore dependent on it, and which for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this nature, nor by his own power make it thoroly harmonize, as far as his happiness is concerned, with his practical principles. Nevertheless, in the practical problem of pure reason—*i.e.*, the neces-

sary pursuit of the 'summum bonum'—such a connection is postulated as necessary. We ought to endeavor to promote the 'summum bonum,' which, therefore, must be possible. Accordingly the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct from nature itself, and containing the principle of this connection, namely, of the exact harmony of happiness with morality, is also postulated. It follows that the postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a highest original good; that is to say, of the existence of God. Now it was seen to be a duty for us to promote the 'summum bonum'; consequently it is not merely allowable, but it is a necessity connected with duty as a requisite that we should presuppose the possibility of this 'summum bonum'; and as this is possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God."

When Kant added his 'Critique of Judgment' to the other two Critiques he gave currency to the tripartite division of consciousness: Cognition, conation, affection. In making intuition the fundamental principle of esthetic philosophy, he was only realizing the possibilities of the third form of knowledge which, in the "Transcendental Esthetic," yields the intuitions of time and space whose source was neither empirical nor rational. In the 'Critique of Judgment' Kant discusses taste and beauty. 'Taste' consists of a "universal without a concept"; that is, like space and time, taste yields a universal judgment independent of external impression and internal inference. 'Beauty' is made up of "pleasure without interest"; it is an ideal satisfaction of reason, rather than a real gratification of sense.

CHAPTER VIII

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

As ALL philosophy in the Enlightenment had converged and concluded in Kant, so in him likewise the age of culture, or Romanticism, found an opening whence paths spread in various directions. Where Kant's famous categories refused to depart from the earth of experience, the categorical or idealistic thinking of his successors rose above sense and penetrated into the transcendent region.

The Critical Philosophy was first received in Jena and Weimar. Schiller adopted its esthetical principles, but chafed under the yoke of the categorical imperative. Herder opposed Kant both theoretically and esthetically, offering in contrast a faith-philosophy of reality and naturistic idea of beauty. Jacobi likewise added to the rather shallow faith-philosophy of Herder and was more opposed than Schiller to Kant's uncompromising moralism. A second group of thinkers took up the problems of the "Critique" more technically. Here Reinhold discussed the relation of knowledge to things in themselves, while Maimor endeavored to describe this troublesome element as an irrational rather than an unknown quantity. This realism was opposed by Beck, who gave to criticism an idealistic interpretation.

Finally a third group took up transcendentalism and, as Plato and Aristotle, rather than the Socratics, carried out the ideas of the great master in the form of classic idealism, so Fichte (1762-1814), Schelling (1775-1854),

Hegel (1770-1831) found in transcendentalism the possibilities of a romantic idealism. First in the field, Fichte followed the ethical teaching of Kant, which he turned into a "Science of Knowledge." Schelling found in Kant's esthetical doctrine the basis of a "Philosophy of Identity." Hegel completes the trilogy by erecting upon the basis of Kant's logical principles a vast system of "Absolute Idealism."

The "transcendental deduction" of the categories from the self-conscious 'ego' gives Fichte his starting-point. Where other systems begin with the objective, he begins with the subjective; his fundamental principle is the self-positing 'Ich,' or universal Self, whose original consisted in action rather than thought. Thus both Faust and Fichte declare: "In the beginning was the Deed." He carries out his idea as follows:

> "We have to search for the absolute, first, and unconditional fundamental principle of human knowledge. It cannot be proven nor determined if it is to be absolute first principle.
>
> "This principle is to express the deed-act which does not occur among the empirical determinations of our consciousness nor can so occur, since it is rather the basis of all consciousness and first and alone makes consciousness possible."

Kant had also pointed out that in each triad of categories the third was deducible from the first, as limitation from affirmation and negation. This constitutes the source of the dialectical movement of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, which Fichte finds in the Ego and Hegel in the absolute. With Fichte three propositions of idealism follow in due order: "(1) The Ego posits itself; (2) a Non-Ego is apposited to the Ego; (3) the Ego apposites in the Ego a divisible Non-Ego to a divisible Ego." These extraordinary propositions seem to mean that the common distinction between a subjective soul and an objective world does not just happen to exist, but is produced by the

higher Self, working first consciously and actively, then unconsciously and passively.

Accepting the self-positing of the Ego in a symbolic fashion, the German 'Romantik' developed a culture of the self which, in the case of Friedrich Schlegel, led to the doctrine of 'Ironie.' Modern egoists—Stirner, Flaubert, Maurice Barrès and others—preserve a certain amount of this Romanticism. For himself Fichte all but reconciled Kant's ideal of freedom with Spinoza's view of the world as substance. For this very reason, perhaps, Fichte calls this doctrine "an inverted Spinozism."

From Fichte's 'Ego,' Schelling returned first to Kant's esthetical philosophy and then reposed in the pantheism of Spinoza. Nevertheless, Schelling's 'System of Identity' grew out of Fichte's 'Science of Knowledge.' The Fichtean doctrine had not been able to escape a sort of "infinite subjectivity," so that to account for the world of experience and justify the principle of thought it was necessary to find some deeper ground than that of the 'Ego' with its perpetual self-positing. Schelling saw that philosophy must not limit itself to one side of the total problem; it must explain shade as well as light, the objective as well as the subjective. The 'System of Identity' seeks to discuss nature and reason together. This it does by showing how the mind, when viewed in its most profound act of intuition, employs the conscious and the unconscious, the free and the determined in viewing the one world of real ideality and ideal reality. The term 'ideality' is employed to indicate the reconciliation of the opposed pair, subject and object, in the inscrutable world-ground of 'Nature.'

Schelling did not possess the intense moral earnestness of Kant and Fichte, and hence he is not found negating the world for the sake of the ethical or destroying speculative philosophy through fanatical interest in the practical. In the conflict between the speculative claims of nature and the ethical demands of humanity he seeks a third path by way of escape.

The third way of viewing the total world of macrocosm and microcosm is the esthetical one, and as Kant had suggested the unity of the speculative and the practical in the esthetical, Schelling fulfils the inherent prophecy in his 'System of Identity':

"This contradiction must be solved, if there is to be a philosophy at all. The solution of this problem or the answering of the question, How can ideas be conceived as conforming to objects and at the same time objects as conforming to ideas? is not the first, but is the chief task of transcendental philosophy.

"Now it is certainly a productive activity which manifests itself in volition. All free action is productive, but productive only with consciousness. If, then, since the two activities are only one in principle, we suppose that the same activity which is productive with consciousness in free action is productive without consciousness in the production of the world, this preëstablished harmony is a reality, and the contradiction is solved. If we suppose that all this is actually the case, then that original identity of the activity which is engaged in the production of the world, with that which exhibits itself in volition, must manifest itself in the production of the former, and these must necessarily appear as the productions of an activity at once conscious and unconscious.

"Such an activity can be no other than the esthetic, and every work of art can only be conceived of as the product of such. The ideal work of art and the real world of objects are therefore products of one and the same activity. The meeting of the two (of the conscious and the unconscious) gives without consciousness the real, with consciousness the esthetic world.

"The objective world is only the original still unconscious poetry of the soul. The universal organum of philosophy—the keystone of its entire arch—is the philosophy of art."

It was no affectation on the part of Hegel when he called his system one of logic, for all other forms of knowledge are made subordinate to the concept, just as all phases of the world, human and physical, have no other ground or purpose than an intellectualistic one. In the spirit of Spinoza, but in accordance with a different method, Hegel seeks to rationalize the universe.

Hegel advances beyond Schelling as Schelling had excelled Fichte. He unites subjective and objective, not by assuming an identity between them, but by erecting a vast system of becoming wherein the formal principle of thought becomes real and objective.

Hegel's 'Logic' is really a work on metaphysics, treated rationalistically in accordance with the romantic ideals of transcendentalism. The study of reality, which it includes, involves the usual divisions of the subject into ontology, cosmology, psychology. Hegel recasts these in forms and reorganizes their content as follows:

"Logic is divided into three parts:

"(1) The Doctrine of Being; (2) the Doctrine of Essence; (3) the Doctrine of Notion and Idea.

"Being is the notion implicit only; its special forms have the predicate 'is'; when they are distinguished they are each of them an 'other,' and the shape which dialectic takes in them—*i.e.*, their further specialization—is a passing over into another. . . . Thus the explanation of the notion in the sphere of being does two things; it brings out the totality of being and it abolishes the immediacy of being or the form of being as such.

"The terms in Essence are always mere pairs of correlatives and not yet absolutely reflected in themselves, hence in essence the actual unity of the notion is not realized, but only postulated by reflection. Essence—which is Being coming into mediation with itself through the negativity of itself—is self-relatedness, only in so far as it is relation to an Other—this

Other, however, coming into view at first not as something which is, but as postulated and hypothetized. Being has not vanished, but, firstly, Essence, as simple self-relation, is Being, and secondly, as regards its one-sided characteristic of immediacy. Being is deposed to a mere negative, to a seeming or reflected light. Essence accordingly is Being thus reflecting light into itself.

"The Notion is the principle of freedom, the power of substance self-realized. It is a systematic whole, in which each of its constituent functions is the very total which the notion is and is put as indissolubly one with it. Thus, in its self-identity, it has original and complete determinateness."

The spread of Hegelianism was rapid, but the school did not live much longer than its author. While the influence of Hegelianism as such is no longer significant, abiding results of its idealism are apparent in present life and culture. In theology and politics Hegel's influence was carried on by Strauss, Feuerbach and Marx. The history of philosophy was organized on Hegelian principles by Uberweg, Schwegler, Zeller, Erdmann and Kuno Fischer. In England his influence was felt by T. H. Green, as it is discernible also in Edward Caird. America has felt some measure of Hegelianism in the instance of W. T. Harris.

Under the general term Realism may be included nearly all the philosophy following after transcendental idealism. As a definite doctrine realism was first formulated by Herbart (1776-1841), whose motto was, "As much appearance (Schein) so much reality (Sein)," and whose fundamental principle was found in a system of related 'reals.' This method was followed by Lotze (1817-1881) with his claim, "Reality is richer than thought." A larger realism appeared in Schopenhauer (1788-1860), who, beginning with Kant, turned German philosophy into irrationalism. In France Comte (1798-1857) developed a system of 'Positivism,' which tended to further a certain

phase of Kantianism without being dependent upon it. England received from Comte through Mill what France had borrowed from the earlier Anglican thinkers, Bacon and Locke. The evolutionary theory then came in through Spencer (1820-1903) to form an independent doctrine of a realistic and positivistic character.

Where the idealists had followed Kant's transcendental method they had not appreciated his doctrine of the subjectivity of space and time, nor had they attempted to describe the thing-in-itself in which reality was to be found. With Kant, Schopenhauer believes that the world appears to the mind through the forms of time, space and casuality. For himself he insists that behind and beneath this world of representation there is a real world of will. The will is the thing-in-itself. On this assumption Schopenhauer seeks to explain Nature, and align an ideal for humanity; the world is the objectification of the will-to-live, as if to say, "But thou, O man! are above the world; therefore deny the will-to-live." The development of such a doctrine involves four parts of Schopenhauer's masterpiece, 'The World as Will and Idea,' as follows: (1) The world as representation (theory of knowledge); (2) the world as will (metaphysics); (3) the world as Platonic idea (esthetics); (4) assertion and denial of the will-to-live (ethics).

With the will behind him, Schopenhauer does not hesitate to make the great idealistic assumption of the Vedanta, Plato, Berkeley and Kant, that the world as given in experience is merely ideational, since he says:

> "'The world is my idea.' This is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, tho man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. If he really does this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom. It then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world which surrounds him

is there only as idea—*i.e.*, only in relation to something else, the consciousness, which is himself. No truth therefore is more certain, more independent of all others and less in need of proof than this, that all that exists for knowledge, and therefore this whole world, is only object in relation to subject, perception of a perceiver; in a word, idea. What is this world of perception besides being my idea? Is that of which I am conscious only as idea, exactly like my own body, of which I am doubly conscious, in one aspect as idea, in another aspect as will?"

Beginning with the doctrine of esthetics, Schopenhauer's philosophy of life is found, and Part Three affords a new view of the Idea as Part Four reveals an altered conception of Will. The aim of art is twofold: it purges man of the will-to-live and presents the outer world in its unity. This is to be seen in the following passages:

"In the esthetical mode of contemplation we have found two inseparable constituent parts—the knowledge of the object, not as the individual thing but as the Platonic Idea—that is, as the enduring form of this whole species of things—and the self-consciousness of the knowing person, not as individual but as pure willless subject of knowledge. The condition under which both these constituent parts appear always united was found to be the abandonment of the method of knowing which is bound to the principle of sufficient reason and which, on the other hand, is the only kind of knowledge that is of value for the service of the will and also for science."

The transition from esthetics to ethics is made necessary because the artistic work of contemplation is not sufficient to save the individual from the will-to-live which can be overcome only by renunciation. Only a few are artists; all can be moralists, and while the ecstatic moment of esthetic pleasure is occasional, the denial of the will-to-live may be made permanent.

While it is true that Schopenhauer's view of the world-ground implies the irrationalism of a blind will, the life-ideal which is advanced involves the triumph of intellect over impulse. This appears esthetically in the redemption of man through contemplation, while in the ethics it assumes the striking forms of conscience, non-retaliation and self-denial. In this view of reason as victorious over sense Schopenhauer was followed by Wagner and Tolstoi. The assertion of the will-to-live and the triumph of egoism were celebrated by Nietzsche and Ibsen. Among professional philosophers, Wundt and Paulsen affirm the supremacy of the Schopenhauerian will.

The positive philosophy of Comte is realistic in a sense entirely different from Schopenhauer's system of the will. Where Schopenhauer had turned away from a 'noetical' or intellectualistic conception of being, Comte determines to set aside all transcendental inquiries for the sake of studying phenomena. In the midst of this study of Nature Comte aims to pursue a study of social phenomena, so that the double aim of positivism may be summed up under the two heads of science and society. Comte's method was encyclopedic and historical; it reviews what has been accomplished in the various sciences and attempts a philosophic reorganization upon the basis of Positivism. The general principle of the positive, or scientific, is deduced historically from the progress of mankind, through the lower order of thinking which Comte calls the mythological, or theological, the metaphysical, or philosophical, and finally the scientific, or positive. His line of argument is characteristic:

> "From the study of the development of human intelligence, in all directions and through all times, the discovery arises of a great fundamental law, to which it is necessarily subject and which has a solid foundation of proof, both in the facts of our organization and in our historical experience. The law is this: That each of our leading conceptions—each branch of our

knowledge—passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: The Theological, or fictitious; the Metaphysical, or abstract, and the Scientific, or positive. Hence arise three philosophies, or general systems of conceptions on the aggregate of phenomena, each of which excludes the others. The first is the necessary point of departure of the human understanding and the third is its fixed and definite state. The second is merely a state of transition.

"In the theological state the human mind, seeking the essential nature of things, the first and final causes (the origin and purpose) of all effects—in short, Absolute knowledge—supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings.

"In the metaphysical state, which is only a modification of the first, the mind supposes, instead of supernatural beings, abstract forces, veritable entities (that is, personified abstractions) inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena.

"In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after Absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws—that is, their invafiable relations of succession and resemblance."

Like Comte, Spencer attempts to carry out the reorganization of philosophy upon the basis of science and society. As the idealism of Plato and the materialism of Hobbes had sought the unity of organized nature and humanity in the form of a physico-political doctrine, so Spencer's law of Evolution seems to afford a means of transition from physics to politics. Before the law of physical and social evolution could be deduced and set in the proper light, it was necessary for Spencer to distinguish between the knowable and the unknowable. As Comte had turned away from both theological and philosophical forms of the transcendental, so Spencer narrows his attention to the

field of the knowable, but not without observing the possibility of something higher than human personality. This he regards in a negative manner only as the 'unknowable.' Concerning this he says:

"Very likely there will ever remain a need to give shape to that indefinite sense of an Ultimate Existence, which forms the basis of our intelligence. We shall always be under the necessity of contemplating it as some mode of being—that is, of representing it to ourselves in some form of thought, however vague. . . . By continually seeking to know and being continually thrown back with a deepened conviction of the impossibility of knowing, we may keep alive the consciousness that it is alike our highest wisdom and our highest duty to regard that through which all things exist as The Unknowable.

"The Knowable appears in contrast to the Unknowable, against which it is outlined as upon a dark background.

"After concluding that we cannot know the ultimate nature of that which is manifested to us, there arise the questions, What is it that we know, in what sense do we know it and in what consists our knowledge?

"How then is Philosophy constituted? It is constituted by carrying a stage further the process indicated. So long as these truths are known only apart and regarded as independent, even the most general of them cannot without laxity of speech be called philosophical. But when, having been severally reduced to a mechanical axiom, a principle of molecular physics, and a law of social action, they are contemplated together as corollaries of some ultimate truth, then we rise to the kind of knowledge which constitutes Philosophy.

"The truths of Philosophy thus bear the same relation to the highest scientific truths that each of these bears to lower scientific truths. As each widest gen-

eralization of Science comprehends and consolidates the narrower generalizations of its own division, so the generalizations of Philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest generalization of Science."

The principle toward which all of Spencer's philosophy inclines is that of Evolution, whose law is stated as follows:

"Advance from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous is clearly displayed in the progress of the latest and most heterogeneous creature—Man. While the peopling of the earth has been going on, the human organism has grown more heterogeneous among the civilized divisions of the species, and the species, as a whole, has been made more heterogeneous by the multiplication of races and the differentiation of them from one another.

"At the same time that Evolution is a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous it is a change from the indefinite to the definite. Along with an advance from simplicity to complexity, there is an advance from confusion to order—from undetermined arrangement to determined arrangement. Development, no matter of what kind, exhibits not only a multiplication of unlike parts, but an increase in the clearness with which these parts are marked off from one another. And this is the distinction sought. . . .

"Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."

From the standpoint of Positivism it would seem as tho philosophy had been left stranded by science, premising that the thought of the future consider all or any interpretations of the world of sense without reference to any imperceptible order of being. But in the midst of recent scientific clamor philosophy has not been silent. The close

of the last century witnessed the formulation of a monistic philosophy having as its goal the reconciliation of the physical and the psychical. This monism expressed the speculative need of an age devoted to psychological research guided by biological principles. Voluntarism, which exalted the will above the intellect, was produced by the general spirit of activism prevalent in the latter half of the nineteenth century; its definite formulation as a theory was brought about by Schopenhauer. Belief in a single earth-force as expressed by Monism and Voluntarism was furthered by researches in the fields of physics and chemistry, biology and psychology, whose testimony seemed to demonstrate the existence of one active principle in the universe. The practical ideal of this parting period is best expressed in Nietzsche's term, "the will-to-power."

Right or wrong, good or bad, the Golden Age of Science, in which we now live, has not only colored philosophy, but has begun it along a new line. The publication of Darwin's 'Origin of Species' in 1858 was as distinct a philosophical event as Plato's enunciations of the Socratic doctrines, or the decisions of the First Council of Constantinople as to the books which should be included among the canonical Scriptures. Whether it be in so scientific and iconoclastic a work as Haeckel's 'Riddle of the Universe,' or in so eagerly religious a book as Rudolph Eucken's 'The Problem of Human Life,' the evolutionary hypothesis stands out in high relief, either for defense or attack. In the five names selected as leading on the march of pure philosophy, Nietzsche, Bergson, Eucken, James and Russell, this leading thought of the age must be kept in mind, Spencer's definition serving as its description.

Nietzsche (1844-1900) is a link between two contrasting schools of realism and idealism. He is the apostle of pessimistic subjectivism, a subjectivism which was but a turtle-shell into which one might creep in order to escape from the blinding shafts of light that shone effulgent from

the orb of scientific materialism. At the same time the Nietzschean philosophy is the glorification of the self, of the super-self, of the limitless rights of the artistically gifted individuality. Most of the value of Nietzsche's work lies in his extraordinary literary gifts, his passion for utterance, his rebellion against a soulless civilization, his loathing for the standard of practical utility, his repugnance to the very touch of a world that spins to the tune of conformity. He cries aloud in the wilderness for freedom, for self-exaltation, for a sublimated hedonism, for opportunity wherein spontaneity and creative power may find full vent.

Yet this subjectivism has shown itself defective. The very stimulation caused by the suggestion that the individual should rise superior to the world is inevitably followed by reaction when it appears that such an arising can never be. Nietzsche strives to make ascetics by the flowery road of hedonism and hedonists along the thorny path of asceticism. It is full easy to over-reach oneself when arrogantly treading others down. None the less, Philosophy owes a rich debt to the erratic prophet of subjectivism who, at least, advanced a system that possessed dramatic significance and emotional appeal—elements long lacking in philosophical works.

Of logical system, Nietzsche is sadly lacking. His many books cannot be wrought into a coördinated whole. Most of his writings are polemical and controversial, his criticisms are pungent, his assertions imperious, but his revelations of new truths few. Primarily his doctrine is a declaration of the individual, that every sphere of life is complete in itself and peculiar to itself, that uniqueness is superior to collectiveness, and especially that in the world of art—which is a world begotten of the Subject—the fixation of subjective moods designed to evoke ecstasies of emotion is the end to be sought. To the Nietzschean philosophy, or rather revolution against accepted philosophical views, the newer schools of Art, Impressionism,

Cubism, Futurism and the rest, belong. 'Let the dead past bury its dead' is Nietzsche's cry; let us carry the banner of the present, let us see for ourselves how vibrant and full of color is this life in which we live! It is easy to see that such statements would be possessed of tremendous force to people conscious that their lives were shut within a narrow round; it is also easy to see that the whole domain of existent conditions would speedily make any new round, narrow and circumscribed also. Nietzschean Subjectivism is a fertilizer of thought, but not a philosophical system.

In Henri Bergson is found the antithesis of Nietzsche. The subjectivist was audacious, the Creative Evolutionist is timid; Nietzsche blares, Bergson phrases melodiously. The one storms the four quarters of the heavens, with the value of doing something and making that something original or interpretative of the subject; the other flatters the weaknesses of mediocrity, and tries to please us when we are conscious of our failings by the suggestion that everything ideal has no verity and that the universe is as shifty and ague-kneed as ourselves.

There is but one point of difference between the idealism of Bergson and that of all his idealistic predecessors, and that is the manner in which he postulates the universal mind, the ultimate being. To Bergson, God is evolving. There, in three words, is the Bergsonian philosophy. The cosmic sensibility is an experiment without an experimenter, and development is but an unreal and apparent change, since change is but an idea in an eternally fluxing absolute. He cannot help but show that he has no reason for concern in life, in spite of his very earnest effort to transmute values with powers.

Prof. Santayana, who is no trivialist in his own viewpoint of individual worth, attacks Bergson with a wholesome joy. We find him saying: "The embarrassment that qualifies M. Bergson's attainments in mathematics and physics has another and more personal source. He under-

stands, but he trembles. Non-human immensities frighten him, as they did Pascal. He suffers from cosmic agoraphobia. We might think empty space an innocent, harmless thing, a mere opportunity to move, which ought to be highly prized by all devotees of motion. But M. Bergson is instinctively a mystic, and his philosophy deliberately discredits the existence of anything except in immediacy, that is, as an experience of the heart. What he dreads in space is that the heart should be possessed by it, and transformed into it. . . . Things must be reduced again to what they seem; it is vain and terrible to take them for what we find they are.

"M. Bergson is at bottom an apologist for a very old human prejudice, an apologist for animal illusion. His whole labor is a plea for some vague but comfortable faith which he dreads to have stolen from him by the progress of art and knowledge. There is a certain trepidation, a certain suppressed instinct to snap at and sting the hated oppressor, as if some desperate small being were at bay before a horrible monster. M. Bergson is afraid of space, of mathematics, of necessity, and of eternity; he is afraid of the intellect and the possible discoveries of science; he is afraid of nothingness and death.

"These fears may prevent him from being a philosopher in the old and noble sense of the word; but they sharpen his sense for many a psychological problem, and make him the spokesman of many an inarticulate soul. Animal timidity and animal illusion are deep in the heart of all of us."

The fallacy of Bergsonism, however, lies deeper than this. It is, to put it bluntly, a misuse of scientific phenomena to interpret metaphysical subtleties, or, from the other aspect, a metaphysical effort to dodge the inevitable sequence of cause and effect. He will not declare that life is the gift of a Creator, he is terror-fraught by the mere idea that life is the natural expression of a material being, and he is compelled to postulate, instead, an "alien and ghostly madness" descending into matter to cause it

to live. He is essentially a dodger of his own conclusions, for he denies the continuity of sensation and yet revels in psychological microscopy.

Rudolph Eucken may be a reactionary, may be summoning his flock back to the fold of a faith that has become largely a shadow-world, but he posits a much more legitimate philosophy than that of Bergson. He is not afraid of his historical material, as Bergson is afraid of his scientific warp and woof. A phrase of Eucken's is largely a key-note to his thought. He says: "The concentration of effort upon spiritual culture gives a central importance to the individual." Nietzsche would say that in the possibility that the individual could gain by possessing spiritual culture, to that extent would that spiritual culture be justified. Bergson would say that the perception by the individual of the possibilities of benefit caused through spiritual culture was a proof of the individual's potentiality for spiritual culture. Eucken will have none of this; to him the verities are eternal and external, superhuman and super-mundane. He says:

> "There are two ways of regarding times like ours, times which are driven back on fundamentals and have to struggle in order to safeguard even the bare possibility of a spiritual life. In the first place, they are hard, uncomfortable times, distracted and unsettled, hotbeds of dissent and denial; the pettiness of man and the uncertainty of his position are brought home to us with ruthless directness. But, on the other hand, if once we clearly recognize the constraining force of their problems and the spiritual necessities which inform them, they become stirring, progressive, fruitful times, insuring to man a unique dignity and vocation. For they show that only through his own deed can he win to what is fundamental in his nature, that he himself is a co-worker of the whole, that he is lord of his own destiny. Such times constrain him to look problems in the face, to seek no support from

outside, but to find it rather in the world which is invariably present to his spirit."

Eucken is firmly convinced that the world's soul goes marching on "to a new belief in spiritual life." Yet even Eucken cannot escape his times, but speaks of the "historic evolution of spiritual life," and his terrible weakness appears when in speaking of the force of natural selection has nothing better to suggest than: "It is not natural science that leads us into naturalism, but the weakness of our spiritual convictions." He is even driven to begging the main question, assuming, without discussion, the "spiritual nature of man." "As certainly as man is a spiritual being," he writes, "and just in the proportion that he is spiritual, that goal (of developing freedom from all care and worry) can never suffice him. All the material comfort would only mean emptiness of soul. As a spiritual being, he cannot reconcile himself to a life devoid of content, and such content he can only find by going back upon his fundamental relation to reality, grounding his whole being in a realm of truth and love." All of which may be good, wholesome preaching, but is not philosophy, not even moral philosophy.

Eucken was convinced that the preaching of the Germanized Protestant Christianity of America—that is actually what he called it—would develop a "spiritual democracy." But there is very little of Eucken's City of God idea in America's only modern philosopher, William James. There is no doubt as to James's democracy; it flaunts itself on every page of his work, and there is not much doubt as to the thin-bloodedness of his spirituality. It is Bergsonian, and what more could be said? But James has possessed far more perception of the philosophical content than Bergson, and Pragmatism is a force to be reckoned with.

Primarily, then, Pragmatism is a theory setting forth the vital and continuous adjustment of events and their sequences, and positing the development and persistence

of intelligence in the perception and connection of these events. When to this is added the fact that James was a thorough-going romanticist, the result follows naturally that he was a most determined foe of intellectualism.

Ideas, to the pragmatist, are the essentials; the life that brought about those ideas is as nothing. Following a mistaken emphasis upon certain sides of the evolutionary hypothesis, William James developed the concept that theory is merely an instrument for practice, and that intelligence is merely a help toward material survival into a system of thought which he named pragmatism. It is quite possible, had its founder striven more for elucidation and less for controversy, that the value of pragmatism in the history of philosophy would occupy a far larger place than it does now.

Nature, says William James, is to be interpreted in the terms of psychology, and accordingly, since it possesses psychic attributes, which are the exclusive property of persons, it is to be interpreted personally, or even anthropomorphically—in the terms of human personal relatives. This, of course, is pure animism, but James upholds his animism in modern terms which give his conclusions a distinct element of novelty, which afford a new vista of thought.

Under these terms the purposes of the divine-human animism are not to be thought of in the terms of logic or law; they are not destinies nor static harmonies; they are practical endeavors, efforts of intention, immanently set into finite souls in such wise that they both affected the environment and are, in turn, affected by the environment that others have created.

This animistic 'spirit' of pragmatism is instinct with romanticism. As Santayana phrases it, the spirit is "a romantic adventurer. Its future is undetermined. Its scope, its duration and the quality of its life are all contingent. This spirit grows; it buds and sends forth feelers, sounding the depths around for such other centres or

forces of life as may exist there. It has a vital momentum, but no predetermined goal It uses its past as a stepping-stone, or rather as a diving-board, but has an absolutely fresh will at each moment to plunge this way or that into the unknown.

"The universe is an experiment; it is unfinished. It has no ultimate or total nature, because it has no end. It embodies no formula or statable law; any formula is at best a poor abstraction, describing what, in some region and for some time, may be the most striking characteristic of existence; the law is a description *a posteriori* of the habit things have chosen to acquire and which they may possibly throw off altogether that a day may bring forth is uncertain; uncertain even to God. Omniscience is impossible; time is real; what had been omniscience hitherto might discover something more to-day.

"Much in us is doubtless immortal; we survive death for some time in recognizable form; but what our career and transformations may be in the sequel we cannot tell, altho we may help to determine them by our daily choices. Observation must be continued if our ideas are to remain true. Eternal vigilance is the price of knowledge; perpetual hazard, perpetual experiment, keep quick the edge of life."

Pragmatism, then, is not so very new, for such statements are those of radical empiricism and radical romanticism. Yet James's elucidation of his theory is new. It is new in the sense that it entices the old faith to the old goal by a path where all the scenery looks deceptively different. The admitted, the formal, the intellectually restrained—these James has abolished. The theists may welcome pragmatism, but they will have to take James and pay his price, and his price is subscribing to the Bergsonian dogma that "God is evolving."

Of contemporary philosophers there is, perhaps, only one who has taught pure philosophy. Neither Nietzsche, Bergson, Eucken or James are super-eminent masters. All

have the same bad habit of searching the heart and from this somewhat debatable process drawing conclusions which they posit as necessary concomitants to eternal truth, if indeed, they be not the eternal verities themselves. But Bertrand Russell has the temper of the mathematician, and though this sometimes leads him astray in the belief that mathematics is the be-all and end-all of existence, at the same time it clarifies his thoughts from nebulous misconceptions and gives him the power to say exactly what he means. Observe how succinctly he disposes of the supposed "facts" used to bolster up pragmatism.

"The facts that fill the imaginations of pragmatists," Mr. Russell writes, "are psychical facts; where others might think of the starry heavens, pragmatists think of the perception of the starry heavens; where others think of God, pragmatists think of the belief in God; and so on. In discussing the sciences, they never think, like scientific specialists, about the facts upon which scientific theories are based; they think about the theories themselves. Thus their initial question and their habitual imaginative background are both psychological."

Those of us who are not mathematicians will enjoy Mr. Russell's demolition of his opponents more than his enunciation of his own philosophy. "Where the treasure is, there will the heart be also," and there is no doubt that Mr. Russell's treasures are shrined in a mathematical casket. Thus he says:

"To reconcile us, by the exhibition of its awful beauty, to the reign of Fate is the task of tragedy. But Mathematics takes us still further from what is human, into the region of absolute necessity, to which not only the actual world but every possible world must conform; and here it builds a habitation eternally standing, where our ideals are fully satisfied and our best hopes are not thwarted. It is only where we thoroughly understand the entire independence of ourselves, which belongs to this

world that reason finds, that we can adequately realize the profound importance of its beauty." Again:

"Real life is to most men a long second-best, a perpetual compromise between the ideal and the possible; but the world of pure reason knows no compromise, no practical limitations, no barrier to the creative activity embodying in splendid edifices the passionate aspiration after the perfect form which all great work springs. Remote from human passions, remote even from the pitiful laws of nature, the generations have gradually created an ordered cosmos where pure thought can dwell as in its natural home, and where one, at least, of our nobler impulses can escape from the dreary exile of the actual world."

The mathematical hypothesis of the good, as enunciated by both Mr. Russell and his forerunner and co-laborer, G. E. Moore, is a valuable modern re-statement of Calvinism. On the other hand, it is characteristically a philosophy or an ethical body of thought anachronistic to modern feeling.

Whither now? Undoubtedly the Spencerian philosophy holds paramount sway, though changed by the changing times. None of the philosophies serve. There is no settlement of the waters of thought, life is running swiftly in the modern world, and philosophic ideas are straws in the current. The irresponsibility of reason is declared loudly. There is a clamor for facts and only a half-hearted interpretation of them. There is a fad for psychological analysis, but no one troubles to use the data that have been gathered. There are as yet but few who feel that what we can know is not all that exists, and that the mind may and should be freed from the trammels, alike, of matter and idea. How is this to be done, what solid ground of logical truth may be able to make full use of all this heterogeneous collection of concepts? This is the thrilling query that confronts students of Modern Philosophy. The Age awaits its voice.

SOCIOLOGY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY

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CHAPTER I

THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY

NOTHING less than the "sum total of human achievement," so Lester F. Ward declares, constitutes the subject-matter of sociology. "It is concerned," he says, "with social activities. It is a study of action—that is, of phenomena. It is not a descriptive science in the naturalist's sense—a science that describes objects looked upon as finished products. It is rather a study of how the various social products have been created."

Thus broadly defined, the enormous importance of this branch of knowledge is immediately apparent. It underlies all that Man is, it conditions all that he does. Culture, history, economics, jurisprudence and politics all fall within its scope.

The germs of the sociological idea may be traced through Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hume, Bentham, Burke, Hegel and Fourier; but sociology as a science did not emerge until the nineteenth century. The word "sociology" was first used by Auguste Comte. Herbert Spencer was the first great sociologist.

It was Spencer who laid the evolutionary basis of sociology, and he blazed the way for all his successors. The evolutionary point of view dominates modern sociological thought. When the early habits of men are found to be

indistinguishable from those of animals; when it is possible to trace not only a progressive development of humanity, but a development ruled and regulated by well-defined principles; when these principles are seen working themselves out in the same way in tribes and nations inhabiting different and even disconnected continents—it is reasonable to conclude, with Lewis H. Morgan, the author of "Ancient Society," that "mankind commenced their career at the bottom of the scale and worked their way up from savagery to civilization through the slow accumulations of experimental knowledge."

The primal question confronting the social investigator is, How did society originate? and, like most other fundamental questions, it cannot be answered easily or definitely. It is not known when human life first appeared on the earth, and ignorance even extends as to whether man or woman was the dominant sex in the beginning. None can say which of the ancient civilizations came first in order. China claims that its dynasties stretch back millions of years, and Egyptian chroniclers tell of a Babylonian history extending hundreds of thousands. But such calculations may safely be dismissed as fanciful. All that is known for certain is that the racial history of mankind is at least to be numbered in tens of thousands of years.

The biblical chronology, based on the assumption that the human race originated in a single pair, 4004 B.C., has been so long impressed on the human consciousness that despite the evidential value of newer theories, the old idea still counts its numerous adherents, and to many it is a difficult mental exercize to realize the implications of the more modern conceptions. It should not be forgotten that the first stages of man's social development and his first discoveries must have been by far the most difficult, owing to the feebleness of his power of abstract reasoning. He fought with his fellows, and on occasions he learned to combine with them for mutual protection, as the animals do. The earliest association was a horde. Hunger and

sex-passion were the two great motor-powers in man's life, as in the lives of animals. The psychic factors that drove him onward, such as imitation and curiosity, he also shared with the animals.

It was not until he learned how to speak that he may be said to have risen above the animal plane. Articulate speech was his first great achievement. And speech, according to Franklin H. Giddings, originated in a very curious way. "The communal spirit," Giddings states in his "Principles of Sociology," "finds its first and rudest expression in bodily play and excitement." Primeval man romped and frolicked with his fellows. There were rhythmic beatings of the hands and arms and some approach to song, and "under the mental exaltation of such occasions, rather than under any less stimulating circumstances, attention would be fixed upon vocal sounds such as signs." Thus speech was born.

Speech stimulated curiosity in primitive man as surely as it whets the curiosity of the child to-day. "It is when the child begins to apply names to things," Giddings points out, "that his curiosity becomes insatiable. In the effort to discover whether or not the new object resembles anything that he has already classified and denominated, he examines it by every means known to him; by touch, taste and sound, by pulling and twisting, by throwing, and pounding, and crushing, until for the time he has completely exhausted his powers of attention. In like manner, under the mental excitement of practicing his newly acquired and wonderful faculty of speech, the primitive man, we may be sure, awakened to the intense interest in the qualities and relations of the objects that he was beginning to name, which, in his descendants, was to become the quenchless thirst for knowledge."

The powers developing through the exercize of speech and of curiosity were dominant factors in the upward growth of humanity. They tended to emphasize inequality, to separate the clever from the stupid. The possessor of a

glib tongue and of a capacity for observation became the most interesting object of distinction. The wish to emulate, the desire to excel, began to be consciously conceived in the mind. "In the birth of these two desires," says Giddings, "the long course of human progress began."

Man's first struggles were with the forces of nature, with wild beasts and with the members of his own species outside his horde. His first inventions were connected with the making of tools or of means of defense against wild animals. Man has been characterized as "the tool-using animal," but the description is not distinctive enough. Even the brutes use the tools that are ready to hand in the form of clubs and stones. The English anthropologist, Edward B. Tylor, thinks man should rather be termed "the tool-making animal." He is the only creature who has learned how to improve the quality of the tools furnished by Nature.

During the Glacial Epoch man lived in caves. His food was vegetal as well as carnivorous. In addition to the spoils of the chase, he lived on nuts, fruits, roots, wild honey, and perhaps even birds' eggs, grubs from rotten wood and insects. He plucked bark from the trees and found that he could weave the filaments with his fingers into a rough texture. This was the beginning of cloth. While patiently rubbing sticks together to give them point, he saw a spark leap forth and ignite the wood-dust which had been scraped from the sticks. Thus fire was born. The discovery of fire naturally led to the cooking of food. Its possessors were improved in health and vigor. They found that the best way to keep cooking utensils from burning was to plaster them with clay. This was the beginning of pottery. With the assistance of fire, logs were hollowed into canoes and the points of stakes were hardened. Flints were sharpened into spears, and the bow and arrow very likely grew out of the spring-trap set in the woods by fitting a dart to an elastic branch.

So far the hunger and hunting instincts of elemental

man have been followed. But what of man's relation to woman, it will be asked, and what of woman herself in prehistoric times? The answer to these questions is difficult and obscure.

Most sociologists agree that the savage peoples passed through a "matriachal" stage in which descent was traced through the woman exclusively and in which woman was the dominant sex. Lester F. Ward goes so far as to argue that in the earliest dawn of human existence woman was the only sex and that man was at first a mere parasite upon her. He also argues in his "Pure Sociology" that the early matings of men and women were promiscuous; that man did not at first even recognise the casual connection between sex-intercourse and the birth of children, and that when he did come into this knowledge he made the women and children his chattels. According to this theory, the female, in the beginning, ruled the male, but was afterward subjected to him. The "subjection of woman" was carried to terrible extremes, and, in Ward's judgment, constitutes one of man's blackest crimes.

Ward summons to the support of his theory of early promiscuity some of the greatest authorities. Lubbock shared this view and Letourneau has said: "In the lower grades of civilization, in the most primitive human hordes, there is nothing yet that deserves the name of marriage. It is by hazard of necessity that sexual unions, or rather couplings, take place, and one single law governs them—the law of the strongest." On the other hand, Morgan holds that there were well-defined marriage forms as far back as anything is known, and that these consisted successively of intermarriages between brothers and sisters in a group and of intermarriages of several brothers to each others' wives in a group.

The theory of the "subjection of woman" has Herbert Spencer's support. "In the history of humanity as written," he says, "the saddest part concerns the treatment of women, and had we before us its unwritten history we

should find this part still sadder. I say the saddest part, because tho there have been many things more conspicuously dreadful—cannibalism, the torturings of prisoners, the sacrificings of victims to ghosts and gods—these have been occasional, whereas the brutal treatment of women has been universal and constant. Utter absence of sympathy made it inevitable that women should suffer from the egoism of man without any limit save their ability to bear the entailed hardships."

The theories of Giddings, both in regard to early marriage customs and woman's subjection, are entirely different. He thinks that from earliest times the tendency in mating was toward relatively monogamic relations. "There is at least a reasonable presumption," he asserts, "that the family of primitive man was an intermediate development between the family of the highest animals and that of the lowest living men. If so, it was a simple pairing family, easily dissolved and perhaps rarely lasting for life." According to this theory, the earliest family was "a temporary monogamy," and the stability of the relation increased as society itself became more stable. The state of savagery, Giddings continues, was necessarily one of war, but "it seems quite wrong," he avers, "to conclude that women in savage life are always slaves and men their tyrannical masters. There is plenty of evidence to show that so far from being slaves, the women of these low societies are on a substantial public and private equality with the men."

Whatever may be the truth as to these and other conflicting theories, it is certain that the men and women of primeval times must alike have suffered and struggled in their conflict with one another and with external nature. First as forest-hordes, then as dwellers in caves and cliffs, they waged a never-ending battle with adverse circumstances.

The next period in human development was the hunting and fishing stage. Some of the earliest European

communities built rude huts along the coasts of Scandinavia. They subsisted in large part on shell-fish, and after eating threw away the shells around their dwellings. These heaps of refuse, these "kitchen middens," may still be seen on the shores of the Danish islands. Mingled with thousands of cast-away oyster and cockle shells are bones of animals, birds and fish, and spears, knives and implements.

Other primitive settlements were composed of lake-dwellers. In Ireland, in the north of Italy and in Switzerland have been found the evidences of their activity. The stakes on which the Swiss houses rested are still standing in the shallow parts of Constance, Zurich, Geneva and nearly all the Swiss lakes. They represent a more complex life than that of the Scandinavians. It is probable that as many as 300 wooden huts were sometimes comprized in one settlement and as many as 1,000 people. The lake-dwellers caught fish, cultivated cereals and domesticated animals.

The domestication of animals led to a fourth stage in human society—the pastoral. By this time the 'horde' had become a 'tribe,' and within the tribe the household, the 'clans,' or 'gentes,' and the 'phratries' were becoming clearly differentiated. All over the world these same forms developed. The clan was the outgrowth of the household. It represented kinship organization larger than the single family, and differing from the family in including only the relatives, real or nominal, in one line of descent. The family name of the present day is a survival of the clan-name. The phratry was the outgrowth of the clan, and in course of time became a distinctively religious association.

The pastoral stage of society under which these forms developed grew naturally out of the hunting stage. "When a female animal is killed," says Winwood Reade in "The Martyrdom of Man," "the young one, fearing to be alone, often follows the hunter home; it is tamed for

sport; and when it is discovered that animals can be made useful domestication is methodically pursued. While men were yet in the forest they tamed only the dog to assist them in hunting and perhaps the fowl as an article of food. But when certain tribes, driven by enemies or by starvation from their old haunts, entered prairie land, clad in skins or bark cloth, taking with them their firesticks and perhaps some blacksmith tools, they adopted breeding as their chief pursuit, and subdued to their service the buffalo, the sheep, the goat, the camel, the horse, and the ass. At first these animals were merely used as meat; next, their milk-giving powers were developed, and so a daily food was obtained without killing the animal itself; then they were broken in to carry burdens, to assist their masters in the chase and in war; and clothes and houses were manufactured from their skins."

To the pastoral stage belong the prehistoric Asiatic tribes who are generally credited with being the founders of modern civilization. They fall into four great groups —the Turanians, or Chinese Tartars; the Hamites, from whom the Egyptians are supposed to have been descended; the Shemites, or Semites, the ancestors of the Babylonians, Hebrews and Phenicians; and the Aryans, or "noble," who differed much in appearance from the slit-eyed Mongols, and whose language was quite distinct from that of the Hamites and Semites. The Aryans were a hardy and adventurous shepherd tribe. They are believed to have overspread Europe on the one side, India on the other. Celts and Germans, Russians and Poles, Romans and Greeks, are all traced to this common stock. The Persian and Hindu tongues, the Greek and the Latin, all sprang from the same root.

This Aryan migration, with its far-reaching influence over the history of the world, is itself an interesting evidence of the nomadic habits of early man. There was nothing stable in social life, and huntsmen and shepherds

wandered wherever they wished. They lived in tents and huts, and left behind them the mounds and barrows in which their chiefs lay buried.

The first signs of a more settled life appear in the next, the agricultural, stage; and woman was largely responsible for the change. While the men were fighting, hunting or following the herds, the women collected vegetable food, upon which they subsisted exclusively during the absence of their husbands. The need of continuous diet doubtless suggested the idea of sowing and transplanting. Thus agriculture became a part of the community life and was at first a female occupation. But as long as the tribes were moving from one region to another agriculture was merely a secondary pursuit. It was only when tribes encountered specially fertile grounds, or were hemmed in by mountains in a valley, that agriculture became the principal occupation. Such agricultural tribes, still warlike, yet developing toward a more peaceful status, were the Grecians of the Homeric epoch and the Italian tribes previous to the founding of Rome.

The more stable life of agriculturists gave an impetus to building and architecture. It also developed the sense of private property. Up to this time private property had only extended to simple personal belongings, such as tools, articles of adornment, and trophies of the chase or of war. There had been a large degree of communism, and private property in land had not even been thought of. But now the immense benefits resulting from private ownership of land and products became apparent and the tribes began to draw boundary lines.

There was also a great development of slavery. This had existed in previous periods, but to hunters and fishermen, even to roving shepherds, slaves were of little advantage. Under an agricultural régime they could be set to work in the fields and employed constantly.

To this period may be traced the beginnings of trade.

"The pastoral tribes," as Winwood Reade points out, "had a surplus supply of meat, milk, wool and the rude products of the ancient loom. The marine tribes had salt and smoked fish. The agricultural tribes had garden-roots and grain. Here, then, a division of labor had arisen among the tribes; and if only they could be blended together a complete nation would be formed. But the butcher tribes, the fishmonger tribes, and the baker tribes lived apart from one another; they were timid, ferocious, and distrustful; their languages were entirely distinct. They did not dare to communicate with one another, except to carry on dumb barter, as it is called. A certain tribe, for example, who desired salt approached the frontier of the sea-coast people, lighted a fire as a signal, and laid down some meat or flour. They then retired; the coast tribe came up, laid down salt, and also retired. The meat or flour tribe again went to the spot, and if the salt was sufficient they took it away; if not they left it untouched, to indicate that they required more; and so they chaffered a considerable time, each bid consisting of a promenade."

Such a system of trade might go on for a long while without the respective tribes becoming better acquainted with each other. The bloody arts of war were necessary to compress these heterogeneous peoples into one nation. "The shepherd tribes," Reade continues, "had a natural aptitude for war. They lived almost entirely on horseback, they attacked wild beasts in hand-to-hand conflict on the open plain, and they often fought with one another for a pasture or a well. They were attracted by the crops of the agricultural people, whom they conquered with facility. Usually they preferred their roaming life, and merely exacted a tribute of corn. But sometimes a peopled worsted in war, exiled from their pastures, wandering homeless through the sandy deserts, discovered a fruitful river plain, in which they settled down, giving up their nomad habits, but keeping their flocks and herds.

They reduced the aborigines to slavery; made some of them laborers in the fields; others were appointed to tend the flocks; others were sent to the river or the coast to fish; others were taught the art of the distaff and the loom; others were made to work as carpenters and smiths. The wives of the shepherd conquerors were no longer obliged to milk the cows and camels and to weave clothes and tents; they became ladies and were attended by domestic slaves. The simple fabrics of the old tent life were refined in texture and beautified with dyes; the potter's clay was converted into fine porcelain and glass; the blacksmith's shop became a manufactory of ornamental arms; ingenious machines were devised for the irrigation of the soil; the arts and sciences were adopted. Here, then, we have a nation manufactured entirely by means of war."

Under such conditions the time was ripe for the development of the two most important social institutions —those of religion and government. Until now the germs of both had existed, but not their reality. Speculation has always been, and will probably always be, rife in regard to how the religious instinct originated. Giddings thinks that it grew out of man's efforts to analyze his own being. Speaking of the momentous "first time" man tried to analyze himself, he says: "Ordinarily thought and body seemed to be inseparable. Ordinarily the bodies of other men seemed like his own; they acted like his own and responded so perfectly to his spoken or acted thought that in them also body and thought seemed to be a concrete whole. But he had seen them when they responded no more. It was as if something real, the impalpable and evasive, had departed with the breath. Were there, then, after all, in every man two souls? It seemed almost as if there might be, and the longer the primitive man thought about this question and talked about it with his comrades, the more probable to his mind did the affirmative answer become. His own experiences seemed

to furnish the final proof. Had he not often in imaginative moods witnessed things not visible to the bodily eye? Had he not repeatedly in dreams wandered far into the forest while his body lay motionless in sleep?

"So in the individual and in the social mind was born at last the idea of the self, or personality, as a conscious life, soul or spirit, dwelling in the body but distinct and separate from it."

From this conception grew the idea that whatever manifested life was personal and was actuated by motives like human motives. "Conscious will was in everything that moved or changed, and the will was prompted, like man's will, by appetite, curiosity, desire, friendliness, or malevolence. The world was a bewildering aggregation of conscious powers. Some of them were contemptible and man could abuse or use them; but others were terrible, swift, subtle or mysterious in their action and filled the wondering human soul with mingled human admiration and dread. The serpent that could run without legs, the turtle that could breathe air or live in water, the hawk that could see its prey from the sky, the plant that could heal or poison, the tornado, the lightning, and the sun—these were beings to be regarded with awe and to be propitiated with the ceremonial respect accorded to all-powerful men."

When man with his newly acquired gift of speech had begun to name himself and his fellows, he had inevitably turned to the animals and natural objects around him. Fanciful analogies, trivial associations, doubtless guided his choice. "Assuming," says Giddings, "that primitive men for generations had named and nicknamed themselves from natural objects and had decorated themselves with such trophies of the chase as feathers, beaks, horns, claws, or even entire heads or skins, we can see that but one conclusion was possible when they thought about the relation of such facts to their conceptions of spirits. A man who found himself named from the eagle necessarily believed that he shared the spirit of the eagle in

a peculiarly intimate and personal way, and he therefore felt with all eagles a close spiritual kinship. From this belief to the conclusion that the eagles would protect him in many mysterious ways, and that he must refrain from injuring any eagle as he would refrain from injuring a human associate, was an easy transition in his simple thought. The eagle became his totem."

At an early stage the totem had been the sacred sign around which the clan had clustered. Children had taken the clan-name or totem of the mother, at least in the beginning, and one of the strictest rules binding upon them had been that forbidding intermarriage between members of the same clan. If the mother were of the Bear-clan her son would be a Bear, and accordingly he might not marry a Bear-girl, but might take a Deer-girl or Heron-girl.

As the clan grew in strength and in influence it began to formulate rules, at first binding only on its own members, but gradually extending to other clans, in which may be traced the germs of government and of all political ideas. It began to dictate the laws of toleration and of mutual protection and defense on which jurisprudence rests. It enforced rights and duties. It defined property-holding and settled quarrels and feuds. The older and wiser men became judges, and some of these, of a military turn of mind, were the war-chiefs, while others, of a studious nature, laid the foundations of priesthood. Side by side the two great institutions of government and of religion developed.

In times of crisis the war-chiefs of the clans met in council. They discussed the problems of military defense and aggression. They came to feel that hostilities between related tribes were a dissipation of strength that should be saved to use against common enemies. A realization of the advantages of coöperation and of mutual trust followed, and the commander-in-chief of the confederated council was already a potential king.

So human society emerged from chaos into order, and so the laws of social evolution operated. In America, in Africa, in Australasia, in Asia, the economic motives generated by primitive life were the same and worked themselves out along the same general lines.

This does not imply that every people passed through the same stages. There have been races who were stagnant, savages who never emerged from savagery. Such are the negro tribes inhabiting central Africa. There have been the Mongols and the Hindus, who have stood still for centuries, fatalistic, pessimistic, preoccupied with archaic faiths. There have been people like the Aztecs of Mexico who reached a comparatively high state of culture and then declined. But, despite these side-eddies, there has been a main stream of progress, and it has followed the same general lines of tendency in all countries.

The points of similarity between prehistoric Europe and America are most remarkable. This continent, like Europe, has had its flint-users, its nomadic tribes, its rude hunters and fishermen. Here, too, an aboriginal population have erected mounds and barrows and have become cliff-dwellers. And here may be traced, with great distinctness, the transition from the pastoral to the agricultural epochs, from the Stone to the Bronze and Iron Ages.

The toilsome struggles of prehistoric man laid solid foundations for future ages. From caves and forest-depths he emerged into the light. His rude huts and tools, his ruder habits, served their purpose and passed. He must have seen, at least in his prophetic moments, something of what was to come—the Egyptian lore, the purple of Nineveh, the Persian power, "the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome." A new vista opened—the vista of Civilization.

CHAPTER II

THE ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS

THE two essential features of civilization, as Giddings defines them, are "permanent occupation of a definite territory" and "active exploitation of resources by a highly organized industry." There could be no civilization in any real sense until the agricultural stage in social evolution had been reached. The savages of the primeval forest lived a life of torpor, tempered by spasms of activity. The shepherd tribes roamed from pasture to pasture without any settled purpose. It was only when men were willing to settle down in one place and to develop their resources systematically that any high degree of progress became possible. The strengthening and integration of political and military systems were now taken in hand. Religion acquired its temples, its priesthood, its ritual. Towns and cities were built. The relation of blood-kinship, on which barbarism and savagery had rested, gave way, more and more, to relations based on mutual interests and coöperation. The tribe was merged in the nation and the nation in the empire.

The earliest civilizations were established in China, India, Babylonia and Egypt. These countries seemed marked by nature as suitable abodes for community-life, and in each there grew up a people skilled in the management of land, acquainted with manufacture and possessing some knowledge of practical science and art.

The Chinese were the navigators of ancient times. Their

junks explored the Asiatic seas and penetrated even to America, so it is claimed. India was from the first a Land of Desire, attracting because of its precious jewels and vegetable products. Yet both China and India exerted but little influence, relatively speaking, on posterity. The main streams of progress issued from Babylonia and Egypt.

The people of these elemental countries have been compared by Winwood Reade to islanders without ships. "The intermediate seas," he remarks, "were navigated by the wandering shepherd tribes, who sometimes pastured their flocks by the waters of the Indus, sometimes by the waters of the Nile. It was by their means that the trade between the river lands was carried on. They possessed the camels and other beasts of burden requisite for the transport of goods. Their numbers and their warlike habits, their intimate acquaintance with the watering-places and seasons of the desert enabled them to carry the goods in safety through a dangerous land; while the regular profits they derived from the trade and the oaths by which they were bound induced them to act fairly to those by whom they were employed."

Egypt is the first recorded civilization, and its chief contributions to human progress may be said to lie in its great inventions and in its religion. Between five and ten thousand years before Christ this narrow land was more densely populated than any other stretch of country of the same size in the world's history.

The reason for this may be found in the fertility of the soil. No other people has ever made a living so easily as the Egyptians. Once a year the Nile overflowed—rising red and angry, then turning to green and covering the adjoining fields. The whole country became a lake, from which the villages, on artificial mounds, emerged. When the water subsided, leaving behind it a black silt or mud, all that was necessary was to cast the seed on the surface. No other work was called for. No changes of weather

need afterward be feared. Sunshine was all that was necessary, and in Egypt the sunshine is everlasting.

The first inventions of the Egyptians were very naturally connected with their precious water-supply. They found that it ran differently in different years; that it was sometimes excessive and sometimes scarce; that it overflooded certain parts of the country and left other parts dry. So they devised a system of dikes, reservoirs and lock-canals and stored the water to supply the wants of a dry year. As a result of the ravages of the water they had to invent also a system of surveying, in order to settle disputes that arose from year to year. They were impressed by the fact that the rising of the waters coincided with certain aspects of the stars. This led to the study of astronomy and to the discovery of the solar year.

The Egyptians believed in the immortality of the soul and attached unprecedented awe and solemnity to the burial of their dead. The tombs of their greatest were mighty monuments like the pyramids, but even the humblest were laid away with reverent ceremonies. Every Egyptian town possessed its grave-chambers or catacombs, and at Thebes was established a "city of the dead," where countless graves, like bees' cells, were hewn in the rock, with straight and winding staircases, passages, shafts and galleries leading up and down. The practice of embalming the dead seems to have arisen from a belief that the wandering spirit, in its process of purification, was at last to be united with its original body, the sacred mummy, and thus to enter the region of heavenly light.

At first the Nile valley was divided into a number of independent states, but these in time became confederated and selected Thebes as a kind of national capital. In the dawn of history Menes, "the Egyptian Charlemagne," the first of the Pharaohs, moved the capital to Memphis, not far from where Cairo now stands.

By degrees Egypt became consolidated. The system of government was despotic, the Pharaohs being regarded not

merely as representatives of the gods, but as gods themselves, and the mass of the people were thrust into greater and greater subjection. Yet there were compensating features. Civil laws were administered impartially. Women were treated with regard, tho as yet monogamy, in the strict modern sense, was hardly conceived of.

Slavery became an important institution during this epoch. The temples, the pyramids, the colossal statues of Egypt were mostly built by slaves. The Israelites, as the Bible tells, were among those set to work on public monuments. Now slavery, as Lester F. Ward points out, had its own function in the working out of human destinies. "It may safely be inferred," he observes, "from all that is known of actual savages and primitive peoples, that prior to the period of social integration, and at the beginning of the period of conquest, mankind, both the conquered and the conquering races, were utterly incapable of sustained labor and had no conception of it.

"How did man learn to work? Did the needs of existence teach him self-denial, tone down his wild, unsettled nature and discipline his mind and body to daily toil? Not at all. It is safe to say that if left wholly to these influences man would have never learned to labor. It required some other influence far more imperative and coercive. In a word, nothing short of slavery could ever have accomplished this. This was the social mission of human slavery—to convert mere activity into true labor."

The chief enemies of the Egyptian people, from the earliest times, were the shepherd tribes, the robbers of the desert. Three times these savage folk overran the land and conquered it. But Egypt rallied after each attack and finally threw off the oppressors. Some 1,300 years before Christ, Rameses the Great, the most renowned warrior-king of Egypt, ascended the throne. For centuries after his death monuments and inscriptions in conquered countries bore witness to his power and dominion. Then followed a period of ferment, of revolution and counter-revo-

lution. At one time there were three rival dynasties. Aristocracy and caste became marked. Luxury supplanted the earlier simplicity. The gulf between rich and poor widened. The masses of the people became indifferent to governmental corruption and endeavored to go about their business. But all this was the unmistakable sign of national disintegration. Egypt was perishing, as Rome and Greece were afterward to perish, from enervating and luxurious habits of living, from class strife, from lack of national cohesion.

In Asia Minor and Mesopotamia were growing up the peoples who were soon to be the regnant powers. Ionia, the fairest province of Asiatic Greece, was beginning to make its influence felt. It was the birthplace of poetry, of history, of philosophy. It was where the Homeric poems were composed. The Phenicians, too, were scouring the Mediterranean in their vessels and opening up markets for trade. "These Canaanitish men," says Reade, "are fairly entitled to our gratitude and esteem, for they taught our intellectual ancestors to read and write. Wherever a factory trade was carried on it was found convenient to employ natives as subordinate agents and clerks. And thus it was that the Greeks received the rudiments of education. That the alphabet was invented by the Phenicians is improbable in the extreme, but it is certain that they introduced it into Europe. They were intent only on making money, it is true; they were not a literary or artistic people; they spread knowledge by accident, like birds dropping seeds. But they were gallant, hardy, enterprising men. Those were true heroes who first sailed through the sea-valley of Gibraltar into the vast ocean and breasted its enormous waves. Their unceasing activity kept the world alive. They offered to every country something which it did not possess. They roused the savage Briton from his torpor with a rag of scarlet cloth and stirred him to sweat in the dark bowels of the earth. They brought to the satiated Indian prince the luscious

wines of Syria and the Grecian isles in goblets of exquisitely painted glass. From the amber-gatherers of the Baltic mud to the nutmeg-growers of the equatorial groves, from the mulberry plantations of the Celestial Empire to the tin mines of Cornwall and the silver mines of Spain emulation was excited, new wants were created, whole nations were stimulated to industry by means of the Phenicians."

It was not from Ionians or Phenecians, however, that Egypt received its deathblow, but from the Assyrians. In the region back of Chaldea, the country embraced by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, this warlike race had been nurtured. The far-famed Niveneh was their capital.

The Assyrian Empire had its day and then fell into three parts. The Medes, the Babylonians and the Lydians took the reins of power. The Medes inhabited uplands bordering on the Tigris. Ecbatana was their capital. Their priests were called Magi. They worshipped the sun and the elements of fire as symbols of deity and they followed the precepts of Zoroaster.

The Babylonian Empire attained immense power and prestige under the rule of Nebuchadnezzar. He routed an Egyptian army, destroyed Jerusalem, carried the Jews into captivity and reduced Tyre, the Phenician city, after a memorable siege. "He built a new Babylon, as Augustus built a new Rome," says Reade, "and the city became one of the wonders of the world. The Euphrates ran through the center of the city and was crossed by a stone bridge, which was a marvel for its time. But more wonderful still, there was a tunnel passing underneath the river, and connecting palaces on either side. The city was united to its provinces by roads and fortified ports. Rafts inflated with skins and reed boats pitched over with bitumen floated down the river with timber from the mountains of Armenia and stones for purposes of building. A canal large enough for ships to ascend was dug from Babylon to the Persian Gulf,

and on its banks were innumerable machines for raising the water and spreading it upon the soil."

The Lydians also attained an advanced stage of evolution. "They did not consider themselves," Reade observes, "behind the rest of the world. They boasted that they had invented dice, coin and the art of shopkeeping and also that the famous Etruscan state was a colony of theirs. They inhabited Asia Minor, a sterile, rugged table-land, but possessing a western coast enriched by nature and covered with the prosperous cities of the Asiatic Greeks. Hitherto Ionia had never been subdued, but the cities were too jealous of one another to combine, and Crœsus was able to conquer them one by one. This was the man whose wealth is still celebrated in a proverb; he obtained his gold from the washings of a sandy stream."

Each one of these Asiatic empires lived its brief and feverish life and then passed. All alike lacked the elements which make for endurance and stability. In the twinkling of an eye the triple alliance of Medes, Babylonians and Lydians was broken. A band of hardy mountaineers rushed out of the recesses of Persia and swept like a wind across the plains. They were dressed in leather; they had never tasted wine; they knew nothing of trade. They were taught three things—to ride on horseback, to hurl the javelin and to speak the truth.

All Asia was soon to feel the impact of this people. India and Egypt were added to their empire, the greatest that the world had ever seen. "The Persians," according to Reade, "used to boast that they ruled from the land of uninhabitable heat to the land of uninhabitable cold; that their dominion began in regions where the sun frizzled the hair and blackened the faces of the natives and ended in a land where the air was filled with snow like feathers and the earth was hard as stone. The Persian Empire was in reality bounded by the deserts which divided Egypt from Ethiopia on the south and from Carthage on the west; by the desert which divided the Punjab from Bengal; by

the steppes which lay on the other side of the Jaxartes; by the Mediterranean, the Caspian and the Black seas.

"Darius, the third emperor, invented a system of provincial government which, tho imperfect when viewed by the wisdom of modern times, was far superior to any that had preceded it in Asia. He appointed satraps or pachas to administer the conquered provinces. Each of these viceroys received with his commission a map of his province engraved on brass. He was at once the civil engineer and commander of the troops, but his power was checked and supervised by a secretary or clerk of the accounts, and the province was visited by royal commissioners once a year. The troops in each province were of two kinds; some garrisoned the cities; others, for the most part cavalry, lived, like the Roman legions, always in a camp; it was their office to keep down brigands and to convoy the royal treasure from place to place. The troops were subsisted by the conquered people; this formed part of the tribute and was collected at the point of the sword. There was also a fixed tax in money and in kind, which was received by the clerk of the accounts and dispatched to the capital every year.

"The Great King still preserved in his habits something of the nomad chief. He did not reside all the year in one spot. He wintered at Babylon, but in the summer the heat was terrible in that region. The citizens retired to their cellars and the king went to Susa, which was situated on the hills, or to Ecbatana, the ancient capital of the Medes, or to Persepolis, the heart and home of the Persian race.

"An army of incalculable grandeur was frequently required by the Persians. They were a restless people, always lusting after war. Vast as their empire was, it was not large enough for them. The courtiers used to assure an enterprising monarch that he was greater than all the kings that were dead and greater than those that were yet unborn, and it was the aim and desire of the kings to annex the plains of southern Russia and so to make the Black Sea

a lake in the interior of Persia, and to conquer Greece, the only land in Europe which really merited their arms. In both these attempts they completely failed. The Russian Tartars, who had no fixed abode, whose houses were on wheels, decoyed the Persian army far into the interior, eluded it in pursuit, harassed and almost destroyed it in retreat. The Greeks defeated them in pitched battles on Greek soil and defeated their fleets in Greek waters."

The contest between the Greeks and the Persians doubtless seemed a small matter to the latter. No one could have foreseen at that time the coming supremacy of Greece. There are few problems, in fact, so fascinating as that presented by the unparalleled development of Greece. How did it happen that so small a country exerted so remarkable an influence on the course of events and the intellectual history of mankind?

A glance at the map may help to solve the problem. Greece occupies a unique position. It is nearer than the other European lands to those countries in which civilization first arose. It is the borderland of the East and West. Its coasts are greatly indented and it possesses many hospitable ports and harbors. The Ægean Sea is like a lake; usually it is calm, lustrous and, as Homer says, "of the color of violets." The climate is clear and beautiful. These facts may help to explain something of the spell that Greece cast over the ancient world.

The mountains of Greece are disposed in a peculiar manner, so as to enclose fertile spots completely cut off from one another. In each of these valleys there grew up a community with its own traditions and customs. The laws were made and debated in a general assembly of citizens.

Commerce and religion were chiefly instrumental in bringing together these early townships into a kind of confederation. A central spot was chosen as a market-place and it was made, for the common protection, a sanctuary of Apollo. Apollo was the sun-god of the Greeks, as Osiris had been of the Egyptians. The people when they met for

purposes of trade performed religious rites and held festivals at which athletic feats were witnessed. The combined market-place and sanctuary became in time the famous oracle of Delphi, and the sports expanded into the Olympian games.

The enthusiasm aroused by the Olympian games contributed largely to the unprecedented development of Greece. "The man who won the olive garland on that celebrated course," says Reade, "was famous forever afterward. His statue was erected in the public hall at Delphi; he was received by his native city with all the honors of a formal triumph; he was not allowed to enter by the gates; a part of the city wall was beaten down. The city itself became, during five years, the talk of Greece, and wherever its people traveled they were welcomed with congratulations and esteem.

"The passion for praise is innate in the human mind. It is only natural that throughout the whole Greek world a spirit of eager rivalry and emulation should prevail. In every city was established a gymnasium where crowds of young men exercized themselves. This institution was originally intended for those only who were in training for the Olympian games, but afterward it became a part of daily life, and the Greeks went to the gymnasium with the same regularity as the Romans went to the bath.

"The Greek world was composed of municipal aristocracies, societies of gentlemen living in towns, with their farms in the neighborhood, and having all their work done for them by slaves. They themselves had nothing to do but to cultivate their bodies by exercise in the gymnasium and their minds by conversation in the market-place. They lived out of doors, while their wives remained shut up at home. In Greece a lady could only enter society by adopting a mode of life which in America usually facilitates her exit. The Greeks spent little money on their wives, their houses or their food. The rich men were expected to give

dramatic entertainments and to contribute a company or a man-of-war for the protection of the city.

"The market-place was the Greek club. There the merchants talked their business; the labors of the desk were then unknown. The philosopher instructed his pupils under the shade of a plane tree or strolling up and down a garden path. Mingling with the song of the cicada from the boughs might be heard the chipping of the chisel from the workshop of the sculptor and the laughter and shouts from the gymnasium. And sometimes the tinkle of a harp would be heard; a crowd would be collected and a rhapsodist would recite a scene from the Iliad, every word of which his audience knew by heart, as an audience at Naples or Milan know every bar of the opera which is about to be performed. Sometimes a citizen would announce that his guest, who had just arrived from the Sea of Azov or the Pillars of Hercules, would read a paper on the manners and customs of the barbarians. It was in the city that the book was first read and the statue exhibited—the rehearsal and the private view—it was in Olympia that they were published to the nation. When the public murmured in delight around a picture of Xeuxis or a statue of Praxiteles, when they thundered in applause to an ode by Pindar or a lecture by Herodotus, how many hundreds of young men must have gone home with burning brows and throbbing hearts, devoured by the love of fame. And when we consider that tho the geographical Greece is a small country, the true Greece—that is to say, the land inhabited by the Greeks—was in reality a large country; when we consider with what an immense number of ideas they must have been brought in contact on the shores of the Black Sea, in Asia Minor, in southern Italy, in southern France, in Egypt and in northern Africa; when we consider that, owing to those noble contests of Olympia, city was ever contending against city and within the city man against man—there is surely no longer anything mysterious in the exceptional development of that people."

Not all of the Greek cities, however, reached so high a state of civilization as that here indicated. Sparta, from the first, was little more than a military encampment and to the last scorned the finer graces of life. But in Athens the people were consumed by a passion for truth and for beauty.

The two great contributions of Athens to world progress were a democratic government (based, however, on slavery) and an incalculable quickening of the artistic and cultural side of life. In regard to the first point, Morgan writes in "Ancient Society": "When Grecian society came for the first time under historical observation, about the first Olympiad (776 B.C.) and down to the legislation of Cleisthenes (509 B.C.), it was engaged upon the solution of a great problem. It was no less than a fundamental change in the plan of government, involving a great modification of institutions. The people were seeking to transfer themselves out of gentile society, in which they had lived from time immemorial, into political society based upon territory and upon property, which had become essential to a career of civilization. In fine, they were striving to establish a state, the first in the experience of the Aryan family, and to place it upon a territorial foundation, such as the state has occupied from that time to the present. Ancient society rested upon an organization of persons and was governed through the relation of persons to a gens and tribe; but the Grecian tribes were outgrowing this old plan of government and began to feel the necessity of a political system. To accomplish this result it was only necessary to invent a deme or township, circumscribed with boundaries, to christen it with a name and organize the people therein as a body politic. Altho apparently a simple idea, it required centuries of time and a complete revolution of preëxisting conceptions of government to accomplish the result."

First Theseus tried to organize a society of classes,

namely, the well-born, husbandmen and artizans. He failed because he antagonized the conservative instincts of the people. Then Solon tried to organize society on a basis of property and military service. He failed because the new arrangement left the line of demarcation between the tribal and miscellaneous population as sharp as before. Finally Cleisthenes went to the bottom of the question by simply decreeing that all men who lived within the boundaries of any local subdivision of a tribal domain should be enrolled as members of the local community which dwelt there. The result was the first genuine democracy, the germ of an organized body politic with powers of local self-government, like the modern American township. "It was an inspiration of the genius of Cleisthenes," Morgan exclaims, "and it stands as the master work of a master mind. Under the new government the popular assembly held the substance of power and guided the destiny of Athens.

"The new element which gave stability and order to the state was the deme or township, with its complete autonomy and local self-government. A hundred demes similarly organized would determine the general movement of the commonwealth. As the unit, so the compound. It is here that the people must begin if they would learn the art of self-government and maintain equal laws and equal rights and privileges. They must retain in their hands all the powers of society not necessary to the state to insure an efficient general administration, as well as the control of the administration itself. Athens rose rapidly into influence and distinction under the new political system. That remarkable development of genius and intelligence which raised the Athenians to the highest eminence among the historical nations of mankind occurred under the inspiration of democratic institutions."

But, it must he repeated, the "democracy" so glowingly extolled by Morgan rested on slavery. The greatest Greek thinkers defended slavery. Aristotle thought that with-

out it culture would be impossible, and it may reasonably be argued that here again, as in the Egyptian epoch, slavery had a useful function to perform. Certain it is that under the Athenian system, half free and half slave. there developed what is in some respects the most wonderful period in human history. W. D. P. Bliss, in an article quoted by Giddings, calls it a system of "aristocratic Socialism." He says: "What is a socialistic organization of a city? The ownership and operation of land and capital collectively by the city, for the good of its citizens. Did Athens under Pericles have this? No student of Boeckh's 'Public Economy of Athens,' nor one who can put together the statements of hundreds or thousands of passages in the classic Greek authors, can well deny this. Athens owned lands, mines, forests, farms, houses, markets, which it worked, under one form or another, for the profit of the citizens. Its citizens did not support the city; the city supported the citizens—at least all such as needed support. Out of the revenues derived from its possessions, Athens practically guaranteed a livelihood to every citizen. Have we not here the essence of a very complete Socialism? . . . It practically asked from each citizen according to his ability and gave to each according to his need. This was accomplished in the main by two institutions: the so-called 'liturgics,' securing from the rich gratification for the less fortunate, and above all by the 'dicasticon,' or daily money payment for public service, given to any citizen who wished it, and in quantity sufficient to enable him to live upon it in respectability and ordinary comfort. It was the latter institution which above all made Athens socialistic, and was introduced by Pericles, as we may clearly learn, among other sources, from Aristotle (Politics II, 12) and Plato (Gorgias, 575)."

"What a record it is!" Bliss continues. "Socrates (469-399 B.C.), Plato (428-347 B.C.), Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)—surely in the history of thought there are no greater names than these. In the drama, Æschylus (525-456

B.C.), Sophocles (495-406 B.C.), Euripides (480-406 B.C.) —here are the masters of the classic tragedy; while Aristophanes (444-380 B.C.) is the unique founder of the world's comedy. In history, Thucydides (470-404 B.C.) has perhaps no rival, while Xenophon (430-355 B.C.) has but few. In sculpture, Phidias (490-432 B.C.) and Praxiteles (390 B.C.) stand supreme, while Myron (480 B.C.) and Scopas (370 B.C.) occupy high place. In architecture, Ictinus and Callicrates, the architects of the Parthenon (438 B.C.), and Mnesicles, the builder of the Propylæa (437 B.C.), produced works, of their period certainly the most beautiful and of all periods the most perfect buildings in the world. In painting, Polygnotus (460 B.C.) did work which cultured Athens placed on a par with her sculpture. In oratory, every school-boy knows of Demosthenes (385-322 B.C.), every college-boy of Æschines (389-314 B.C.), while their contemporaries compared Lysias (445-378 B.C.) and Isocrates (436-338 B.C.) with these. In statesmanship, Pericles (495-429 B.C.), Cimon (504-449 B.C.), and Themistocles (514-449 B.C.) are names that would stand out in any history; while in generalship, Miltiades (490 B.C.), the hero of Marathon, and Nicias, the leader in the Spartan wars, can never be forgotten. Other names, among them Alcibiades (450-404 B.C.), Cleon (422 B.C.), Thrasybulus (390 B.C.), Lycurgus, the orator (395-323 B.C.), and Myronides (457 B.C.), belong to this period. Thirty-one names! Where in history is there another city that can produce even an approximation of such a record?"

With similar enthusiasm Ward declares in "Pure Sociology": "Beginning with Thales, Anaximander, Pythagoras and Anaximines in the seventh and sixth centuries and continuing with Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras in the fifth, and Democritus, Aristotle, Epicurus and Euclid in the fourth, followed by Archimedes and the Alexandrian school in the third and second centuries before our era, we have a great mass of cosmological ideas

which, seen thus in perspective, towers up into gigantic proportions. These men were not priests, but all belonged to the privileged class who possessed leisure and opportunity for observation and meditation, and while the earlier of them could only teach their doctrines to their disciples, these latter found ways at last of preserving and transmitting these thoughts until they could ultimately be recorded and handed down as imperishable achievements of the human mind.

"If all that these men and their contemporaries, too numerous to mention, actually taught the world could have been accepted and seized upon, it would almost seem that we moderns would have had nothing to learn. About all that we of the past five centuries have accomplished has been to prove and 'establish' the truths that they taught. I shall not undertake a systematic enumeration of them, but may be permitted to mention the atomic theory, taught by Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus; the heliocentric system, taught by Pythagoras and Aristarchus of Samos; the conservation of energy, distinctly perceived by Epicurus; the nature of electricity, dimly foreshadowed by Thales; the fact of a universal struggle for existence, epigrammatically stated by Heraclitus and taught by Lucretius; the discovery of the power of steam, demonstrated experimentally by Hero; the whole science of geometry, taught by all the Greek philosophers and reduced to theorems by Euclid that it has been found difficult to improve even in point of phraseology; the law of specific gravity, discovered by Archimedes; the principle of the lever and the fulcrum, also worked out by Archimedes; the foundations of natural history, laid by Aristotle and built upon by Theophrastus; and finally the fundamental principles of psychology and sociology, taught by Aristotle as well as by some of the sophists and stoics."

Yet even Greece had not the elements that make for permanence. With all their wisdom the Greeks were un-

able to learn one of the most important of all lessons, the lesson of coöperation. Their cities were incessantly at war, and within the same city walls rival parties hated one another more bitterly than any foreign enemy.

Three hundred years before Christ, Alexander, King of Macedon, swept down upon Greece and conquered it. He was himself of Greek descent, but in temperament and character more nearly resembled a barbarian. Hannibal regarded him as the greatest general that ever lived. To this day his memory has never perished in the East; the Turcomans still speak of his deeds of war; in the tea-booths of Bokhara his biography is recited.

He crossed over into Asia Minor and defeated the Persians in two pitched battles. Then he passed into Syria, laid successful siege to Tyre and gained mastery of the Mediterranean Sea. He entered the plains of Mesopotamia and defeated the Persians a third and last time. He even penetrated beyond India and fought with the Tartars and then "longed for new worlds to conquer."

One of Alexander's most lasting achievements was the foundation in Egypt of the city that bears his name. It was at first the seat of the palace of his general, Ptolemy, and it became a center of culture for the entire ancient world. A university was established there; a botanical garden filled with medicinal and exotic plants; a menagerie of wild beasts and rare birds; and the famous library where 700,000 volumes were arranged on cedar shelves and catalogued by clerks.

Alexander's empire broke up into three kingdoms—Macedonia, Asia and Egypt, but each one of the three soon lost its pristine vigor and disintegrated. Across the Mediterranean, in Italy, the real power was germinating. Several hundreds of years before, had settled there, on the banks of the Tiber, the ancestors of the people who now were to bring all civilization under their sway. Rome was in the ascendant.

If the gifts of Greece to world-progress were democ-

racy and culture, the gift of Rome may be summed up in one word—law. The Romans were the first among all peoples, Giddings observes, to "shape the traditional materials of law into logical and correlated systems of universal validity."

As early as 450 B.C., ten specially elected Roman magistrates, the decemvirs, made a series of laws which they wrote on twelve tables of stone. This was the Law of the Twelve Tables, codified in rude, short, trenchant sentences. It condemned sorcery and excessive usury, and inflicted punishment on the insolent debtor. According to Cicero, it was "the source of all the Roman law." Four centuries after its publication the children had to learn it in the schools.

The legal system of Rome was directly dependent on its political and military structure, and this reached a state of efficiency unparalleled in ancient times. In the arts of organization and administration Rome showed actual genius. It built its roads so strongly that they endure unto this day, and its extensive public works show that some of the most important principles of engineering, including those of the arch and the catenary, had been worked out and applied.

Rome's earliest government was very simple. Each family was ruled by its "father," and a king ruled over all. For state purposes the fathers gathered in the Senate, or meeting of old men. The people were warriors and small farmers; their tastes were simple, their habits deliberate, their morals austere. They spent three centuries conquering the land in their immediate vicinity, but each conquest was permanent. The Romans held by the plow what they won by the sword, and sent to the new community their own citizens. The municipal government of a conquered city was left undisturbed.

From the first there were two classes in the Roman community—the original settlers and the foreigners who

joined them. The Romans were the "patricians," the rest were "plebeians." Between these two there was century-long strife. Both classes were personally free and both entered the ranks of the army, but the former alone were organized in 'gentes,' 'curiæ' and tribes (corresponding to the clans, "phratries" and tribes of Greece and of prehistoric times) and held the powers of government. The plebeians, in other words, were disfranchised; they carried the burdens, without being allowed the privileges, of government. The Roman problem, like that of the early Greeks, was how to incorporate in a tribal state a heterogeneous multitude of unrelated men.

Servius Tullius, five hundred years before Christ, faced this problem in much the same way as Cleisthenes had met the similar situation in Athens. He "instituted a new system," says Morgan, "and placed it upon a foundation where it remained to the close of the republic. The three principal changes were: First, the substitution of classes, formed upon the measure of individual wealth, in the place of the gentes; second, the institution of the comitia centuriata as the new popular assembly, in place of the comitia curiata, the assembly of the gentes, with a transfer of the substantial powers of the latter to the former; and third, the creation of four city wards, in the nature of townships, circumscribed by metes and bounds and named as territorial areas, in which the residents of each ward were required to enroll their names and register their property."

This was only the first of the great victories won by the plebeians. When kingship was abolished in 510 B.C. and a more democratic form of government instituted, the plebeians were protected by special magistrates of their own, the tribunes, and gradually forced the patricians to open to them all the offices of the state.

The republican period immediately following upon the admission of the plebeians to civic privileges constituted the Golden Age of Rome, and during this period were laid

the foundations for its world empire. First the Latins, then the Italian tribes, then Sicily went down before its victorious arms; then Carthage and Spain; until the Mediterranean had become a Roman lake.

About the time of the Carthaginian wars the Roman constitution was complete. It was always, be it remembered, a city constitution, and in this lay both its strength and its weakness. At the head were two consuls elected every year. These were supported by prætors whose offices were chiefly judicial. There were also censors who numbered and organized the people; quæstors who attended to financial matters; and ædiles who looked after the public buildings. To all of these high offices the Roman citizen was elected by popular vote. No office, excepting the censorship, could be held for more than twelve months, and none carried with it any salary or emolument.

The Romans had no standing army. Every citizen between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, possessing property worth at least four thousand pounds of copper, was placed on the military roll. From this roll were selected each year four legions, two for each consul. Each legion had six tribunes and sixty centurions, chosen, like the consuls and soldiers, fresh every year. The tribunes were appointed both by popular assembly and by the consuls. The centurions were nominated by the tribunes, subject to the approval of the consuls.

Hence it appears, says Liddell in his "History of Rome," that "the Roman system, both in army and state, was strictly republican—that is, calculated to distribute public offices to as many citizens as possible and to prevent power being absorbed by any single man or classes of men. There were no preferred statesmen or officers, but there was a large number of men who had served for a time in each capacity. There was no regularly trained soldiery, but every citizen had served in his time several campaigns, and every one was something of a soldier."

The political and military officers changed from year to year, but behind them was a mighty power that did not change—the Senate. The importance of the Senate can hardly be overestimated; it was the most august assemblage of the ancient world, the forerunner of all modern parliaments and legislatures. Three hundred participated in its deliberations, and 'Senatus Populusque Romanus,' S. P. Q. R., was the magic legend emblazoned on the Roman banners. "The strict verdict of history cannot but acknowledge," says Mommsen, "that this body early comprehended its great task and worthily fulfilled it. Appointed, not by the mere accident of birth, but by the free choice of the nation, confirmed every five years by the severe censorial inspection of the most venerable men; holding office for life, and not dependent on the expiration of the term of the mandate or the vacillating opinion and suffrage of the people; united and acting thoroly in union, from the time when the classes were made equal; including in itself all that the people possessed in the way of political intelligence and practical knowledge of State business; possessing unrestricted authority of action in all financial questions and in the conduct of foreign policy; completely ruling the executive, whose officers held their positions only for a short time, while the power of intervention possessed by the tribunes had also been exerted on its side when once the quarrel between the classes was over—by virtue of all these things, the Roman Senate was the noblest expression of the national will; and in its constancy of policy and wisdom, in unity and patriotism, in fulness of power and steadfast courage, it was the first political corporate body of any period—'an assembly of kings' who knew how to unite despotic energy with republican devotion. Never was a State better represented in its foreign relations than Rome in her prosperous period by her Senate. By its means the Roman people were enabled to accomplish

the most gigantic of all human tasks—a wise and successful self-government."

Rome excelled not only in self-government, but in government of others. Its systems of provincial administration were immeasurably superior to all previous systems established by Persia and Macedonia. At the close of the Hannibalic war it was in possession of five provinces. A hundred years later it was governing seventeen—ten in Europe, five in Asia, two in Africa. These provinces were allowed the right of self-government in all local matters, but were ruled by magistrates sent every year from Rome by the Senate.

The history of the development of the Roman state is a history of the admission of a constantly increasing number of its members into full citizenship. The original Roman stock fought every innovation, but were forced into concessions by the logic of events. The plebeians, the Italian tribes, even the provincials, at last became Roman citizens. But this democratic process was in part deceptive. It did not mean what it seemed to mean. The privileges granted were in part given to avert impending disaster.

During the years immediately preceding the Christian era a great transformation was taking place in Rome. The rulers had become intoxicated with power. Just government gave way to oppressive taxation. Free labor was supplanted by slave labor. The army became more and more brutal and dictatorial. The people were becoming a rabble, intent upon "bread" and "circuses." Gladiatorial shows were the order of the day. Oriental sensuality had become fashionable. The ancient integrities were subverted. The "decline and fall" of Rome had begun.

Even the most brilliant men of the age—the Cæsars and Antonies, the Pompeys and Ciceros—could not save Rome. The Empire was instituted; Augustus extended the sway of the Roman arms; there was a great intel-

lectual awakening stimulated by the writings of such men of genius as Virgil, Ovid, Horace and Livy; but Rome was doomed.

From a sociological point of view, and judged in the light of its entire development, the very features in the Roman government that made for its early strength may be shown to have contributed to its final downfall. "As a whole," Morgan thinks, "the Roman government was anomalous. The overshadowing municipality of Rome was artificial, illogical, approaching a monstrosity." But in the end, it is clear, the issue was moral, even more than sociological. Rome had decayed and was soon to be overwhelmed. On the physical side the Goths and the Vandals were the rude instruments appointed by destiny. On the moral and spiritual side it was Christianity that did the work. Into the welter and chaos of falling Rome this pure ray penetrated. "The world empires of Persia, Macedonia and Rome had all prepared the way," as Giddings points out, "for the Christian conception of universal brotherhood. So long as this conception was nothing more than an esoteric affirmation that all men are brothers because they are children of one Father, it made but little impression upon the social mind; but when by the genius of St. Paul it was converted into an ideal, into a doctrine that all men through a spiritual renewing may become brothers, the new faith underwent a transformation like that which converted the ethnic into the civic conception of the state, and Christianity became the most tremendous power in history."

CHAPTER III

THE MIDDLE AGES

MEDIEVAL society is distinguished from all other periods of human history by two unique developments—the ascendency of religion as a social force and the establishment of the feudal system. The first marked a revolution in the spiritual temper of mankind. The second initiated a new stage in social evolution.

In ancient times the chief civilizing agent had been the war of conquest. It was war with this motive that compressed the tribes into the nation; that started trade; that unlocked Egypt, Babylonia, India; that developed the genius of Greece and the administrative powers of Rome. But now all this was to change. Men began to care more about religion than about war, and when they fought it was in the name of religion.

The rise and growth of Christianity, the conquest of mighty Rome by a despised and persecuted sect, furnish the most impressive example in all history of the triumph of spiritual over material power. In tracing the steps by which this vast transformation was effected, W. E. H. Lecky, in his "History of European Morals," expresses his conviction that Christianity owed its success primarily to the mood of moral and spiritual unrest attending the dissolution of the Roman Empire. "Under circumstances more favorable to religious proselytism than the world had ever before known," he writes, "with the path cleared by a long course of destructive criticism, the re-

ligions and philosophies of mankind were struggling for the mastery in that great metropolis where all were amply represented, and in which alone the destinies of the world could be decided. Among the educated a frigid Stoicism, teaching a majestic but unattainable grandeur, and scorning the support of the affections, the hope of another world and the consolations of worship, had for a time been in the ascendant, and it only terminated its noble and most fruitful career when it had become manifestly inadequate to the religious wants of the age. Among other classes, religion after religion ran its conquering course."

In the midst of this confusion of standards Christianity gained its ascendency; and the causes of its triumph, Mr. Lecky avers, are not difficult to discover. "No other religion," he says, "had ever combined so many distinct elements of power and attraction. Unlike the Jewish religion, it was bound by no local ties, and was equally adapted for every nation and for every class. Unlike Stoicism, it appealed in the strongest manner to the affections and offered all the charm of a sympathetic worship. Unlike the Egyptian religions, it united with its distinctive teaching a pure and noble system of ethics and proved itself capable of realizing it in action. It proclaimed, amid a vast movement of social and national amalgamation, the universal brotherhood of mankind. Amid the softening influence of philosophy and civilization it taught the supreme sanctity of love. To the slave, who had never before exercized so large an influence over Roman religious life, it was the religion of the suffering and the oppressed. To the philosopher it was at once the echo of the highest ethics of the later Stoics and the expansion of the best teaching of the school of Plato. To a world thirsting for prodigy it offered a history replete with wonders more strange than those of Apollonius; while the Jew and the Chaldean could scarcely rival its exorcists and the legends of continual miracles circulated

among its followers. To a world deeply conscious of political dissolution, and prying eagerly and anxiously into the future, it proclaimed with a thrilling power the immediate destruction of the globe—the glory of all its friends and the damnation of all its foes. To a world that had grown very weary gazing on the cold, passionless grandeur which Cato realized and which Lucian sang it presented an ideal of compassion and love—an ideal destined for centuries to draw around it all that was greatest, as well as all that was noblest upon earth—a Teacher who could weep by the sepulcher of his friend, who was touched with the feeling of our infirmities."

But if conditions were so favorable to the growth of Christianity, why, it may well be asked, was the new religion so bitterly persecuted? Lecky traces the persecution to three chief causes. In the first place, he says, the doctrine that correct theological opinions are essential to salvation and that theological error necessarily involves guilt was profoundly antipathetic to the Roman spirit of toleration. So also were the "religious terrorism" preached by Christians, the attachment to a Bible that celebrated religious massacres and that inculcated belief in "hell-fire" awaiting the unbeliever. The third cause of the persecution is attributed by Lecky to the refusal of the Christians to participate in the religious ceremonies of the day. The Romans came to feel that their increasing calamities were due to the neglect of the gods.

It was not until the reign of Constantine that Christianity conquered. This ambitious emperor, a baffling combination of good and of evil qualities, the founder of Constantinople, the murderer of his own wife and son, was keen enough to realize what his predecessors had not seen—that amid the wreck of the decaying Roman Empire Christianity was the one growing and vital force. He began to load the church with privileges. He authorized the Christian bishops to constitute themselves arbiters in civil matters; he exempted the churches from

taxation; he yielded to them portions of the imperial domain. Thus the new faith was enabled to add the influence of wealth to its spiritual idealism. The Roman Empire split into Eastern and Western divisions, while Christianity was strengthening and unifying its forces. Even heresy helped to keep it alive and vivid by providing wholesome combat. Tertullian, St. Anastasius, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine and many more made contributions to its impassioned literature. Its hierarchical organization began to take shape. At first the church was a republic and there was little or no distinction between clergymen and laymen. A committee of presbyters or elders, with a bishop or chairman, administered the affairs of the Christian community. Gradually the elders were transformed into priests, and a sharp line of cleavage was drawn between clergy and laity. The bishops began to monopolize theological discussion, and met together at various councils to discuss questions of discipline and dogma. Rome became the headquarters of the new organization and the Pope its supreme officer. Christianity was now incorporated.

Goths, Vandals, Franks were all deeply influenced by the Christian propaganda. An Italian archbishop was established even in far-away Britain. When Charlemagne, king of the Franks, conquered the enemies of Rome—the pagan Avars, the Mussulman Arabs, and the idolatrous Saxons—he identified the triumph of Christianity with the triumph of his own cause. And finally when he came to Rome and was crowned there by Pope Leo III he acknowledged the spiritual sovereignty of the church. This was the beginning of the "Holy Roman Empire," and led to cataclysmic contests between popes and emperors for the sovereignty of Europe.

The linking of Christianity with military power under Charlemagne was symbolic of the change through which the new faith was passing. From the beginning its influence was strangely contradictory. It had at first op-

posed militarism, but later stimulated the war spirit. Its immediate effect in its own domain had been to increase a sense of the sacredness of life, to suppress the gladiatorial shows, to encourage the foundation of schools, hospitals and charitable institutions. In its later period it led to some of the bloodiest persecutions recorded in history. From the first it was very intolerant. It cannot be acquitted of the charge of having contributed to the intellectual stagnation which, by common consent, was the distinguishing quality of the "Dark Ages." "The suppression of all religions but one by Theodosius," Lecky declares, "the murder of Hypatia by the monks of Cyril, and the closing by Justinian of the schools of Athens are the three events which mark the decisive overthrow of intellectual freedom. A thousand years had rolled away before that freedom was in part restored."

In the eighth century Christianity was menaced by a rival religion—Mohammedanism. It had arisen in Arabia and established its régime from the Indies to the Pyrenees. "This great religion," according to Lecky, "spread the deepest and most justifiable panic through Christendom. Without any of those aids to the imagination which pictures and images can furnish, without any elaborate sacerdotal organization, preaching the purest Monotheism among ignorant and barbarous men and inculcating, on the whole, an extremely high and noble system of morals, it spread with a rapidity and it acquired a hold over the minds of its votaries which it is probable that no other religion has altogether equaled. It borrowed from Christianity that doctrine of salvation by belief which is perhaps the most powerful impulse that can be applied to the characters of masses of men, and it elaborated so minutely the charms of its sensual heaven and the terrors of its material hell as to cause the alternative to appeal with unrivaled force to the gross imaginations of the people. It possessed a book which, however inferior to that of the opposing

religion, has nevertheless been the consolation and support of millions in many ages. It taught a fatalism which in its first age nerved its adherents with a matchless military courage and which, tho in later days it has often paralyzed their active energies, has also rarely failed to support them under the pressure of inevitable calamity. But, above all, it discovered the great tho fatal secret of uniting indissolubly the passion of the soldier with the passion of the devotee. Making the conquest of the infidel the first of duties and proposing heaven as the certain reward of the valiant soldier, it created a blended enthusiasm that soon overpowered the divided counsels and the voluptuous governments of the East, and within a century of the death of Mohammed his followers had almost extirpated Christianity from its original home, founded great monarchies in Asia and Africa, planted a noble tho transient and exotic civilization in Spain, menaced the capital of the Eastern empire, and but for the issue of a single battle they would probably have extended their scepter over the energetic and progressive races of Central Europe. The wave was broken by Charles Martel at the battle of Poictiers. One great change was in fact achieved. The spirit of Mohammedanism slowly passed into Christianity and tronsformed it into its image. The spectacle of an essentially military religion fascinated men who were at once very warlike and very superstitious. The panic that had palsied Europe was after a long interval succeeded by a fierce reaction of resentment. Pride and religion conspired to urge the Christian warriors against those who had so often defeated the armies and wasted the territory of Christendom, who had shorn the empire of the Cross of many of its fairest provinces and profaned that holy city which was venerated not only for its past associations, but also for the spiritual blessings it could still bestow upon the pilgrim. The papal indulgences proved not less efficacious in stimulating the military spirit than the promises of Mohammed, and for about two centuries every pulpit in Christendom pro-

claimed the duty of war with the unbeliever and represented the battlefield as the sure path to heaven. The religious orders which arose united the character of the priest with that of the warrior, and when at the hour of sunset the soldier knelt down to pray before his cross, that cross was the handle of the sword."

Thus originated the Crusades, with their incalculable influence upon the destiny of Europe. In one sense they were a failure. Hallen speaks emphatically of their corrupting influence on the morals of the time. They were futile in achieving their avowed end—the recovery of the Holy Land from Moslem hands. But they led to enlargement of ideas, intercommunication of knowledge, exchange of products. "What changes took place," exclaims Victor Duruy in his "History of the Middle Ages," "even in the countries whence the Crusaders started and in the minds of those men and their contemporaries! Before that time they had lived separated and hostile lives; the Crusades did away with isolation and division to a great extent. On the perilous voyage, crossing the distant countries and in the midst of people of another religion the Crusaders acknowledged their brotherhood in Jesus Christ. The division of the immense army into corps according to nations brought the men of one country to consider themselves children of the same fatherland. The Frenchman from the north drew near to the Frenchman from the south. The feeling of national fraternity which had been lost to France since the days of Rome, tho felt for a short moment under Charlemagne, was found again on the road to Jerusalem.

"The great expeditions which renewed the ties between Christian nations and connected Europe with Asia opened once more the paths of commerce, closed since the time of the invasions. The East was again accessible to the merchants of the West; manufacturers started up again to furnish the arms, trappings and clothes needed by so many men. This movement, once begun, did not again die out. The number of artizans multiplied like the merchants, and

little by little great sums of money accumulated in their hands. A new element of power, which had passed out of knowledge, was then revived—namely, personal wealth opposed to wealth in land—which will show continued growth from this time, and by the side of the nobles, the masters of the soil, will appear the commoners, grown to be masters of gold through manual labor and intelligence.

"Certain institutions or new customs were directly caused by the crusades. In the confusion produced by the great gatherings of men some distinguishing marks were necessary. They invented or increased the use of coats of arms, which consisted of various emblems upon the shields of warriors of distinction or their armor or banners, and which passed from father to son after the thirteenth century. These armorial bearings grew into a complicated language which formed the science of Heraldry. Family names also began to make their appearance at this time."

The distinctive social centers of the Middle Ages were the monastery and the castle. The former, it is often forgotten, helped to keep industry, as well as religion, alive and preserved the love of books and learning in an age which cared nothing about such things. "The rapid decomposition of the entire Roman Empire by continuous invasions of barbarians," Lecky points out, "rendered the existence of an inviolable asylum and center of peaceful labor a matter of transcendent importance, and the monastery as organized by St. Benedict soon combined the most heterogeneous elements of attraction. It was at once eminently aristocratic and intensely democratic. The power and princely position of the abbot was coveted and usually obtained by members of the most illustrious families, while emancipated serfs or peasants who had lost their all in the invasions, or were harassed by savage nobles, or had fled from military service, or desired to lead a more secure and easy life, found in the monastery an unfailing refuge. The institution exercized all the influence of great wealth, expended for the most part with great charity,

while the monk himself was invested with the aureole of a sacred poverty. To ardent and philanthropic natures the profession opened boundless vistas of missionary, charitable and civilizing activity. To the superstitious it was the plain road to heaven. To the ambitious it was the portal to bishoprics, and, after the monk St. Gregory, not infrequently to the Popedom. To the studious it offered the only opportunity then existing in the world of seeing many books and passing a life of study. To the timid and retiring it afforded the most secure and probably the least laborious life a poor peasant could hope to find. Vast as were the multitudes that thronged the monasteries, the means for their support were never wanting. The belief that gifts or legacies to a monastery opened the doors of heaven was in a superstitious age sufficient to secure for the community an almost boundless wealth, which was still further increased by the skill and perseverance with which the monks tilled the waste lands, by the exemption of their domains from all taxation and by the tranquillity which in the most turbulent ages they usually enjoyed."

Like the monastery, the castle of medieval Europe had grown up directly from the older Roman Empire. One of the causes of Rome's downfall had been the swollen estates of its nobles. Rich land-owners had surrounded themselves with favored bodyguards and an army of slaves and field-workers. After the collapse of the empire many of these had been freed, yet still felt the need of a master and remained near the ancestral home. This was the germ of the feudal castle, in which a baron or a lord lived as absolute ruler, owning no authority but his own, holding a high court of justice in his hall, issuing laws for his estates, living by court fees, by taxes levied on passing caravans and by ransoms for prisoners, sometimes obtained in fair war, sometimes by falling upon peaceful travelers.

The distinctive feature of feudalism was just this unbridled rule of the military leader and land-owner. The different countries still had kings, but kingship was often

little more than a title. The social chaos of the time made the enforcement of central government impossible. The local powers were a law unto themselves. Such a state of society had never before, and has never since, existed in the world.

The typical feudal castle was an enormous building, either round or square, massive, without ornaments or any pretensions to architectural style and generally built on a hill. It was pierced by a few loopholes, from which arrows could be shot, and had a single gate opening on a moat which could only be crossed by a drawbridge. It was crowned with battlements from which rock, pitch and melted lead could be thrown on the heads of assailants.

Land tenure under the feudal system was based on a sense of mutual obligation between a lord and his subjects. If one lord obtained land from another he became, under the terms of the bargain, a "vassal" with definite rights and duties. He must serve his master-lord, or "suzerain," on the field of battle and in the court of justice and pledge himself to legal and voluntary "aids" which practically amounted to taxes. The suzerain, on his side, could not reclaim any land ceded to the vassal unless the latter broke faith. He was also expected to defend his subjects if attacked and to treat them justly. Every vassal had a right to be judged by his peers and in the presence of his lord.

The lords and vassals were the warriors of medieval society; below them were graded the social workers. The villeins were allowed most freedom, and yielded yearly rent and services for their lands. They tilled the fields, looked after the castle, worked in the vineyards, repaired the roads, made furniture, utensils, horseshoes, plowshares, carriages, etc. They could marry as they would and transmit their property to their children. The next grade was that of "mortmain tenants," whose property, in the absence of heirs, reverted to the lord. The mortmain tenant could not marry without the consent of his lord. Then, finally, came the serfs, or men of the soil, who at first were

little better than slaves. They made clothing and armor for the nobility, built its castles and baked its bread.

Feudalism, as Hallam points out in his "View of the State of Europe During the Middle Ages," had both its good and its bad points. As a promoter of peace and good order in society it was a failure. The feudal system originated in war and thrived on war; it was intrinsically adverse to the accumulation of wealth and the improvement of those arts which mitigate the evils or abridge the labors of mankind. But "as a scheme of civil freedom," says Hallam, "it bears a noble countenance. To the feudal law it is owing that the very names of right and privilege were not swept away, as in Asia, by the desolating hand of power. The tyranny which, on every favorable moment, was breaking through all barriers, would have rioted without control if, when the people were poor and disunited, the nobility had not been brave and free. So far as the sphere of feudality extended, it diffused the spirit of liberty and the notions of private right." Moreover, the feudal institutions were invaluable as a school of moral discipline. "Society," Hallam continues, "had sunk, for several centuries after the dissolution of the Roman Empire, into a condition of utter depravity; where, if any vices could be selected as more eminently characteristic than others, they were falsehood, treachery and ingratitude. In slowly purging off the lees of this extreme corruption the feudal spirit exerted its ameliorating influence. Violation of faith stood first in the catalogue of crimes, most repugnant to the very essence of a feudal tenure, most severely and promptly avenged, most branded by general infamy. The feudal lawbooks breathe throughout a spirit of honorable obligation. The feudal course of jurisdiction promoted, what trial by peers is peculiarly calculated to promote, a keener feeling and readier perception of moral as well as of legal distinctions. And as the judgment and sympathy of mankind are seldom mistaken in these great points of veracity and justice, except through the temporary success

of crimes or the want of a definite standard of right, they gradually recovered themselves when law precluded the one and supplied the other. In the reciprocal services of lord and vassal there was ample scope for every magnanimous and disinterested energy. The heart of man, when placed in circumstances which have a tendency to excite them, will seldom be deficient in such sentiments. No occasions could be more favorable than the protection of a faithful supporter or the defense of a beneficent suzerain against such powerful aggression as left little prospect except of sharing in his ruin."

Another of the direct results of feudalism was romantic love. It is seldom realized how modern is this all-powerful and all-penetrating sentiment. It did not exist in ancient times. It was born in the Middle Ages and it is easy to see how the conditions favored its development. "In the first place," says Lester F. Ward, "the constant and prolonged absenteeism of the lords and knights, often with most of their retainers, from the castle left the women practically in charge of affairs and conferred upon them a power and dignity never before possessed. In the second place, the separation of most of the men for such long periods, coupled with the sense of honor that their knighthood and military career gave rise to, caused them to assume the rôle of applicants for the favor of the women, which they could not always immediately attain as when women were forcibly seized by any one that chanced to find them. These conditions produced a mutual sense on the part of both sexes of the need of each other, coupled with prolonged deprivation on the part of both of that satisfaction. The men, thus seeking the women, naturally became chivalrous toward them. The solitary life of women of high rank made them somewhat a prey to the lusts of men of low degree, and the knights assumed the rôle of protecting them from all dangers. Moral and Christian sentiments also played a part, and we find among the provisions of the

oath that every chevalier must make the following solemn vows:

" 'To maintain the just rights of the weak, as of widows, orphans and young women.

" 'If called upon to conduct a lady or a girl to any place, to wait upon her, to protect her and to save her from all danger and every offense or perish in the attempt.

" 'Never to do violence to ladies or young women, even tho won by their arms, without their will and consent.'

"Such an oath made a universal point of honor, any breach of which would be an everlasting disgrace and be punished severely by the order of knighthood to which they belonged, could not fail to produce a powerful civilizing effect upon the semi-barbaric men of that age. The whole proceeding must have also given to women a far greater independence and higher standing than they had ever before enjoyed since the days of gynecocracy in the proto-social stage. Out of this condition of things there arose a special class of poets who wrote lyrics wholly different from the erotic songs of antiquity that go by that name. These poets were called troubadours, and some of them wandered from place to place, singing the praises of the great court ladies and still further inflaming the new passion, which was relatively pure and contented itself with an association of men with women while conserving the honor and virtue of the latter. This, of course, was a passing phase and somewhat local, being mainly confined to southern France and parts of Spain. It degenerated, as did the whole institution of chivalry, and by the end of the thirteenth century nothing was left of either but the ridiculous nonsense that Cervantes found surviving in his time and which he so happily portrayed in Don Quixote. But chivalry had left its impress upon the world, and while Condorcet and Comte exaggerated certain aspects of it, no one has pointed out its greatest service in grafting romantic love upon natural love, which until then had been supreme."

The feudal era lasted, approximately, from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, but long before the end of that period disintegration had set in. The villeins and serfs were rebelling against lordly authority, and the "communes," or medieval towns, were becoming a social power.

The medieval town was in some cases a survival of the city of Roman times, but it owed its new vigor to the influx of small land-holders and artizans from the country. The new element organized itself into guilds and corporations, and tho still subservient to the castle lord, became more and more independent. From now on the position of the feudal over-lord was menaced both by his own dependents, who often revolted against his authority and threatened to leave him, and by the growing towns. These insisted on independent jurisdiction, rights of market and tolls, freedom from military service and other similar privileges, and if their demands were not granted called in the nearest king to help them. He was generally glad to do so, for his interest lay in curbing the overweening power of the feudal lord. So civil war was precipitated and feudalism crumbled.

No proper understanding of the history either of England or France is possible without a clear grasp of the feudal struggle. In both countries there were three similar elements contending—the king, the nobles and the people. But the combinations of the different elements were different, and from this difference in combination resulted the difference in the histories of the two countries. In England the Norman Conquest had made the king so strong that the nobles were compelled to unite with the commons in defense of their honor and their property. Thus English liberty sprang from the aristocracy. In France, on the other hand, it was the feudal lords who were strong and the king and the people who united to achieve a greater liberty.

In Germany the feudal system lasted longer than in other countries, and one of the chief reasons for this lay

in the fact that its dynasties were cursed with barrenness. Again and again the royal line died out. The feudal chiefs took advantage of the situation, and at each election of a new king, to use an expression of the day, they "plucked a feather from the imperial eagle." As a result, there were finally a thousand princes in Germany and many states and principalities.

Spain and Italy were also divided and took centuries to emerge as coherent nations. In the north was darkness. "Prussia and Russia," says Duruy, "are of yesterday. But in the East there appeared a nation, the Turks, which was formidable because it possessed what Christian Europe no longer had, the conquering spirit of religious proselytism, which had been the spirit of the Crusades, and also what Europe did not yet possess, a strong military organization."

From the standpoint of invention and discovery, the medieval period was peculiarly sterile. "Here and there," says Ward, "a flicker of inventive genius flashed up, as when the Saracen, Ebn Junis, at the end of the tenth century, invented the pendulum; when the compass, perhaps invented by the Chinese and certainly used by them in traveling overland, found its way to Europe and was applied to water navigation; when gunpowder, likewise of Asiatic origin, but hitherto only used for pyrotechnic display, was applied to projectiles and became an engine of war; or when the Saracens invented a process of making paper from linen rags and cotton. Even the great art of printing, whose invention broke the spell, had been independently invented in China and was actually brought to Europe by Venetian navigators.

"The middle of the fifteenth century marks the beginning of the modern era. The invention and practical application of the art of printing was the turning point, but a long train of other, often apparently independent, inventions and discoveries quickly followed. Oil paintings came forward, completely superseding the wax painting of

the ancients and leading the way to the Renaissance. Engraving on copper, invented in 1460, gave birth to a new art and helped to swell the stream. The sixteenth century stands out most prominently, because it required half a century for the art of printing to begin to bear fruit. Leonardo da Vinci lived into the sixteenth century; Giordano Bruno just lived it out, as did Tycho Brahe; Galileo, Descartes, Francis Bacon and Harvey did much of their work in it, but continued it far into the seventeenth. The sixteenth century produced the telescope and the microscope, at least in their rudiments, also the thermometer and the camera obscura. The vernier and proportional dividers were useful accessories to scientific work. Clocks and watches came forward run by weights, but it took another century to evolve the spring. Mills for grinding grain were invented in the fifth century and were driven by water power, but the flour was unbolted and the bran and hulls were all ground together. Now a bolting machine was invented and thenceforth men might have white flour. Heretofore they had always eaten with their fingers, for chop-sticks were unknown in the West. Now some unknown genius invented forks. Such are a few of the sixteenth-century inventions."

Greater things were to come. A mighty reform movement was gathering within the Roman Church. Wycliffe and John Huss were preparing the way for Luther and Calvin. The Renaissance was at hand, and in Italy could already be seen the first signs of the awakening that was soon to result in the most wonderful artistic era since the age of Greece. The Portuguese were on the road to the Cape of Good Hope. Columbus was dreaming of a land beyond the Atlantic.

CHAPTER IV

COMMERCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF CAPITALISM

THE early sixteenth century may be considered as marking the first of two great steps in the transition from medieval to modern society. No previous period had seen such varied and sweeping changes as then took place within two or three generations. The second step, effecting an equally sudden and profound social transformation, took place about the end of the eighteenth century.

To Hegel the passage from medieval to modern life appeared as "the Spirit becoming conscious that it is free, inasmuch as it wills the True, the Eternal, that which is in and for itself Universal." To Comte and Buckle it appeared as the triumph of knowledge over superstition. To Spencer it appeared to consist essentially in the passing of political power and social prestige from a class of warriors to a class of merchants, financiers and manufacturers, in the passage from militarism to industrialism. Each of these conceptions has contributed to a clear view. But to understand the causes of the change it must be remembered that the production of wealth is a phenomenon more fundamental than science or religion, war or politics. The somewhat vague generalizations of sociology must give way to the more concrete study of economics. This view is expressed by Karl Marx in his "Critique of Political Economy" as follows: "In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations which are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite

stage in the development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation on which rise legal and political forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. At a certain stage of their development the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed."

From this point of view it may be said that in the social revolution of the sixteenth century the prime factor was the expansion of commerce and in that of the eighteenth it was the rise of machine production.

Throughout the Middle Ages the commercial cities had existed within the prevailing feudal system, but had hardly been a part of it. They had always exercized a disturbing influence upon the workings of that peculiarly stable social order, and at last they generated a force which disrupted it. Medieval commerce dealt chiefly with articles of luxury, with some of the raw materials for handicraft, such as wool, hides and metals, and with goods that could not be produced in all places, such as fish and salt and wine. The most lucrative branch of commerce was that which centered in the Italian cities, whose merchants carried on a trade with the Orient, importing silk, cotton, spices, drugs, jewels and other commodities for the use of the wealthier classes. Through France and Germany this trade extended to western and northern Europe, leading to the formation of secondary commercial centers on the large rivers, on the shores of the Baltic and North

seas and in England. The great staple of English export was wool.

The commerce as well as the industry of the Middle Ages was, in comparison with that of modern times, very simple in its methods. There was no extended system of credit. Lending on interest, while not unknown, was generally regarded as an extortionate practice. This was a natural view in a society where men seldom had occasion to borrow except in personal need, where commercial and industrial undertakings were conducted on so small a scale as not to require the use of borrowed capital. Production, both agricultural and industrial, was carried on by hand labor and was characteristically production of goods for use rather than of commodities for sale, and in so far as commodities were produced for sale it was chiefly for a personally known local market.

Competition, which the modern age has declared to be the life of trade, was then looked on as its bane. The personal relations subsisting between employer and employee and between buyer and seller discouraged any vigorous competition, which was also restricted by guild regulations and by law. The typical bourgeois of the Middle Ages, only in a somewhat less degree than the typical nobleman or peasant, thought rather of continuing in the paths of his fathers and building up his fortune gradually in the accustomed fashion than of straining his energies to advance rapidly by changing whatever he might find changeable.

By the end of the fifteenth century the slow growth of commerce had, together with other causes, gone far toward undermining the feudal system. "Altho the whole feudal system was outwardly intact," says Belfort Bax in his "German Society at the Close of the Middle Ages," "the thinker who was watching the signs of the times would not have been long in arriving at the conclusion that feudalism had already begun to disintegrate or was on the eve of doing so. The growing use of firearms in

war; the rapid multiplication of printed books; the spread of the new learning after the taking of Constantinople in 1453 and the subsequent diffusion of Greek teachers throughout Europe; the surely and steadily increasing communication with the New World and the subsequent increase of the precious metals; and last, but not least, Vasco da Gama's discovery of the new trade route from the East by way of the Cape—all these were indications of the fact that the death-knell of the old order of things had been struck.

"Notwithstanding the apparent outward integrity of the system based upon land tenures, land was ceasing to be the only form of productive wealth. Hence it was losing the exclusive importance attaching to it in the earlier period of the Middle Ages. The Roman law was establishing itself in the place of the old customary tribal law which had hitherto prevailed in the manorial courts, serving in some sort as a bulwark against the caprice of the territorial lord; and this change facilitated the development of the bourgeois principle of private as opposed to commercial property." And George Burton Adams, in his "Civilization During the Middle Ages," thus summarizes the tendencies of the times: "Ships were multiplied; new articles of commerce brought into use; new routes opened; geographical knowledge increased; villages were transformed into cities; money came into more general use; wealth was accumulated, and with wealth power and influence in a new class, the Third Estate. In lands the most favored serfdom disappeared and the agricultural laborer shared to some extent in the general improvement. The results of increasing commerce acted directly upon the political development of Europe. The commercial classes demanded security and order. They stood ready to aid the state in repressing feudal violence. They demanded a uniform law, which they found in the Justinian code, and by their use of it, and by their influence in the governments which were forming, they secured its preva-

lence over the native law, thus strongly reinforcing the tendency to centralization naturally involved in the fall of feudalism."

In nearly all these respects, largely by reason of her insular postion and freedom from invasion, England was one of the "most favored lands." Serfdom was practically extinct there by the end of the fourteenth century. By the end of the fifteenth the nobility had largely lost its feudal attributes and power had been concentrated in the royal hands, securing internal peace and regular administration, tho at the cost of political liberty. Both peasants and artizans were prosperous. The period from the Peasants' Revolt in 1381 to the accession of Henry VIII in 1509 is characterized by Thorold Rogers in his "Six Centuries of Work and Wages" as "the Golden Age of the English laborer." Neither before nor since have the working people enjoyed so favorable a combination of high wages, short workday and steadiness of employment.

Meanwhile trade and industry were developing slowly but steadily. Especially, instead of sending a large part of her wool abroad in the raw state and importing all her fine cloth, England was now beginning to compete in the continental markets with the cloth manufactured in north Italy and the Low Countries. She was qualifying for the economic headship of the world. But what ultimately gave her the lead was a series of events which shifted the economic center of gravity of Europe from the shores of the Mediterranean to those of the Atlantic and, at the same time, dislocated and readjusted the social relations of all the peoples of western Europe.

During the fifteenth century had been perfected two nautical instruments, the compass and the sextant, which made longer voyages practicable, and this in turn led to the building of larger and swifter ships and the making of better maps and charts. Western civilization now had the means in its hands to broaden its geographical horizon.

In the memorable year 1492 Christopher Columbus, sail-

ing under the Spanish flag, tried to reach Asia by sailing west from the Straits of Gibraltar and thus stumbled on the discovery of the New World. Spain took the lead in exploring America and acquired possession of a part of the northern continent and all of the southern except Brazil, which fell to Portugal's share. Not until a hundred years later did other nations take a serious part in the settlement of America. Throughout the sixteenth century Spain and Portugal remained almost undisputed masters of the colonial empires of the West and the East.

Finding in America no such rich civilizations to trade with or to plunder as the Portuguese had found in Asia, the Spaniards, says H. de B. Gibbins in his "History of Commerce in Europe," "explored their new conquests with only one object—the acquisition of gold and silver. The most fertile regions, tho possessing the most luxuriant natural resources, were despised unless they immediately exhibited signs of the precious metals. The precious metals positively streamed into Spain, and an era of extraordinary luxury arose. The Spaniards have in all ages despised commerce and industrial arts with an intensity that has since brought its natural punishment in their financial ruin, and at this period they despised them still more. They drove out the Jews, their most diligent and skilful workmen. Their own industry, such as it was, could not suffice for all the desires which the silver of Peru gave them the means of satisfying, and thus foreign merchants and artizans had to supply the deficiency."

Thus the stream of precious metals trickled through the channels of trade to every country in Europe whose industry could produce a surplus for export. This stimulated commerce and manufacture all over Europe, but especially in the Low Countries and in England. Production of commodities for sale began to engage the energies of a larger proportion of the people. In the general scramble for wealth the conservatism of the old days gave way. Social classes were disturbed. Occupations which had been re-

garded as sordid and almost servile became lucrative and rose to honor. Forms of property which had assured their holders of wealth and power lost their value. All social ideals were shaken. Everything that stood in the way of the bourgeoisie in the sudden expansion of its energies ceased to be sacred and was attacked with vigor.

It was an age of change, political and religious as well as economic, and of intense intellectual activity. It was the age of the consolidation of the great monarchies. It was the age of the Protestant Reformation—or, as the historian Seebohm more accurately names it, the Protestant Revolution—and of the regeneration of the Roman Church. It was the age of Rabelais and Cervantes and Shakespeare, of Copernicus and Galileo and Francis Bacon—of the rise of a great and varied literature and the beginnings of science.

But with all these glories, it had also its dark side. It was an age of loss and degradation for the working classes. Bax says: "The number of persons who, owing to the decay or collapse of the feudal system, were torn from the old moorings and left to drift about shiftless in a world utterly unprepared to deal with such an increase of what was practically vagabondage, was augmenting with every year. The vagrants in all western European countries had never been so numerous as in the earlier portion of the sixteenth century. A portion of these disinherited persons entered the service of kings and princes as mercenary soldiers and thus became the first germ of the modern standing army. Another portion entered the begging profession. Yet another portion sought a more or less permanent domicile as journeymen craftsmen and unskilled laborers in the cities. This fact is noteworthy as the first indication of the proletariat in modern history."

In England this abasement of the condition of the workers was even more severe than on the continent. Several causes conspired to the same end. The debasement of the coinage by Henry VIII. accentuated the natural effect of

the cheapening of the money-metals in producing a rise of prices with which wages could not keep pace. The dissolution of the monasteries at once enriched the nobles and merchants who bought their confiscated lands and deprived the laborers of the relief which the monastic charities had given them in bad times or occasional misfortune. The suppression of the craft guilds had the like effect and also deprived the working people of their only nucleus of organization.

Combined with all these, the rapid growth of the wool industry plunged the English working classes into abject poverty. This seems a paradox. The growth of industry implies an increased demand for labor, and this should mean improved conditions for the workers. But such was not the case. Sheep-raising requires much land and little labor. The landlords therefore fenced in the commons, on which the peasants and villagers had enjoyed the right of pasturing their beasts. And they turned vast quantities of arable land into sheep pastures, evicting the tenants by thousands, and rack-rented such cultivators as remained. At the same moment the demand for labor in the rural districts was reduced and the supply of it increased. The towns and cities were flooded with men seeking employment and the wages of artizans were forced down. How extensive was the increase of sheep-farming and how disastrous to the poorer classes is testified by Sir Thomas More in his "Utopia," where he says that in his day the sheep had become a more ravenous beast than the wolf or the lion and devoured whole villages, cities and provinces.

The rise of the new economic system of production of commodities for sale at a profit had created just what it needed for the enrichment of the dominant classes—a numerous body of propertyless workers, possessing no means of livelihood but the sale of their labor-power for wages, and an "army of the unemployed," the unconscious but effective allies of the employers in every effort to re-

duce wages, lengthen the workday and intensify labor. The increase of production during this and the two following centuries was only in small measure due to the improvement of agricultural and industrial methods. To a far greater extent it was effected by a systematic impoverishment of the workers, which compelled them to toil harder and to live more poorly than in the preceding age.

That the impoverishment was systematic is repeatedly asserted by Rogers, as when he says that "from 1563 to 1824 a conspiracy concocted by the law and carried out by parties interested in its success was entered into to cheat the English workman of his wages, to tie him to the soil, to deprive him of hope and to degrade him into irremediable poverty." And his view is supported by such contemporary evidence as these words of Elizabeth's great minister, Lord Burleigh, written in 1588: "The wealth of the meaner sort is a fountain of rebellion, a source of their contempt of the nobility and the hatred they have against them. It must be cured by keeping them in awe through the severity of justice. We must lay, as it were, sewers and channels to suck and draw from them their money by subtle and indirect means to be handled insensibly."

How well the effectiveness of the wage system as a means of driving laborers was appreciated by the end of this period may be seen from two quotations. In 1741 David Hume wrote: "From the experience of our planters, slavery is as little advantageous to the master as to the slave, wherever hired servants can be procured. A man is obliged to clothe and feed his slave, and he does no more for his servant. The price of the first purchase, therefore, is so much loss to him; not to mention that the fear of punishment will never draw so much labor from a slave as the dread of being turned off and not getting another service will from a freeman."

Adam Smith in "The Wealth of Nations," published in 1776, says: "Tho the wear and tear of a free servant be equally at the expense of his master, it generally costs

him much less than that of a slave. The fund destined for replacing or repairing the wear and tear of a slave is commonly managed by a negligent master or careless overseer. That destined for performing the same office with regard to a freeman is managed by the freeman himself. The disorders which generally prevail in the economy of the rich naturally introduce themselves into the management of the former; the strict frugality and parsimonious attention of the poor as naturally establish themselves in that of the latter. It appears accordingly that the work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end than that performed by slaves."

There was not yet, and could not be until the advent of power-driven machinery, anything like the modern factory, with its enormous aggregation of capital and of labor, its minute division and coördination of processes and the impersonal relation of its workmen to their product and to their employer. There did grow up, however, something intermediate between this and the medieval shop in which the master craftsman worked with his few journeymen and apprentices, some of whom were members of his household and all of whom might reasonably hope in due course to reach the dignity of mater.

Gibbins, in his "Industrial History of England," speaking of the textile industry in the time of Henry VIII., says: "Master manufacturers, weary of municipal and guild-made restrictions, organized in country places little communities solely for industrial purposes and so arranged as to afford greater scope for division of labor. The master was bound to his workmen rather more closely than at present, but the germs of the modern system were there, for this new system was not that of domestic or cottage industry, as had been the rule in previous periods, but a system of congregated labor organized upon a capitalistic basis by one man—the organizer, head and owner of the industrial village—the master clothier. Perhaps the greatest of them was John Winchcombe, of whom it is

recorded that a hundred looms always worked in his house, and he was rich enough to send a hundred of his journeymen to Flodden Field in 1513."

Apprenticeship as a system of industrial education was declining. The old gradation of artizans into apprentices, journeymen and masters—which had corresponded very closely to the gradation of classes in a school—was now giving place to a division of the industrial population into permanent classes, wage-workers for life, in turn becoming divided into skilled mechanics and common laborers, and employers, who need not be workmen at all, but were supervisors of labor and business managers.

Tools were being improved and specialization of trades was increasing gradually throughout this period, but nearly all industrial processes were still performed by simple hand labor. The advantage gained by the concentration of some dozens or scores of workmen in a shop was rather on the business side than on the technical side; it was not so much the advantage of a large producer over a small one (the chief consideration now) as the advantage of a large buyer and seller over one who buys materials and sells products on a small scale. The amount of capital invested in a plant was still small; far the larger portion was required for stock and current wages. In brief, while exchange was taking on a larger social aspect, production yet remained essentially individualistic, both in the sense that the workmen used simple tools and in the sense that the employer was an individual proporietor-manager, manufacturing corporations being almost unknown.

As it was the expansion of commerce which first stimulated the growth of commodity-production, so for nearly three hundred years commerce ran ahead of industry in the development toward a fully capitalistic form of organization. Even in the middle of the eighteenth century, says Gibbins, "the large capitalists were chiefly the foreign trading companies." And John A. Hobson in his

"Evolution of Modern Capitalism" says: "It was the merchant and not the manufacturer who represented the most advanced form of capitalism in the eighteenth century."

The origin of corporate organization of capital was due to the heavy cost and risk involved in remote foreign trade. To fit out and provision a ship for a voyage requiring many months, to man and arm it for defense against pirates and to stock it with goods for trade might tax the resources and hazard the fortune of the richest individual merchant. A great advantage was obviously gained by several merchants joining for such a purpose. If the undertaking was successful, each gained a larger profit in proportion to his outlay; if it failed, none need be completely ruined.

To encourage such trade, companies were chartered—the Russia Company in 1554, the Turkey Company in 1581, the East India Company in 1600 and others afterward—each of which had for its members the exclusive right to trade in some designated region. Only a few years later similar companies were formed by the Dutch and the French. These companies differed materially both from the older merchant guilds and from the partnerships and joint-stock companies of later days. The company maintained ships and trading posts at the common expense, defrayed by admission fees and dues. But the merchants belonging to the company traded as individuals and were not personally responsible for the debts of the company, as they would be in a partnership; nor could they sell their rights of membership, as can a shareholder in a modern corporation.

Out of these, by a slow evolution, grew the joint-stock companies, with their features of corporate enterprize, impersonal membership and limited liability. Very gradually they lost their monopolistic character, and almost as gradually this form of organization was extended to the purposes of insurance, banking and the maintenance of canals and water-works, the only kinds of business which, so late

as 1776, Adam Smith thought it practicable for a joint-stock company to conduct without an exclusive privilege. Only when the introduction of machinery made it advantageous to use large bodies of capital in manufacture did corporate ownership become common in industry.

It will be observed that the difference between the old trading company and the modern corporation is more than a difference of magnitude; it is a difference in kind. The former was essentially an organization of persons for convenience in carrying on some particular trade. The latter is essentially an organization of capital, in which it is indifferent to the corporation who are its members and indifferent to the members what is the trade engaged in so long as the corporation pays dividends. This may be taken as typical of the whole contrast between the period of nascent capitalism which began with the geographical discoveries and the period of maturing capitalism which was ushered in by the Industrial Revolution of the later eighteenth century.

On the political side this period was marked by two important phenomena—the rise of constitutional government in England and the great wars for colonial dominion and commercial advantage.

The virtual autocracy of the Tudor monarchs (1485-1603) can be rightly understood only if it is regarded as in effect a revolutionary dictatorship in the interest of the sheep-raising and money-getting landowners and the commercial bourgeoisie. As against the remnants of the old nobility, the peasants and the artizans and laborers, these dominant classes were united in support of the crown. Themselves unschooled in political action and distrustful of their own strength, they were glad to uphold a central government which ruthlessly broke down feudal customs and guild rules, despoiled the clergy, depressed and impoverished the workers, promoted the monopolization of land and at the same time maintained public order and enacted legislation favorable to the development of trade.

The submission of the bourgeoisie, however, was only temporary. It is of the nature of autocracy to become rigid and unprogressive, once its power is well established. It is of the nature of a commercial and industrial community to require flexible laws and policies to suit its evolving needs. Moreover, as soon as the special work of the Tudor dictatorship had been performed, an antagonism of interest began to develop between the landowners and the mercantile and manufacturing class. By the time of James I. the bourgeoisie had reached such wealth and power as to think of trusting to itself. By the time of his son, Charles I., it had come into violent conflict with the monarchy. In 1642 this conflict broke out into a civil war, which ended in 1649 with the execution of the king and the establishment of the commonwealth. The opposition of interest which immediately began to show itself between the wealthy bourgeoisie and the poorer classes so weakened the republican government that it lasted only two years beyond the death of its great general and executive, Oliver Cromwell, and in 1660 Charles II. was recognised as king.

But the Restoration was only a truce. The crown dared not seriously insist upon the prerogatives which it had exercized during the sixteenth century, and when James II. sought to defy the will of the classes represented in Parliament he was easily deposed and the royal office transferred to a new line under a constitutional settlement which gave the House of Commons supreme power in legislation and taxation and an effective control over the executive and judicial functions. Of this, the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688, Achille Loria says in his "Economic Foundations of Society": "It signified the political triumph of the bourgeoisie. Traders, brokers, bankers and speculators were carried into power with the new dynasty. The monarch created joint-stock companies and granted them subsidies and privileges. Industry was favored. It is to be noted, however, that this triumph was effected without any intervention on the part of the laboring

classes, who, far from finding themselves benefited by the revolution, lived to see their economic bondage increased through the subsequent expansion of capital."

Since foreign commerce, and especially commerce in colonial products, was the field in which the greatest fortunes were to be acquired, each national state sought to promote the interests of its own merchant class by monopolizing as much of the world's trade as it could.

The system pursued by all the European nations throughout this period is briefly sketched by Gibbins ("History of Commerce") in the case of Spain. Not only did she exclude the merchants of other nations from trade with her colonies, but she deliberately discouraged the development of industry there. "Few harbors were established. The cultivation of European products and all manufactures were forbidden. The cultivation of the vine and olive was suppressed, in order that the inhabitants might be compelled to buy from Spain. Natives and colonists alike were forced to purchase from the mother country all kinds of clothing and manufactured articles. In fact, Spain put into practice to its fullest extent the mischievous 'sole market' theory of colonization, under which a colony is merely looked upon as a market for the goods of the mother country, while it is not allowed to manufacture or sell goods on its own account. Even trade carried on by Spanish merchants was subject to most hampering restrictions. Of course smuggling and corruption flourished under such a foolish policy. Piracy and filibustering arose as a natural consequence. Such a system could not last long, and its end came in due course." However foolish the policy may now seem, it was followed by other nations as well, and its end did not come for three hundred years.

By the end of the sixteenth century the Dutch, the French and the English bourgeoisie were strong enough to attack the Portuguese and Spanish monopoly of the East and West Indies. They sought to participate directly in the trade, instead of being content to receive Indian and

American products at the peninsular ports. Such an attempt meant armed conflict. From the revolt of the Netherlands in 1579 to the Peace of Paris in 1765 the chief European nations were almost continuously engaged in vast wars—wars fought on sea and land, in India and America as well as in Europe—wars of England against Spain, of Holland against Spain and Portugal, of England and France against Holland and at last of England against France.

The nature and cause of these conflicts are thus described by Gibbins: "The English war with Spain in the time of Elizabeth was due to commercial as well as religious causes. The opening up of the New World made a struggle for power in the West almost inevitable among European nations; the new route to India made another struggle for supremacy as inevitable in the East. The Englishmen of the Elizabethan age cast off their fear of Spain, entered into rivalry with Holland and finally made England the supreme commercial power of the modern world." And in his 'History of Commerce' he adds: "Indeed, our foreign history from 1688 to 1815 is little more than the record of a long duel between England and her rival, France (generally at first aided by Spain), for the possession of the colonial and maritime supremacy of the world."

The net effect of these struggles was to dismember the Portuguese Empire in Asia, transferring a part of it to the Dutch and a larger part ultimately to the English; to give England also large colonial possessions in North America and the West Indies; to break the naval power of Spain, leaving Britannia to "rule the wave," and to establish England as the leading commercial and industrial nation in the world, with France as a close second in continental trade and influence.

CHAPTER V

MODERN INDUSTRY AND THE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS

THE change from the domestic system of industry to the modern system of production by machinery and steam power is described as sudden and violent. "The great inventions," according to Gibbins' "Industrial History of England," "were all made in a comparatively short space of time, and the previous slow growth of industry developed quickly into a feverish burst of manufacturing production that completely revolutionized the face of industrial England. Nothing has done more to make England what she is than this sudden and silent Industrial Revolution, for it increased her wealth tenfold and gave her a half a century's start in front of the nations of Europe."

There is nothing accidental in the fact of so many and such varied inventions made at about the same time and just at this time. Says J. A. Hobson in his "Evolution of Modern Capitalism": "The history of the textile inventions does a good deal to dispel the 'heroic theory' of invention—that of an idea suddenly flashing from the brain of a single genius and effecting a rapid revolution in a trade. No one of the inventions which were greatest in their effect was in the main attributable to the effort or ability of a single man; each represented in its successful shape the addition of many successive increments of discovery; in most cases the successful invention was the slightly superior survivor of many similar attempts. This is the history of most inventions. The pressure of indus-

trial circumstances directs the intelligence of many minds toward the comprehension of some single central point of difficulty. The common knowledge of the age induces many to reach similar solutions."

By 1770 the conditions for a vast expansion of English industry had been prepared. A large wage-working class had been created, first by a sudden movement in the sixteenth century, then by a more gradual continuation of the process of impoverishment already described. On the other hand, a large amount of wealth had been accumulated in the hands of merchants and landowners, ready to be turned into industrial capital. The victory of England over France and Spain in the commercial and colonial wars, which came to a climax in the conflict of 1756-1763, gave her complete control in India, the whole of North America east of the Mississippi and a part of the West Indies, a superior power on all the seas and a stronger position than she had ever before occupied with reference to continental trade. The presence of labor and potential capital provided the means, the domination of so large a share of the world's markets furnished the stimulus, to an unexampled development of production. It was this which "directed the intelligence of many minds" toward the technical problems of manufacture and led to the devising of such improved methods of industry as would increase the production of goods in proportion to the increased possibilities of selling them at a profit.

The transformation which now took place is sketched in Arnold Toynbee's "Industrial Revolution in England" as follows: "The mechanical arts were still in a very backward state. In spite of the fact that the woolen trade was the staple industry of the country, according to Adam Smith, there had been only three inventions of importance since the reign of Edward IV.—the exchange of the rock and spindle for the spinning wheel; the use of machines for facilitating the proper arrangement of the warp and woof before being put into the loom, and the employment

of fulling mills for thickening the cloth instead of treading it in water. He forgot to mention the fly shuttle, invented in 1738 by Kay. Its utility consisted in its enabling a weaver to do his work in half the time and permitting one man instead of two to weave the widest cloth.

"Four great inventions altered the character of the cotton manufacture—the spinning jenny, patented by Hargreaves in 1770; the water frame, invented by Arkwright the year before; Crompton's mule, introduced in 1779, and the self-acting mule, first invented by Kelly in 1792, but not brought into use till Roberts improved it in 1825. None of these by themselves would have revolutionized the industry. But in 1769 James Watt took out his patent for the steam engine. Sixteen years later it was applied to the cotton manufacture. In 1785 Boulton and Watt made an engine for a cotton mill at Papplewick and in the same year Arkwright's patent expired. These two facts together mark the introduction of the factory system. But the invention most fatal to domestic industry, the power loom, tho also patented by Cartwright in 1785, did not come into use for several years. The iron industry had been equally revolutionized by the invention of smelting by coal, brought into use between 1740 and 1750, and by the application in 1788 of the steam engine to blast furnaces. In the eight years which followed the amount of iron manufactured nearly doubled.

"To the workpeople this system meant a change from independence to dependence. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the report of a committee asserts that the essential difference between the domestic and the factory system is that in the latter the work is done 'by persons who have no property in the goods they manufacture.' Another direct consequence of this expansion was the regular recurrence of periods of overproduction and of depression. The new class of great capitalist employers made enormous fortunes; they took little or no part personally in the work of their factories; their hundreds of

workmen were individually unknown to them, and as a consequence the old relations between masters and men disappeared and a 'cash nexus' was substituted for the human tie."

The use of the new methods necessitated, and in turn by their productiveness facilitated, the investment of ever larger amounts of capital in means of industrial production. Whereas under the old system the greater part of the manufacturing capital was that required for stock and current wages, this portion was now far outweighed by the amount needed for industrial plant. In the language of economics, to use profitably a given amount of circulating capital, an ever larger amount of fixed capital must be used with it, and since profit increased with the magnitude of the establishment, competition among manufacturers required, and competition among investors provided, an ever-increasing aggregate capital in the manufacturing industries. After the rise of the factory system the dominant economic interest in England passed definitely to the manufacturers. The necessities of exchange and of investment gave rise at the same time to a distinct class of financial capitalists (formerly not clearly distinguished from the commercial class), which grew steadily and by the end of the nineteenth century was becoming more and more tightly consolidated.

The effects of the Industrial Revolution could not be confined to England, tho there the new methods had their earliest and, for a long time, their fullest development. In course of time America and France and continental Europe were all to feel its influence.

Gibbins' "History of Commerce" gives the following account of the causes leading up to the revolt of England's American colonies: "In 1650 an act confined the export and import trade of the colonies to British or colonial ships. In 1660 it was enacted that the chief colonial products could not be exported direct from the colonies to foreign countries without being first brought to England and

there unladen and then reshipped by English merchants. The colonists were also compelled to buy what foreign manufactures and commodities they needed exclusively from England. This was forced upon them by an act of 1663, which allowed no foreign commodity to be sent to the colonies unless it was laden in an English port and sent on an English ship. At times the colonists made attempts to start home industries, but these were promptly suppressed. Woolen manufactures were forbidden in 1719, iron manufactures in 1750. Even colonial hatters were not allowed to send hats from one colony to another. Nevertheless the American colonists evaded the regulations which forbade them to trade with any country but England, and they succeeded in doing, for instance, a fairly considerable trade (almost entirely contraband) with the French and Spanish settlements. In the reign of George III. Grenville, a Whig minister, tried to stop this and to raise money wherewith to pay for the American portion of the Seven Years' War by taxing the colonists upon the stamps on legal papers. The chief result was to irritate the colonists. They formed associations for buying only their own manufactures, and so powerful was the feeling of opposition that it produced a decline in the commerce with England so serious that, upon a petition of the principal English manufacturers themselves, the act was repealed in 1766. But the very next year an act was passed imposing duties on tea, glass, painters' colors and pasteboard. But it was found utterly impracticable to collect these new duties, and in 1770 the act was repealed, except in so far as regarded the duty on tea. The colonists refused to buy tea. The East India Company, who found this caused a decrease in their trade, tried to force some of this commodity into America, and matters came to a crisis on the celebrated occasion when the citizens of Boston emptied a shipload of it into their harbor. In 1775 all trade with the colonies was forbidden, and then followed that unforunate and fatal conflict by

which England lost her first colonial empire. The great War of Independence went on; France eagerly seized the opportunity of assisting the Americans against the English, and England had to pay very heavily for her attempt to carry out the theory of the sole market."

Hostilities began on April 19, 1775, the Declaration of Independence was adopted on July 4, 1776, and the independence of the United States was recognised by the Treaty of Paris, signed on September 3, 1783. After several years of internal dissensions the States formed a unified government, which went into effect on April 30, 1789.

From Benjamin Franklin's essay on "The Internal State of America," written shortly before this event, may be drawn a picture of the economic conditions then prevailing. "The great business of the country," he says, "is agriculture. For one artizan or merchant, I suppose, we have at least one hundred farmers, by far the greatest part cultivators of their own fertile lands, from whence many of them draw not only food necessary for their subsistence but the materials of their clothing, so as to need very few foreign supplies, while they have a surplus of productions to dispose of, whereby wealth is gradually accumulated. The lands are continually rising in value with the increase of population, and, on the whole, the farmer is enabled to give such good wages to those who work for him that all who are acquainted with the Old World must agree that in no part of it are the laboring poor so generally well fed, well clothed, well lodged and well paid as in the United States of America. If we enter the cities we find that the workmen all demand and obtain much higher wages than any other part of the world could afford them. Tho there are few people so miserable as the poor of Europe, there are also very few that in Europe would be called rich; it is rather a general happy mediocrity that prevails. Land being cheap, from the vast forests still void of inhabitants and not likely to be occupied in an age to come, hearty young laboring men who understand the husbandry of

corn and cattle may easily establish themselves there. A little money, saved of the good wages they receive there while they work for others, enables them to buy the land and begin their plantation. From the encouragement to early marriages by certainty of subsistence in cultivating the earth the increase of inhabitants by natural generation is very rapid in America and becomes still more so by the accession of strangers; hence there is a continual demand for more artizans. If they are poor, they begin first as servants or journeymen, and if they are sober, industrious and frugal, they soon become masters, establish themselves in business and become respectable citizens. It is seen that great establishments of manufacture require g eat numbers of poor to do the work for small wages. Those poor are to be found in Europe, but will not be found in America till the lands are all taken up."

The taking up of the accessible land, with its consequence of the growth of a class of wage-workers, occurred more quickly than Franklin apprehended. By 1820 the number of inhabitants was almost treble what it had been in 1790. Until roads and canals were constructed, this population could not easily spread beyond the mountains. In the seaboard States, therefore, a larger proportion of labor became available for employment in manufactures, and the "general happy mediocrity" of wealth began to disappear. In the first period of the Republic the only powerful economic interest distinguished from the great mass of the population was that of the commercial and shipping trade in the North Atlantic States. Within a dozen years after the invention of the cotton gin (1793) the raising of cotton for export became immensely profitable, and the Southern slaveholding planters began to form a unified class with distinct interests and great economic power. In another decade a distinct manufacturing interest had arisen, closely identified with the westward spread of the population. The conflicts and alliances of these three interests that explain the political

history of the United States, with its struggles over the protective tariff, internal improvements, government banks, territorial expansion and interpretation of the Constitution, down to the Civil War of 1861-65, which destroyed the slaveholding class and left the manufacturing interest clearly in the ascendant.

Just five days after the inauguration of the first President of the United States came the meeting of the States-General in France, the first approach to a parliamentary assembly there since 1614. Then began that great movement which is known as the French Revolution, but which, with its sequel, the Napoleonic Wars, actually constituted nothing less than a European revolution, ending in the destruction of feudalism, the fatal weakening of absolute monarchy and the rise of constitutional government and of capitalist society, not in France alone but over almost the whole continent.

In some aspects the French Revolution of 1789 was the homologue of the English Revolution of 1640-60 and 1688. But because it was belated, it was far more sweeping when it came. The rise of the centralized monarchy in France had not, as in England, destroyed the feudal system. The political power had been concentrated in the hands of a bureaucratic despotism. But the nobles and clergy had retained their wealth, their social position and many of their feudal rights and privileges. Under this régime the development of the industrial and trading classes, the bourgeoisie, was positively hampered, instead of being promoted as it was by the English monarchy. In the sixteenth century the French bourgeoisie was behind that of England. Under the Bourbon monarchy it remained almost stationary. Serfdom persisted in large measure, as did antiquated guild rules and feudal exactions. The administration of justice was costly and uncertain. The fiscal system, tho it imposed crushing burdens on agriculture, commerce and industry, was inade-

quate to meet the cost of the wars which the nation had to v.age in defense of such trade as it had.

The government of Louis XVI. fell, not because it was cruel and profligate, but because it was in a state of chronic bankruptcy and unable to adopt a policy favorable to economic progress. The writings of the economists and the philosophers did much to give an intellectual sanction to the revolt against it. The example of the American Revolution counted for much as a direct stimulus. But back of these was the effect of the Industrial Revolution in England, creating new economic conditions in the face of which the French bourgeoisie found itself confronted with utter ruin unless it could likewise transform its methods and enter upon the same course of expansion. Before this imperative need, backed by the discontents of all the unprivileged classes, the Crown and the Church were forced to give way. The Third Estate compelled recognition and representation. A breach once made in the ancient system of impediments, the latent energies of the nation swept all before them. In its first year the Revolution abolished all feudal, clerical and guild privileges, nationalized the enormous properties of the church, declared the personal equality of all citizens and established the principle of constitutional government. But it could not stop there. It was driven on by its own impetus, by the irreconcilable opposition of the former privileged classes and by the hostility of the continental monarchs, who saw their thrones endangered by such an example, and of England, who feared the growth of the young giant and sought to strangle its growth. In 1792 the Revolution proclaimed the Republic and, following English precedent, beheaded the king. Under the same compulsion revolutionary France in that year embarked in a crusade against all monarchies and aristocracies. The revolutionary Republic later gave way to the Empire of Napoleon, but under the eagles as under the tricolor, from 1792 to 1815, the French people fought for

the extension of a political and social order founded upon personal liberty, equality before the law and unrestricted private property, an order adapted to the development of capitalist production and exchange.

The economic causes underlying such vast upheavals as the American and French revolutions have only gradually been apprehended by mankind. Three hundred years ago there was no such thing in the world as exact thinking on economic subjects. The science of political economy had not been born.

"Political economy," says Belfort Bax in his introduction to Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations," "is essentially a modern department of learning. In the ancient world we have only fitful adumbrations of the conception of such a science. In the Middle Ages the idea itself is even lost. Production was almost exclusively for use, and trade or exchange was so little developed that the economic aspect of things never presented itself distinctively.

"Toward the close of the sixteenth century, when the conditions of medieval were rapidly giving place to those of modern life, attention began to be directed in various quarters toward economic problems. Almost simultaneously in Italy, France and England we find the first modern economic treatises published. Unconsciously in the minds of men a theory of commerce had grown up, based upon the simplest and most superficial observation of economic phenomena—to wit: that the precious metals were the concentrated form of all wealth. Enthusiasm for commerce had arisen with the recent expansion of the world-market, and men seeing trade continually produce large fortunes instinctively came to the conclusion that in trade —that is, exchange—is to be found the source of wealth and that its symbol and agent—money—was its sole repository. This was the celebrated mercantile system, the great corollary from it being the doctrine of the balance of trade, which declared it necessary to the prosperity of a country that the exports should always exceed the imports,

inasmuch as by this means bullion flowed into the country, while otherwise there was a loss. The rise in prices, due to the influx of gold and silver from the newly discovered America, had dislocated the commercial relations of the time and set men thinking on the nature of economic processes, while the attempts of governments, arising out of the mercantile theory, to debase the coinage in the hope of thereby increasing their wealth gave a practical turn to the various controversies."

But the mercantile system, as now appears plainly, was based on very superficial reasoning. "The reaction against its fundamental principle," says Bax, "appeared in France in the guise of the 'physiocratic' system, which maintained that land was the sole repository of wealth, with its corollary that agriculture was the sole means of realizing it. The ideas of this school did not attract attention until definitely formulated by François Quesnay (1755) and Jean de Gournay. In Quesnay's work the following passage occurs: 'Let absolute freedom of commerce be maintained; for the surest guardian of internal and external commerce, the most exact and the most profitable to the nation and the State, lies in the unlimited freedom of competition.' To Gournay is due the phrase since become proverbial, 'Laissez faire, laissez aller.' The celebrated French finance minister, Turgot, gives the most complete exposition of the system. In his 'Reflexions sur le Formation des Richesses' (1766) he begins by showing the advantage and necessity of the division of labor and how it results from a systematic exchange of commodities. He then goes on to show that the labor of the husbandman upon the land is the original source of all wealth, since food is the first necessity of man, but then erroneously argues, as a physiocrat, that only the land produces wealth.

Ten years later the first edition of Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" was given to the world. This is one of the epoch-making books. Political economy, as a science, may be said to date from its publication. Adam Smith was

a Scotchman and a metaphysician. His painstaking labors reflect most significantly the transitional era through which his generation was passing.

Like the physiocrats with whom he had much in common, Adam Smith was concerned with the "natural" laws of wealth. The full title of his book was "An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations." He believed in the beneficence of nature and he taught that all would be well with men if they knew how to grasp her laws. To Adam Smith it appeared that the human propensity to "truck, barter and exchange" was the mechanism through which the "invisible hand" of nature accomplished its purpose, and that the greatest good is obtained by each individual "pursuing his own interest in his own way." He was a thorogoing advocate of 'laissez-faire.'

Under Adam Smith's relentless analysis the mercantile system crumbled. He showed that gold and silver were not more important than other forms of wealth, and that they could be bought by any one who had other consumable goods to offer in exchange. "The immediate result of his teaching," observes Bax, "was the complete overthrow, in England at least, of the doctrine of protection and the establishment of free trade as the basis of economic theory."

The system of Adam Smith is mainly a theory of production, and it has been properly called an "industrial system," for human industry is its efficient principle; but it is based on manufacture-industry and was formulated before the Industrial Revolution had substituted machine-industry. Viewing everything from the standpoint of production, Adam Smith reached the conclusion that "natural" value belongs to whatever embodies labor; that labor is the cause of value—the "real price" of things.

Distribution he also interpreted as a "natural" function, accounting for the shares meted out to each by construing them in terms of the "necessary" equivalence of

effort and effect in production. Nature, he contended, makes no mistakes and is not wasteful. Therefore, under conditions of natural competition, effect must be proportioned to effort, and vice versa. He did not identify the natural with the actual, but he held up the natural, rightly apprehended, as the ideal.

Adam Smith, Malthus and Ricardo constitute the trinity of the "classical" school of political economy. "But it seems doubtful," says Dr. A. C. Miller in "The Encyclopedia of Social Reform," "if either Malthus or Ricardo has exerted a greater influence than the great utilitarian who was the tone-giving influence in nearly every department of English thought for at least one-half of the nineteenth century. To the influence of Bentham's teaching the science owes that peculiar constitution which has given rise to its characteristics as 'the mechanics of natural liberty.' To that same influence seems due the shifting of the center of interest from the analysis of production to the theory of value. And to his teaching in particular we owe the creation of that bondman of science, the economic man.

"The specific innovation that utilitarianism accomplished for political economy was the substitution of utility for providential design as the basis of theoretical formulations. Bentham gave to that metaphysics of human nature which had already emerged in Adam Smith a matchless statement, an impregnable setting. It became for political economy a first principle. Adam Smith had shown how the actions of individual man, each seeking his own gain, inevitably promoted the public interest. But Adam Smith was no utilitarian. It was to only one class of actions that he assigned self-interest, and even there self-interest was but a wheel in the mechanism through which nature sought her ends. With the school of Bentham, however, 'there is no true interest but individual interest,' not only in the region of business but throughout the whole of life,

Self-interest is, therefore, not a method of nature; it is nature."

The contribution of Malthus to the science of economics was of an entirely different character. Analyzing the causes of poverty as Adam Smith had analyzed the causes of wealth, he came to the conclusion that human misery was not the result of human injustice and of bad institutions, but of an inexorable law of nature—namely, that population tends to outstrip the means of subsistence. The controversies he started are still reverberating through the world, but it is generally now conceded that his theory is discredited.

Ricardo's great service, according to Bax, "consisted in pointing out that wealth, whether in the form of capital or otherwise, is merely the accumulated product of labor, and in enforcing Adam Smith's position that labor is the sole basis of value, with its corollary that the 'natural price' of a commodity expresses the total amount of embodied social labor it contains. He was also the first to definitely formulate the theory of 'economic rent,' by which is meant the surplus yield or produce from any land over and above that of the worst land in cultivation." The later theories of Karl Marx and Henry George both found support in Ricardo.

Finally, John Stuart Mill should be mentioned as one of the great intermediaries between the classical economists and those of the present day. "Mill may have echoed the laws and phrases of the earlier generation of thinkers," says Dr. Miller, "but he was informing them with a new spirit which reflects the presence of the new influences that were effecting the thinking of his day." Mill radically modified the older and fatalistic conception of "economic man" molded by his environment, and put in its place a conception of man creating the world anew. Where Adam Smith had seen only a sequence of events in nature, Mill saw the living human will operating. The principle of laissez-faire he rejected. For him the "admitted functions

of government embrace a much wider field than can easily be included within the ring-fence of any restrictive definition, and it is hardly possible to find any ground of justification common to them all except the comprehensive one of general expediency." Liberty and property he treated not as "natural rights," but as human contrivances to be tried on their merits.

This pragmatic attitude is typical of the modern spirit, and, taken in conjunction with the growing intelligence of the masses of the people, may help to explain many recent developments. For a century now society has been moving steadily toward a fuller democracy and the extension of governmental functions. Trades unions have been legalized; the suffrage has been widened to include an ever greater and greater number; factory laws and employers' liability acts have been passed, and long steps have been taken toward a system of universal free education.

England has thus far preserved her economic leadership of the world, tho the United States and Germany now tread close at her heels. But she has not, and no nation can hope to have, that supremacy which she enjoyed during and for some time after her Industrial Revolution. Not only has capitalism been transplanted to America and spread all over western Europe; it has thriven in England's Canadian, Australasian and South African colonies; it has been accepted in Japan; it has invaded Russia, Turkey and Persia and is now revolutionizing their social and political life; it is even slowly transforming the ancient civilization of the Chinese. It has become so nearly universal and so completely dominant that only by an effort of the mind can those born under it realize that it is not something eternal and immutable.

CHAPTER VI

THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF SOCIETY

Sociology, in its broadest sense, tells man what he is and how he came to be so. Political economy explains how wealth arose and how it has been distributed, exchanged and consumed. The practical value of both sciences may be said to lie in the light they throw on the present tendencies and future development of society.

Two main attitudes are taken by social thinkers in regard to economic tendencies at the present time. By some it is felt that the basis and structure of existing society are destined to endure and that improvements will be wrought within its limits. Benjamin Kidd, in his "Social Evolution," takes substantially this view, and Richard T. Ely voices the conviction of many conservative economists when he says in his "Evolution of Modern Industry" that "our existing society has great vitality," that "it is sound in its most essential elements," that "a widely diffused ownership of wealth is practicable" and that "the work which is required is improvement along existing lines." On the other side are ranged the thinkers who look for fundamental social changes. Most of these are advocates, trying to bring about such changes. To this class belong Herbert Spencer, who preached an individualism not far removed from philosophical Anarchism; Karl Marx, who believed that he saw in the rise of the working-class a force that would overthrow capitalism and inaugurate a Socialist State; and Henry George, who regarded the pri-

vate ownership of land as the supreme economic evil, and who saw in a "Single Tax" on land values the one measure calculated to reach the root of social injustice.

The basic features of modern society, as Ely defines them, are competition and private property in capital. "Competition," he says, "is the foundation of our present social order. Our legal system rests upon competition as a basis. The great legal decisions in England and America assume, either implicitly or explicitly, that competition is a pillar of the social order." And this is right and logical, from Ely's point of view, for the reason that competition, as he sees it, is nature's own method of insuring progress and providing for "the survival of the fittest."

In the beginning, according to this argument, competition was a biological struggle. It was cruel and brutal, but it performed its function—the improvement of the species. Through every stage of animal and human life it has persisted, and in every stage it has been modified by new conditions. The biological struggle has become an economic struggle, and the crass conflict of earliest times is tempered by a thousand restraining and humanizing influences. This again is as it should be, in Ely's judgment. One of the chief functions of government, he holds, is to "raise the ethical level of competition."

To recognise in competition a corner-stone of present-day society, the argument proceeds, is not to deny that coöperation also has its place. "Perhaps the one fact in the evolution of society that becomes clearer and clearer as time passes," Ely declares, "is that coöperation is the great law of social life growth." The coöperative factors of civilization are as important as the competitive. They may be said to balance each other.

One of the most important of these coöperative factors is rooted in governmental activity. For centuries there has been a steady drift toward the extension of governmental functions. The governments of to-day not only administer civil affairs and organize armies, but manage the postal

service and provide for the education and general well-being of the people. Many European governments now own and control railway, telegraph, telephone and express systems. In New Zealand, the most "advanced" of all modern countries, governmental activities now include banking, insurance, nationalization of much of the land, loans to home-builders, operation of coal-mines, trusteeship and management of estates, old-age pensions, village and farm settlements for the poor, direct employment on public works and mandatory arbitration of labor disputes.

The extension of municipal ownership is equally striking. Gas, water, electric lighting, street railways, ferry-boats, laundries, lodging-houses, theaters, baths, drug-stores, bakeries, restaurants are only a few of the responsibilities that municipalities in all parts of the world have assumed. "Our various governments, national, state and local," comments Ely, "are clearly destined to extend their productive activities, particularly in the field of monopolies. No one who has eyes to see what is going on throughout the regions of industrial civilization can well doubt this fact."

But the most noteworthy of all the coöperative factors of modern society are the "trusts." These have reached their climax in America. Their character is often but little understood, for the reason that the formation of a trust is a matter of business policy, while the attack upon a trust is usually phrased in terms of ethics or of moral philosophy. And, whatever the trust may or may not be, it does not pose as a prophet of moral teaching. That is admittedly not its sphere. There are not many more aggravating evidences of the muzziness of public opinion than this habit of blaming a business trust for not being a Sunday School.

The advantages of the trust are obvious. It is the acme of industrial development and surpasses in economy and efficiency any previously existing combination. But its dangers are equally apparent. It tends to monopoly and

it leads to the cencentration of vast wealth and economic power in a few hands.

The first of these dangers Ely would meet by public control, taxation, tariff reform and similar remedies. One of the chief reforms needed, he thinks, is "complete publicity, with such extension of the criminal law as would send to the penitentiary as quickly the man guilty of theft through the medium of a corporation as the man guilty of theft in his individual capacity." Ely also favors a radical alteration of inheritance laws, with a view to the diffusion of concentrated wealth, and sees in the growth of trade-unionism a healthy offset to capitalistic power.

Ely conceives, then, of society as fundamentally competitive and based on private ownership in capital, yet as modified by increasing coöperative tendencies. It is interesting to contrast his views with the three modern social theories, or "schools," which aim to subvert the very foundations of the present social structure. These are, broadly speaking, Anarchism, the Single Tax and Socialism. "Anarchism" is derived from two Greek words meaning "without government"; it wants to get rid of government altogether. There are two schools of Anarchism—the Individualists and the Communists. The first would preserve competition and private property in capital, the second would abolish both. The Single Tax would preserve competition and private property in the instruments of production, but would abolish private property in land. Socialism would inaugurate an era of universal coöperation, in which land and the instruments of production would alike be owned and administered by the community collectively.

The popular hatred and misunderstanding of Anarchism are undoubtedly due to the acts of violence and assassination associated with it. But Anarchism, properly understood, is a serious philosophy with a serious mission. It aims to eliminate government in the interest of freedom; it would carry the idea of freedom to its logical ultimate in the economic field. Many modern thinkers of world-

influence have imbibed the Anarchist spirit. Herbert Spencer himself, at the beginning of his career, taught that "government is essentially immoral," and that the individual has "the right to ignore the State." In his later writings he modified these extreme conclusions, but the tendency of his argument was always anti-governmental. He makes biology teach the folly of State intervention. He contends that it is absolutely necessary to human progress that each individual should stand on his own legs. The struggle for survival, he says, should go on "without violence," but also without government interference. He believes this process to be really benevolent and affirms: "The poverty of the incapable, the distresses that come upon the imprudent, the starvation of the idle and those shoulderings aside of the weak by the strong, which leave so many in shallows and in miseries, are decrees of a large, far-seeing benevolence." Spencer also believes this competition to be just. Each one should gain "neither more nor less of benefit than his activities will normally bring." "The superior," he says, "should have the good of his superiority and the evil of his inferiority"; and he would put a veto on "all public action which abstracts from some men part of the advantages which they have earned and awards to other men advantages which they have not earned." In harmony with this attitude, Spencer opposed free compulsory public education, public libraries, factory legislation, the establishment of State telegraphy and many other similar innovations. The collectivist trend was in a direction exactly opposite to that which he conceived as healthy development. He looked upon Socialism as "the coming slavery."

From Spencer's position it is but a short step to Anarchism as defined by its advocates. Eltzbacher, who traces the pedigree of Anarchism through Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker and Tolstoy, finds just one common feature in all Anarchistic doctrine, the feature emphasized by Spencer—namely, the negation of

the State. Of the two schools of Anarchism—the Individualist-Anarchist and the Communist-Anarchist—Tucker is the ablest living exponent of the first school, Kropotkin of the second.

According to Tucker, the State is "the embodiment of the principle of invasion." His ideal is a world of free men, competing on equal terms, without coercion. As steps toward this end he advocates the abolition of the "four principal monopolies" of money, of land, of tariff and of patents.

First in the importance of its evil influence, he says, is the money monopoly, which "consists of the privilege given by the government to certain individuals, or to individuals holding certain kinds of property, of issuing the circulating medium." The business of banking should be free to all. The land monopoly is second in importance and "consists in the enforcement by government of land-titles which do not rest upon personal occupancy and cultivation." The third and fourth monopolies are thus analyzed by Tucker: "The tariff monopoly consists in fostering production at high prices and under unfavorable conditions by visiting with the penalty of taxation those who patronize production at lower prices and under favorable conditions. The evil to which this monopoly gives rise might more properly be called misusury than usury, because it compels labor to pay, not exactly for the use of capital, but rather for the misuse of capital." "The patent monopoly protects inventors and authors against competition for a period long enough to enable them to extort from the people a reward enormously in excess of the labor measure of their services; in other words, it gives certain people a right to property for a term of years in laws and facts of nature and the power to exact tribute from others for the use of this natural wealth which should be open to all." The object in removing these and similar monopolies is to secure "equal liberty" for all.

Kropotkin's point of view is very different. He be-

lieves that the "next," "inevitable" stage in social development will be communistic. "Free associations," he says, "are beginning to take to themselves the entire field of human activity." "The large organizations resulting merely and simply from free agreement have grown recently. The railway net of Europe—a confederation of so many scores of seperate societies—is an instance; the Dutch 'Beurden,' or associations of ship and boat owners, are extending now their organizations over the rivers of Germany and even to the shipping trade of the Baltic. The numberless manufacturers' associations and the 'syndicats' of France are so many instances in point. But there also is no lack of free organizations for nobler pursuits; the Lifeboat Association, the Hospitals Association and hundreds of like associations. One of the most remarkable societies which has arisen recently is the Red Cross Society. To slaughter men on the battlefields, that remains the duty of the State; but these very States recognise their inability to take care of their own wounded. They abandon the task, to a great extent, to private initiative."

In the Anarchist society sketched by Kropotkin there will be no "law" as at present understood. The legal phase of social evolution will have been outgrown. "The law is a comparatively young formation. Mankind lived for ages without any written law. At that time the relations of men to each other were regulated by mere habits, by customs and usages, which age made venerable and which every one learned from his childhood in the same way as he learned hunting, cattle-raising or agriculture." "But when society came to be more and more split into two hostile classes, of which the one wanted to rule and the other to escape from rule, the victor of the moment sought to give permanence to the accomplished fact and to hallow it by all that was venerable to the defeated. Consecrated by the priest and protected by the strong hand of the warrior, law appeared."

The coming society, Kropotkin asserts, will be based on common ownership not only of capital, but also of materials for consumption. "People have tried to make a distinction between the capital that serves for the production of goods and that which satisfies the wants of life, and have said that machines, factories, raw materials, the means of transportation and the land are destined to become the property of the community, while dwellings, finished products, clothing and provisions will remain private property. This distinction is erroneous and impracticable. The house that shelters us, the coal and gas that we burn, the nutriment that our body burns up, the clothing that covers us and the book from which we draw instruction are all essential to our existence and are just as necessary for successful production and for the further development of mankind as are machines, factories, raw materials and other factors of productions. With private property in the former goods, there would still remain inequality, oppression and exploitation."

There is nothing in Anarchism necessarily conflicting with the "Single Tax" doctrines propounded by Henry George in "Progress and Poverty," and it is worth noting that here again, Herbert Spencer, in his earlier days, gave countenance to theories similar to those held by George. The keynote of "Progress and Poverty" is struck in the following passage: "The association of poverty with progress is the great enigma of our times. It is the central fact from which spring industrial, social and political difficulties that perplex the world and with which statesmanship and philanthropy and education grapple in vain." George goes on to argue: "The reason why, in spite of the increase of productive power, wages constantly tend to a minimum which will give but a bare living, is that, with increase in productive power, rent tends to even greater increase, thus producing a constant tendency to the forcing down of wages." He states his remedy as follows: "There is but one way to remove an evil and

that is to remove its cause. Poverty deepens as wealth increases and wages are forced down while productive power grows, because land, which is the source of all wealth and the field of all labor, is monopolized. To extirpate poverty, to make wages what justice commands they should be, the full earnings of the laborer, we must therefore substitute for the individual ownership of land a common ownership. Nothing else will go to the cause of the evil, in nothing else is there the slightest hope.

"This, then, is the remedy for the unjust and unequal distribution of wealth apparent in modern civilization and for all the evils which flow from it:

"We must make land common property."

The method by which George proposes to make land common property is the Single Tax. "I do not propose," he says, "either to purchase or to confiscate property in land. The first would be unjust, the second needless. . . .

"We already take some rent in taxation. We have only to make some changes in our modes of taxation to take it all.

"What I, therefore, propose as the simple yet sovereign remedy which will raise wages, increase the earnings of capital, extirpate pauperism, abolish poverty, give remunerative employment to whoever wishes it, afford free scope to human powers, lessen crime, elevate morals and intelligence, purify government and carry civilization to nobler heights is to appropriate rent by taxation.

"In this way the State may become the universal landlord without calling herself so and without assuming a single new function. In form the ownership of land would remain just as now. No owner of land need be dispossessed and no restriction need be placed upon the amount of land any could hold. For rent being taken by the State in taxes, land, no matter in whose name it stood or in what parcels it was held, would really be common property, and every member of the community would participate in the advantages of its ownership."

The third system of social theory proposing fundamental changes in Socialism, and Karl Marx was its first great exponent. Before his time Socialistic doctrines were Utopian and nebulous. He coördinated them into a science. His work, "Das Kapital," has become one of the landmarks of economic thought.

The two great discoveries of Marx were "surplus value" and "economic determinism." By the first he meant the "surplus" which the wage-worker creates, but for which he receives no return. Most social students acknowledge that the workers have never, in any age, received the full value of their product. Slavery and serfdom were alike based on the spoliation of the worker. Henry George traced this spoliation to the private ownership of land. Marx took the position that since the inauguration of the capitalistic era, capital, in the largest sense, is the instrument of exploitation.

Marx's second discovery, sometimes called "the materialist conception of history," was based on his recognition of the overwhelming influence exerted by economic motives on human progress. No other economist or sociologist has sufficiently recognized this influence. In the "Communist Manifesto" of 1848, written in conjunction with Engels, he took the position: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." He also said: "In every historical epoch the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange and the social organization necessarily resulting from it, form the basis on which is built up and from which alone can be explained the political and intellectual history of that epoch." To the establishment of this thesis a large part of his argument was devoted.

But the really dynamic part of his gospel was embodied in the words: "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries unite!" This exhortation has become the battle-cry of a world-wide movement.

Socialist ideas have found expression through a multitude of other thinkers. There are several groups of Socialists divided by differences of opinion in regard to theories and methods. But all are united in the belief that the present competitive order of society, based on private ownership of capital, is about to be superseded, in the process of social evolution, by a coöperative commonwealth, based on public ownership of land and the instruments of production and distribution.

Gidding divides the modern social philosophies into "Individualism," "Anarchism" and "Socialism" and sees truth in all, without commiting himself to any. Individualism he defines as the proposition that every man should be allowed to acquire property, make contracts, engage in private enterprise and employ others, subject to certain limitations and regulations imposed by society through government and law. Among the limitations would be these: That the ownership of property is affected by public use; in other words, the ownership of property is not quite absolute. The State would have a right to step in and say to a man that he must surrender a certain piece of property for a valuation, because the public required it for some other use. Or the State might step in and say to a man that he could not use his property in such a way as to imperil the lives and the health of the people about him. If he wished to manufacture gunpowder or dynamite or conduct chemical works which pour noxious gases into the air, the State would reserve the right to interfere with his use and enjoyment of private property in such cases.

Individualism in this sense differs from Anarchism by incorporating much of the Socialist point of view. "The Anarchist," Giddings points out, "would say, if he is a consistent, philosophic Anarchist, Do not restrict the individual at all; have no government, have no law, let the individual do what is good in his own eyes, from his own motives, subject only to those limitations which the natu-

ral, voluntary, enforced resistance of his fellow men will bring against him if he transgresses against them and encroaches upon their liberties."

"The Individualist," on the other hand, "in so far as he differs from the Anarchist, does so by going half way over to the Socialist position, by going over so far as to agree that there are great, common interests, great, common rights which the State represents and which the State may enforce against the individual for the common good. But, in so far as the Individualist stops short and does not become a Socialist and does not say among the common interests are those of common possession of the economic opportunities of life, the land, the mineral wealth, the inventions of a bygone time, the accumulations of capital, the great means of production—in so far as the Individualist does not include these among the great common goods of the body politic, he stops short of the Socialist position. Now, just to the extent that he falls short of the Socialist position, the Individualist does so because he goes half way to the Anarchist position. He does not like the idea of having the State do too much. He does not like the idea of much law or regulation. He does with the Socialist so far as to say there may be some common possessions, some common interests, some common control, and he goes so far with the Anarchists as to say that government, law, is a necessary evil, and that he does not want any more of it than is necessary for the good of the fundamental, common interest and the social order."

Here, then, are three plausible schemes, or "ways out," and each of the three appeals to some particular group of minds.

It is well to pass on to the more immediate questions of sociological values and their relations to present living. Whether our tendencies are towards individualism or anarchism, or towards any of the varieties or sub-varieties of Socialism, all students of political economy will agree

that the present is more in need of aid than the future, that it is only by the manipulation of the present that we can influence the future. And, unless we hold to the tenet that "all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds," we must hold to the tenet that all is not for the best. To those, moreover, who acknowledge personal responsibility in any form, it follows that some effort must be made to reform that which is not for the best. There, then, lies the basis of Social Reform.

The philosophy of socio-political economy lies in the truth that society is the product of reason, that it is therefore a member of the national group of sciences and capable of rational interpretation. The true social reformer, consequently, should begin his work by a methodical consideration of the data at his command. As has been truly said, there is far more study of the communities of the protozoa than of the communities of men. It should be an axiom of reform that the starting-point must be from conditions as they are. But the inherent weakness of much reform has in the fact that the starting-point taken is that of things as the reformer believes them to be. The hopeless amateurishness of many social reform organizations has become proverbial..

Professor Henry Jones, of Glasgow, on the other hand, a trained economist, remarks of the Scotch slums: "Not less impressive was the completeness of the control of the city authorities over these evil centres. The officers of the law and the criminals knew each other as familiarly as opponents in a game of chess, and were on not less friendly terms. And the rules of the game were thoroughly understood on both sides. [This was penned by a man who knows, as most reformers of experience will admit. But does this disturb him? Not a whit.] There were some evils for which the law had little remedy; but in almost every case these were evils for which legal coercion was not the proper method, or in which the crude powers of legal justice could not be applied with-

out invading legitimate rights and endangering public welfare in wider ways." How different is this picture from the usual clamor against the police forces of American cities. The same evidence would suggest "graft" to the unskilled observer.

Social reform deals with crime and poverty and is of two distinct and separate types. The first of these is individualistic, often associated with religion. This works upon the basis of the inestimable value of a single human soul, counting fruitless years well spent if at last one soul is "saved." The second is communistic, believing that the welfare of the community is the welfare of the units of the community, and here the emphasis is laid upon the securing of the largest civic result with the minimum of waste effort.

The phrase "welfare work" is coming into wide usage to connote the recognition by valid organizations of the ideas that have been formulated by the amateur volunteer associations, practically all of which have been subsidized by the trust interests. The Association for the doing of this, and the Society for the prevention of that, and the Committee for the improvement of the other thing have flaunted themselves by every line of publicity known to the press agent. Their total practical accomplishment is little or nothing, save to individuals, but their force has been effective to bring about a realization of the obligations of the employer and of the state. Such movements include the industrial safety of the employes, and "safety first" is a cry that has begun to have considerable effect in allaying the reckless disregard for life and limb that aforetime characterized the handling of factory operatives.

The social settlement—which usually tries to straddle the ethical-civic force—has been a trying-out ground for much welfare work. Saving and loan plans are now accepted by scores of large industries, recreation has become recognized by cities as a necessary part of their duty

to the children, and sanitation has been extended to a far more rigid requirement than ever before. Many large organizations, such as the International Harvester Company, the U. S. Steel Trust and the Telegraph and Telephone companies, have complete and efficient pension systems. The conditions of work are made as pleasant as possible.

This development finds its chiefest importance in the recognition of the rights of the worker to be considered as a unit of value to the community. This is neither the religious position which holds the man of value because of his soul, nor the position of political economy, which holds the man of value because he is a part of a political and economical whole. It makes the individual a supporter of the state and holds out, as never before, the pride of the state in its citizens, which, undoubtedly, will be reflected by those citizens as pride for the state. From this point of view arises by reflex action all those movements for a "city beautiful," all civic improvement works, and the workers, who are also the voters, will be foremost in the endorsement and approval of plans for community betterment.

Political economy, on the other hand, as contrasted with social reform, deals with the community as an entity in itself, irrespective of the units which compose it. Social Reform is apt to demand the salvation from drunkenness of drunkards. Political economy is apt to discuss drunkenness as much from the side of the fiscal return from liquor taxation as from the point of the greater efficiency of the working citizens of the State. In the great European war, it was the latter argument which put an end to the sale of vodka in Russia, just as, in the Opium War, it was the former argument which caused England to force the nefarious traffic upon China.

The twentieth century is the period of Social and Political Evolutions, or to phrase the matter otherwise, it is the period when both the individual and the State are perceived to be on an ever-upward-tending plane. The

individual is not longer considered as a unit of which he is the beginning and the end; his life is no longer considered as a probation for some other life. In similar fashion, the State is no longer considered as a loose aggregation of individuals to be administered for the best interests of those individuals. Society is now seen to be as material as other portions of the universe, as organic as other functions of matter known as organisms, evolving in the same fashion, and governed by the same laws.

The twentieth century development of sociology and of political economy is the realization that the social structure is as definitely a part of the cosmos as human anatomy or the stratification of the rocks. "Social problems" are topics of discussion, and subjects which, a scant twenty years ago, would have been considered shameworthy to mention are now banded to and fro with an ease that betokens a wide recognition of their universal appeal.

Consider poverty, mother of all miseries. "The poor ye have with you always," has ceased to be a sufficient excuse for poverty. In America, especially, it is felt that poverty ought not to be. It is rapidly becoming a matter of faith that poverty will not always need to be. It is true that there are a score of panaceas suggested for the evil. The prohibitionist declares that the liquor evil is responsible for poverty. The single tax advocate blames the system of taxation. The special pleader in the cause of organized labor lays the onus on low wages, and the capitalist retaliates with the charges of laziness and inefficiency. The physician connotes the part that sickness plays in the distresses of the "submerged tenth." Who cared about the poor, two centuries ago?

Consider crime, the expression of resentment against the restraints of the social state. Once again the social reformers claim a hearing. Some declare that if all incomes were equalized there would be no reason for crime. Others find in deficient education the cause of wrongdo-

ing. Yet others assign it to the decline in religious obedience. Penologists of all schools emphasize the restrictive effects of the fear of punishment, or the beneficent results of remedial rather than punitive measures. But, again, Who cared about the social redemption of the criminal, two centuries ago?

Something has occurred, then, in these two centuries; something so startlingly subversive that it has entirely changed the complexion of the modern world to its own affairs. This occurrence is the development of what may be termed Popular Political Economy. The Greeks possessed it—and they were a democracy; the English-speaking people possess it now, and they are a freer democracy than the ancient Greeks. Muckraking, the resentment against bosses and against graft, the concerted attacks against a double standard of morality, the recognition that marriage does not entitle a woman to become a parasite upon her husband for evermore, the successful campaign against child labor, the passage of innumerable laws regulating sanitary conditions in dwellings and in factories, all these, and a score of similar movements that come surging to the mind, are the direct result of this awakened public conscience.

Political Economy has not only realized its object. A still greater event has occurred. It has realized its subject. A mightier power than has been sits enthroned, as yet unfamiliar with its regnancy and distrustful of its opportunities. This power is Public Opinion. It is, as yet, an unintelligent power, signally unable to see both sides of a question at the same time. It has all the evils of the mob, which, as is well understood, is the mental concept of the lowest stratum, not the highest, just as the strength of a chain is measured by its weakest link, and the speed of a team is determined by the pace of the slowest horse. But Public Opinion is organic, with power of growth and evolution, and while this may not be the best of all possible worlds, it is steadily growing better.

Individualism or Communism? Socialism or Anarchism? Conservativism or Radicalism? These are not contrasting alternatives, they are merely opposing viewpoints. Public opinion is the shaper of social reform, the genius of modern political economy. Centuries may elapse before there will be developed a clearly-wrought, well-poised national understanding which will go far to make the United States the abode of a universal and regulated pursuit, but there can be no doubt that the right keynote has been struck and that the way to a right understanding of the powerful principles of social justice is government by and with the consent of the governed.

ETHICS

ETHICS

CHAPTER I

THE MORAL CONCEPTION

ETHICS is the region of the sublime. High and clear above all the disputations of philosophies, far removed from the pettier aims of mere financial betterment, Ethics points the way to a goal of illimitable loftiness—the Summum Bonum or the Highest Good. Wonderful has been the mental development of Man from the time of his first bewildered watching of the stars, wonderful his advancement in practical efficiency since the days of the chipped flint knives, but the highest point is reached when, with the advancement of the eclectic sense, Man realized that all these forms of advancement were not an end in themselves, but rather a means to an end.

Definitions are double-edged tools with a peculiar facility for injuring the user, but it may be said that Ethics is the Science of the Moral Conception and its relation to Conduct. When it is remembered how widely variant—even to-day—are the moral conceptions of different people, and how remarkably antagonistic the delineation of Conduct—"the vices of Piccadilly are the virtues of Peru"—it is evident that the subject requires clear thought and guarded speech. Ethics is intimately related to Religion, and no more debatable ground than Religion exists; Ethics has been regarded as innate Esthetics, but the canons of good taste change ever; Ethics is close akin to Meta-

physics, and the Scotch description of a metaphysician as being "a man talking about something he did not understand to people who could not comprehend a word he said" is too near a popular conception of the truth not to raise a semi-approving smile.

The department of Ethical Thought considers especially the actions of human beings with reference to their "right" or "wrong," their tendency to recognized "good" or supposed evil. The words "right" and "good" therefore come in as important factors in any consideration of the subject. But "right" means primarily according to rule, and "good" implies that the thing so spoken of is serviceable to some end. "Thus," as John L. Mackenzie suggests, "when we say that the Science of Ethics is concerned with the 'rightness' or 'goodness' of human conduct, we mean that it is concerned with the consideration of the serviceableness of our conduct for some end at which we aim and with the rules by which our conduct is to be directed in order that this end may be attained."

Again, in order to determine surely the ground whereon this subject is based, it is to be observed that conduct implies an aim. Man behaves as he does because he has an end in view, and this end is always a purposed good of some sort or another. His end may be a false conception of good, such as the thief possesses when he robs his fellow man, but his purpose in robbery is to gain some good for himself. Therefore that conduct which is to be esteemed most excellent is that whose end is the highest good, which again may be described as the realization of the highest self.

Ethics assumes as its basis the fact that men are prone to criticize themselves and others and cannot help admiring or condemning those things which impress them as being respectively praiseworthy or blameworthy. "This tendency," points out James Martineau in his 'Types of Ethical Theory,' "displays itself actively in every aspect of life, giving pungency to the gossip of a village, the

chief interest to biography and fiction, the needful authority to law and the highest power to religion. While they all join in the confession that there is an interval between life as it is and life as it ought to be, they investigate no standard, they seek no ground for their own feeling, but are content with reporting the estimates that rise spontaneously in the mind," and certain traits are admired and certain characteristics despised with an absolute inner assurance of judgment. It is the commonest thing to hear people say, "I can tell whether I am going to like him or not just as soon as I see him."

These current judgments constitute a body of ethical facts. In order that Ethics may rightly be considered as a Science, therefore, it must possess the three distinguishing marks of a Science. First, it must observe with painstaking accuracy and record those observations; second, it must classify these observations and determine their relation to each other, which are of earlier and which of later formation and what proportion of inter-relation exists; third, it must explain these ethical facts in such wise as to show the subject as a coherent whole, affording a place for all ethical facts presently discovered or to be.

The vastness of the Science of Ethics, therefore, may be clearly grasped when it is seen that every life that has been lived upon this planet is a different ethical fact, that every thought and opinion which has passed through the mind of every person is an ethical fact, and that every event of history which has required the association of ideas of two or more individuals is an extremely complex ethical fact. Thus, for example, in an ethical consideration of the spread of Christianity not only would it be necessary to be informed on the intrinsic principles of the religion, but also every antecedent historical fact and every individual biography would be relevant to the inquiry. The recording historian may be satisfied with setting forth the facts as earlier records have presented them, but the historian with the ethical sense will realize that none of these things

could have come to pass without a vast array of precedent facts (or causes), and these he must consider. Thus there can be no question that the first desideratum of a Science —*i.e.*, the intimate observation and the recording of facts— is fulfilled in Ethics.

The classification of these facts and the determination of their relations to each other is even more important. Using the former illustration, the spread of Christianity was not a case of isolated effect upon individuals but a general conception which not only was furthered by society but which reflected itself back upon society. Rome deflected Christianity as much as Christianity deflected Rome. Therefore Ethics would not only have to consider the facts of Christianity and the facts of Rome but the manifold facets which each would present and the manner in which the light of each would be broken upon the prismatic light-points of the other.

The third necessity, that of explaining these ethical facts and classifying their relations, is fulfilled by the realization that "all things are working together for good," or, to put it more truly, "toward good." It is true that Theology has been described as the Science of the Absolute Good and that Sociology is given the title the Science of the Communal Good, but both of these are ethical in their nature. For this reason Ethics, non-inclusive of Religion and Sociology, is sometimes called "Private Ethics," but in the brief review hereinafter to follow Religion will not be excluded for the reason that it seems a part of Individual Ethics, whereas Sociology, belonging to society more than to the individual, has been considered elsewhere.

While it may be questioned whether there is any one certain Highest Good, it cannot be questioned that all men are seeking a Higher Good. Some desire wealth, others fame, others independence of restraint, others knowledge, others pleasure, others love and still others find their highest gain in loving and serving others. "This latter is shown by the delight that mothers show in loving," says

Aristotle in his 'Ethics.' Yet again others fix their minds on the pleasures of a life after death as tho they deemed a mental projection to another sphere was of a different character than one to this sphere.

But no one of these is an ultimate end. For example, the man who wants wealth desires it that he may gain ease and opportunity, but he needs these that he may use them for study, for travel or for social pleasures. These again he would not consider ultimate because he would explain his desire for travel as being in order to satisfy curiosity, to enlarge his knowledge or to improve his mind, and, if he were further pressed, he would declare the satisfaction of his curiosity to be due to a further desire beyond, and so on in ever-receding horizons.

Thus, while the ultimate is still far distant, it is abundantly clear that there is a proximate end in view which dimly foreshadows somewhat else in the distance even still more desirable. The essential thing to realize is, that no matter what may be the special end a man has in view at any one time, it is ideal, it is a striving for a higher good, and it forms for him a standard of judgment by which he deems himself able to say that he considers one line of action better than another.

There is truly no intrinsinc difference between the reasoning of the lawless and the law-abiding man. Both are seeking for themselves the greatest amount of good. The former sees that by ignoring the law he can secure the wealth or the revenge which seems to him most desirable with the least expenditure of effort. The law-abiding man sees that he can secure the same ends by obeying the law and making all others obey it. Both are reasoning tc procure for themselves their desires, but the lawless man, short-sightedly thinking for himself alone and for the moment alone, does not realize that universal lawlessness would be an effectual barrier against his successful theft or revenge, for a stronger than he would take it from him, and therefore that his lawlessness only is feasible

because of the value of law. The law-abiding man in similar fashion thinks of the community and himself, realizing protection now and in the future. Both reason on the lines of self-advancement, but one stops short.

Some little emphasis has been laid in the foregoing on the fact that a change in Man's conception of Good is continuously going on and has been in process as far back as the evidences of the human race carry and even farther. In other words, the Moral Conception is not a modern endowment; it is not even a sudden advance, but partakes in all its essentials of pure evolution. Moral judgment assuredly exists among the lower animals. Every man has noticed a dog who has failed in his quest slinking back with his tail between his legs, conscious of his failure and blaming himself therefor; and the social communities—such as ants and bees—reveal numberless cases where moral judgment is so clearly understood as to be observed by the entire community.

In the earliest times of man—the group period—the very structure of the group was held together by a group-moral-conception which evolved and developed into what W. K. Clifford in his essay 'On the Scientific Basis of Morals' calls "The Tribal Self." "If we consider now," he says, "the simpler races of mankind, we shall find not only that immediate desires play a far larger part in their lives, and so that the conception of self is less used and less developed, but also that it is less definite and more wide. The savage is not only hurt when some one treads on his foot, but when any one treads on his tribe."

In the Homeric period, which reveals as early a type of literature as the world possesses, Sir J. Seeley points out that "the distinction between right and wrong is barely recognised and the division of mankind into the good and bad is not recognised at all. It has often been remarked that it contains no villain. The reason of this is not that the poet does not represent his characters as doing wicked deeds, for, in fact, there is not one among them who is not

capable of deeds the most atrocious and shameful. But the poet does not regard these deeds with any strong disapprobation, and the feeling of moral indignation which has been so strong in later poets was in him so feeble that he is quite incapable of hating any of his characters for their crimes. He can no more conceive the notion of a villain than of a habitually virtuous man."

Evidence of the ancient confusion of moral judgment also is seen in the ceremonial observances of the earlier portion of the Mosaic code, wherein, if wrong-doing has occurred in which either animal or inanimate objects were unwittingly participants, they were to be destroyed. The same thing is seen to-day when a man viciously kicks a chair over which he has stumbled in the dark as tho the chair were responsible. The development of the moral consciousness, indeed, is very marked in the Hebrew Scripture, extending all the way from the crude "eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth" to the lofty conception of "forgiveness unto seventy times seven."

This same moral progress which was seen in the group-relation is afterward found advancing rapidly from several different causes. One of these is custom, that which had the earliest origin. Thus, after the group-relation necessity was over, man found himself more or less bound by a set of traditions. An example of a little-remembered original cause is that of shaking hands, the right hand especially, as a token of peace, for it was obvious that when each grasped the other's hand there was no weapon concealed in it, and besides, any free movement of the left arm would be restricted. Manners of all kinds are moral disciplines built upon custom.

When, however, the evolution of the race progressed so far as Law, and Punishment for its violation began, Moral Conceptions took a further development. The first was the mere idea of retribution. Adam Smith in his 'Theory of Moral Sentiment' depicts the aim of punishment as being to make it apparent to the criminal that the

evil consequences of his act are not merely evils to others but evils in which he himself is involved. In its more primitive form it is simply transferred revenge, the accuser securing the aid of the law to enable him to wreak vengeance on the man who has injured him.

The next advance was to the idea of deterrence. In this the aim of punishment was to make the offender an example. He was not punished as retribution for what he had done, but that others seeing the result of misdoing might be warned thereby. This was higher than the revenge idea, for it took into account the future. Yet if this were the sole object of punishment, the advancing moral conception would speeedily show it to be at fault, for it could scarcely be regarded as just to inflict pain on one man merely for the benefit of others.

The third, and the view most commonly held at the present time, is that punishment should be educative, with a design to reform the offender himself. This seems to fit in best with the humanitarian sentiments of the age, and modern penology usually assumes the reform of the offender and the returning him to society as a useful member as being the chief end. It is sometimes a markedly rash assumption.

It is conceivable, however, that there may be a fourth. The reform idea, while sentimentally correct, is open to question on the economic side—whether the producing power to the state of the reformed criminal will be equivalent to the expense incurred by the state in the effort of reform. It is also open to question on the biological side—whether the state is wise in permitting a man of known criminal instincts to return to a free condition where he can marry and transmit those criminal instincts to future generations. The fourth idea, then, which is beginning to show itself more and more clearly in the moral conception of punishment, is that, first, there is a stupendous waste in the upkeep of criminals, whose lives should be an enforced gain to the community rather than an enforced

cost; and, secondly, that it is a biological absurdity to permit the hereditary continuance of characteristics which are known to be perversive to the best interests of the community and the time. Economic value would insist that as long as there be criminals their labor should support the prisons and the police departments instead of the latter being paid by the taxes of the law-abiding householder, and biological common sense would suggest that men in whom definite criminal instincts had shown themselves should be rendered maritally impotent.

The evolution of the moral conception, therefore, insomuch as it recognises fault in wrong-doing, shows a recognition of an inner moral judgment which could determine right-doing and wrong-doing. It is this which is called Conscience. "It involves," says J. H. Muirhead in his 'Elements of Ethics,' in an unusually clear statement of so extremely difficult a thing—"it involves at least two distinguishable elements. First there is an intellectual element. Conscience is a faculty of Judgment. Nor is this judgment merely logical. It is not a mere judgment of fact. It is also judicial. It is a judgment upon fact. Conscience in its usual manifestations seems to be engaged in a species of judicial investigation. So prominent is this element of judgment that by not a few writers it has been held to be the only element that exists in conscience. It has been thought to be in a peculiar sense the voice of reason and has been elevated into the position of a special faculty, which, under the name of the moral faculty, or the faculty of moral judgment, has had a prominent place assigned to it.

"It is clear, however, that this is not the only element or perhaps the most distinctive. It is as involving a characteristic Feeling that the judgments of Conscience come most home to us. This is especially marked, as is to be expected, in judgments upon past conduct—the feeling of remorse being one of the most violent of human emotions. Hence some writers have gone to the opposite extreme

and have claimed that Conscience is wholly a matter of emotion." This was the view taken by Hume in his 'Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,' wherein he states: "The approbation of praise and blame cannot be the work of judgment, but of the heart, and is not a speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active feeling or sentiment."

If this judgment and this feeling synchronize, as long as the appropriate feeling accompanies the intellectual approval of every act, the difficulties of life practically are settled. But, very frequently, reason approves a line of conduct which feeling cannot endorse. It is all very well to say that "virtue is its own reward," but nothing is commoner than the feeling of regret because of attained virtue. The man who refrains from joining his comrades who are on pleasure bent because he knows they will seek unwise companionship has done that which his reason approves, but the feeling of the desire for pleasure which his reason has stopped will make him regretful of his decision.

In the illustration above cited all the merit seems to be given to judgment. But suppose the case to be of the other character. If a man reasons clearly to himself that a certain line of action is possible, that it is legal, that it will have the sanction of his neighbors and that from every known standard of judgment it is right, but has an inner lurking feeling that it is wrong, and yet goes and does it, he has precisely the same feeling of regret that was experienced in the former case, but this time it is regret that he had done wrong, while in the preceding case it was regret that he had done right. In this case the merit seems to lie with feeling. Similar illustrations could be given wherein a man gave way to feeling and then found himself afterward disturbed by judgment. The ethical question arises, Which of these elements of Feeling or of Judgment has the more authoritative claim?

It has been pointed out that this moral conception of a

Conscience is a high step in Evolution, and this is nowhere more clearly shown than in the fact that whereas its existence is almost universally acknowledged, there is no agreement concerning its nature. As Locke in his 'Essay on the Human Understanding' points out, instead of a universal agreement on the main lines of moral obligation, there is a perfect chaos of contradictory principles at various times and in various places and the standard of right and wrong is still to seek.

Conscience, in a very real sense, may be taken as the inner realization of the perfect coincidence between virtue and interest rightly understood, and there is a presumption that following such a sense would fulfil the Highest Good. But such is not true. The saddest note that can be sounded in Ethics is the realization that to do good is not always profitable, so that honesty—for example—is dependent for the excellence of its policy not upon its intrinsic rectitude but upon the vigilance of the police force. "There is no form of intellectual or moral excellence which has not a general tendency to produce happiness if cultivated in moderation," says W. E. H. Lecky in his 'History of European Morals,' "but there are also very few which if cultivated to great perfection have not a tendency directly the reverse.

"Thus a mind that is sufficiently enlarged to range abroad amid the pleasures of intellect has no doubt secured a fund of inexhaustible enjoyment, but he who inferred that the highest intellectual eminence was the condition most favorable to happiness would be lamentably deceived. The diseased nervous sensibility that accompanies intense mental exertion, the weary wasting sense of ignorance and vanity, the disenchantment and disintegration that commonly follow a profound research, have filled literature with mournful echoes of the words of the royal sage, 'In much wisdom is much grief and he who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.' The lives of men of genius have been for the most part a conscious and deliberate realiza-

tion of the ancient myth—the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life stood side by side and they chose the Tree of Knowledge rather than the Tree of Life.

"Nor is it otherwise in the realm of morals. The virtue which is most conducive to happiness is plainly that which can be realized without much suffering and sustained without much effort. The plain truth is that no proposition can be more palpably and egregiously false than the assertion that as far as this world is concerned it is invariably conducive to the happiness of a man to pursue the most virtuous career. 'The pleasing consciousness and self-approbation that rise up in the mind of a virtuous man, exclusively of any direct explicit consideration of advantage likely to accrue to himself from his possession of those good qualities,' form a theme upon which moralists of both schools are fond of dilating in a strain that reminds one irresistibly of the self-complacency of a famous nursery hero while reflecting upon his own merits over a Christmas pie."

Where so many, many schools of thought have arisen and have been hurled to oblivion, where so many great thinkers have revealed themselves only to receive the scorn of their successors, it seems reckless boldness to lay down a definite rule of purpose. This is not susceptible of quotation, for every writer from whom such a quotation could be made would be either the founder or the disciple of a school. Cleared of all the vagueness and nebulousness which seem to hang about the subject, the following statement would seem possible: The purpose of Man's Being is to find the Golden Mean that lies between the Ultimate Good of the Universe, the Highest Good toward his fellow beings and the ever-receding Higher Good for himself, and by perpetual adjustment, to live in approximate correspondence with that Golden Mean.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORY OF ETHICS

WHATEVER may be the heritage that man acquired from brute in the evolution of his physical frame, it must be admitted readily that the moral conception is not a part of it. Patient investigation of the actions of animals have gone far to substantiate the supposition that reason is not foreign to the lower orders of being, and certainly an intuitive sense known as "instinct" exists. But it is a far cry from this to Moral Philosophy. It will not be forgotten that Ethics does not consist only in conduct, but in a definite type of conduct produced by a nice understanding and balancing of the affecting causes of life.

The Ethics of prehistoric man are beyond finding out. It is difficult enough to present the concrete evidences of his life and customs, and utterly impossible to declare what were the moral conceptions that underlay those customs; and the ethics of savagism are equally obscure. Their interpretation in sociology, in religion, and in law, are discussed separately, as the genesis of the historical development of those subjects, but Ethics, pure and simple, finds its first true origin among the Greeks.

In the lower culture-steps high morality is neither inculcated by the priests nor attributed to the spirits or gods. Even to races merely barbaric and outside the strict pale of savagism divine goodness means nothing more or less than personal favoritism. The ancient Jews, it will be remembered, regarded it as a most signal mark of divine

wisdom that the sun should be stayed from its course in order that they might ruthlessly massacre and cut to pieces a hostile army; which, moreover, was seeking its homeland, stolen from them by the rapacity of the Semitic invaders.

Ethics of a similarly primitive character are found among the modern Egyptian fellaheen, despite the influence of the Koran, for detection in theft is to them a sign of divine displeasure; "if God were favorable," they seem to say, "he would have assisted me in this theft." The disregard for human life, seen in savage and semi-savage tribes is an evidence of a low standard of morality, and chastity, as part of the code of morals, is a concept comparatively recent in date of origin. Injuries, no matter how caused, are invariably answered by retaliation.

This system requires that any damage to person or property, even if done unintentionally or in self-defense, must be avenged by inflicting a similar injury. "No distinction," says John S. Hittell, in his 'Mental Growth of Mankind,' "is made as to the obligation of retaliation between treacherous assassination and justifiable ohmicide." If the victom of the wrong survived and was able to punish the offender, the chief duty of retaliation rested upon him, and he was required to get as near an equivalent for it as possible; if his eye had been torn out, then must he tear out his foe's; if his horse had been stolen, he must steal another of equal value. In the case of homicide, the retaliation rested upon the nearest of kin, or indeed the whole tribe.

But even this falls short of revealing the underlying cause of the savage's lack of the Ethical sense. It is mainly due to his lack of continuity of thought. So soon as the physical wants of the savage are satisfied, fully satisfied, he falls into a state of mental torpor. If they are not satisfied, then the desire for their satisfaction will precede all other thought and indeed, prevent it. The average savage mind soon tires, and one of the main obstacles that has confronted the inquirer into customs of savage peoples

is the difficulty of inducing the uncivilized man to sustain a conversation requiring thought for more than five minutes, or at the most, ten minutes at a time.

The Oriental Systems of Ethics were most elaborately carried out, but in every case they were highly restricted. The morality concepts of Lao-Tse and Confucius in China were unquestionably lofty, but they lacked the essential of growth. The maxims of Confucius have been the rules of morality for millions of people through twelve hundred years and they carry as much weight to them to-day as they did when the Han dynasty made them the standard of human wisdom. "They were especially adapted to the Chinese intellect," says John Lord, "which, altho shrewd and ingenious, is phlegmatic, unspeculative, matter-of-fact and unspiritual." He laid down many rules of conduct.

The height of virtue is filial piety, which consists in obedience to authority. Some of his sayings are incisive and poignant, and an example may be given which is as true to-day as when it was penned:

> "Of all people, girls and servants are the most difficult to behave to. If you are familiar with them they lose their humility, if you maintain reserve to them, they are discontented."

The morality of the Vedic literature can scarcely be said to exist. Morality implies conduct devoted to an end, but the Upanishads inculcate absolute inaction of body and mind. Man is taught that he must neither love nor hate, hope nor fear; for the most complete mental and physical idleness, the utmost freedom from all emotions, is the nearest approach to the heavenly state of complete and eternal unconsciousness, which is presented as the highest spiritual ambition. Thus either absorption or annihilation are presented as the Summum Bonum. This might, perhaps, be regarded as doctrine, but is too negative to be considered as morality.

The Ethics of the Avestas are very deeply inwoven, but at root they are but principles implied in a vague alliance

of the powers of good against the powers of evil. Naught is neutral, even the animals are supposed to belong to one side or the other, and thus, the slaying of the animal consecrated to the power of evil constitutes a good deed, but to the good an evil one. It followed that all the possible actions of the world were grouped under one of these two divisions, and consequently all the possible morality consisted in an obedience or disobedience to the laws thus laid down.

All these, however, have borne little or no influence on the great twofold stream of moral thought which have blended into modern Ethics. These two streams were the Jewish and the Grecian, of which the thoughts of the former were the more enduring, the developments of the latter the more complete. Jewish morality practically begins with Moses, and indeed, all its later points of view revert back to the great patriotic leader. An elevated morality is the aim of all law-givers, and the distinctive character of the Hebraic code of morals is its loftiness. What Moses says with regard to the relations of master and servant, to injuries inflicted on the body, to the respect due to parents, to the protection of the widow, the fatherless and the unfortunate, to delicacy in the treatment of women, to unjust judgments, to bribery and corruption, to revenge, hatred and covetousness, to unchastity, theft, murder and adultery can never be gainsaid. Its later overlaying with Rabbinical tradition represents perhaps the greatest fall in human thought, the most pitiful decline of early nobleness that any morality has seen.

Far other was the Greek philosophy, which, in the field of Ethics advanced steadily. It had not, of course, any more than any other form of thought, an abrupt and absolute commencement. This is ably traced by Henry Sidgwick, in his "History of Ethics," one of the best introductions to the subject in the English language. He says: "The naïve and fragmentary utterances of sage precepts for conduct in which nascent moral reflection everywhere

manifests itself, supply a noteworthy element of Greek literature in the 'gnomic' poetry of the sixth and seventh centuries B.C.; their importance in the development of Greek civilization is strikingly characterized by the traditional enumeration of the seven sages of the sixth century; and their influence on ethical thought is sufficiently shown in the references that Plato and Aristotle make to the definitions and maxims of poets and sages. But from such utterances as these to moral philosophy is a long step."

Three philosophers stand out as presenting ethical ideas later inculcated by Socrates, Plato and Epicurus. These three early thinkers were Pythagoras, Heraclitus and Democritus. Pythagoras (580-500 B.C.) touched upon the ethical side of man in his precepts of moderation, courage, loyalty in friendship, obedience to law and his precept of daily self-examination, but delivered all these as a dogma to a religious brotherhood. Heraclitus (530-470 B.C.) advanced a step in his optimistic setting forth that all things in the world were for good, that apparent ill was due to non-comprehension, and advised his followers that "Wisdom is to act according to Nature with understanding." Democritus (460-370 B.C.), despite the unsystematic presentation of the doctrine of pleasure as the highest good, was clear and definite in his statements that this pleasure is of the higher character, that moderation and limitation of desires are the roads to obtaining greater pleasures, while his identification of the highest pleasure with "equableness of mind" reveals intimately the nature of the man.

But these thinkers, together with the brilliant school of Sophists, of whom Protagoras was the chief, reasoned along ethical lines in a most disjointed way. They "combined somewhat loosely the art of getting along in the world with the art of managing public affairs, and they mingled encomiastic expositions of different virtues with prudential justifications of virtue as a means of obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain." To the clear headed Socrates, as he said, they sounded to him "like madmen disputing."

The charge that Socrates (470-399 B.C.) brought against the Sophists and his fellow men generally was that they talked about "justice," "temperance" and "law," yet could not tell what these things were. Definitions were his delight, yet in his own mind he was not sure of what he meant by "good," and when pressed declared that "he knew no good that was not good for something in particular," but affirmed that "good is consistent with itself, the beautiful is also profitable, the virtuous also pleasant."

The Ethics of Plato (427-347 B.C.) cannot properly be treated as a finished result, but rather as a continual movement from the iconoclastic position of Socrates toward the more complete and articulate system of Aristotle. He distinguished several different kinds of unphilosophic virtue, having very different moral values, the lowest being that of the vulgar prudence which abstains from sensual vice, not from moral aversion, but from a calculation that abstinence will bring a balance of pleasure; the highest that exhibited by an unphilosophic mind whose "spirited element" has been duly trained under the guidance of Philosophy. In Plato's view the two fundamental virtues, Wisdom and Justice, in their highest form, are mutually involved. A wise soul will necessarily be one in which all elements operate in harmonious activity; and this activity cannot be perfect unless the rational and governing element is truly wise. The remaining virtues are only different elements or aspects of the complex soul.

The contrast between Plato and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) is so great that hasty judgment is apt to regard them as being radically dissentient. Instead of this, the one is an outcome of the other, and both found starting points in Socrates. Aristotle's point of view with regard to Moral Excellence or Virtue was not that it was a natural feeling, or even a susceptibility to feeling, but that it was a settled habit, formed by a course of actions under rule and discipline in which vicious excess and defect had been

avoided, so that the virtuous man, without internal conflict, willed actions that hit the happy mean in their effects.

With Aristotle closed the Socratic movement. Socrates had removed the skepticism of his times by withdrawing the minds of men from unsatisfactory speculations regarding Nature to the study of man himself. Plato followed the same idea, but gave it a universal application, using also Ethics as the main subject of inquiry, and subordinating physics. Aristotle, on the other hand, with his emphasis on physics, metaphysics and logic, paved the way for a new era of skepticism and allowed Ethics to be set aside. His treatise on "Ethics" is masterly and contains close thought, but nothing more clearly shows the bent of Aristotle's mind than the incompleteness and inconsequence shown therein, when contrasted with the perspicuity of his writing along other lines. The Aristotelian ethics were too purely speculative to satisfy the later age of Greece.

A school developed, however, headed by Zeno (342-270 B.C.), known as the Stoics. This form of thought "separated the moral from the worldly point of life with an absoluteness and definiteness that caught the imagination; which regarded practical goodness as the highest result and manifestation of its ideal of wisdom; and which bound common notions of duty into an apparently complete and coherent system." But here still was to be found the idea that virtue was a matter to be taught. Martineau opposes this strongly when he says: "It is evident that no distinction is to be drawn, in such a scheme, between natural and moral evil. No room is left for guilt as opposed to ignorance, or for retribution as opposed to discipline." A further fault of the Stoics lay in their dissociation of the life of a philosopher from the life of an active citizen; this viewpoint being due, partly, to the fact that they were passing through the period of the decay of the Greek city state.

Zeno and the Stoics stood out against the prevailing

corruption, but Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) was tainted therewith. He maintained that pleasure is the sole ultimate good and pain the sole evil; that no pleasure is to be rejected except for its painful consequences and no pain to be chosen except as a means to greater pleasure. Epicurus, moreover, was careful to point out that the pleasures of the mind were more desirable and therefore higher than the pleasures of the body, endeavoring to provide against sensual misfollowings, but in this he was not successful, and his doctrines subsequently were perverted, especially when the arts of life were brought into the service of luxury and materialism was the creed of society.

The importance of Stoicism is heightened by the carrying out of its principles into the Roman philosophy. Cicero (106-43 B.C.), indeed, claimed himself to belong to the Sceptical school, but in Ethics he was little more than a transcriber, while Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius followed a branch of the Stoic school. In their hands it took its typical note that the world as it is must be taken and regarded as perfect, and that the most unwise policy is that of supposing present errors to be confuted in a world that is still future. "It is not possible," says Marcus Aurelius, "that the nature of the universe has made so great a mistake, either through want of power, or lack of skill, as that good and evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and bad."

Neo-Platonism, which found its chief exponent in Plotinus of Alexandria (205-270 A.D.), is a strange juxtaposition of the lofty conception of the knowable set forth by Plato; the moral idealism of the Stoics, cut loose from nature; the hybrid Philo-Judaism of the close of the old era, and the inrush of Oriental ascetism. Plotinus was still sufficiently a Platonist to accord to the body some privileges, and hence avoided the mortification idea which his chief disciple Porphyry carried to its extreme, but Plotinus led the way to Oriental mysticism by reasoning that since all thought implies difference, or the possibility of differ-

ence, it is dual, and therefore God cannot be thought of. There must be, he argued, an essential unity prior to this duality, a Being wholly without the possibility of difference; and accordingly the highest mode of human existence, in which the soul apprehends the absolute, must be one in which all definite thought is transcended and all consciousness of self is lost in the absorbing ecstasy.

The importance of the Ethics of Neo-Platonism lies not a little in the fact that it was made the basis for the only truly concerted attack made on Christianity, from the philosophic side, namely, that by the Emperor Julian, "the Apostate," when he endeavored to restore the heathen worship. His effort to restore the oracle of Apollo Daphneus in the famous cypress grove at Antioch is well known, when he arranged for a magnificent procession with libations, dances and incense, only to find in the temple one solitary old priest, who ominously offered in sacrifice—one tough old goose.

"The fundamental differences between pagan and Christian Ethics," says Sidgwick, "do not depend on any difference in the value set on rightness of heart or purpose, but on different views of the essential form or conditions of this inward rightness. In neither case is it presented purely and simply as moral rectitude. By the pagan philosophers it was always conceived under the form of Knowledge or Wisdom, by Christian teachers and evangelists, on the other hand, the inner springs of good conduct were generally conceived as Faith and Love."

In a most perspicuous treatment of the subject, W. E. H. Lecky, in his "History of European Morals," says: "The Ethics of paganism were part of a philosophy. The Ethics of Christianity were part of a religion. The first were the speculations of a few highly cultivated individuals, and neither had, nor could have had, any direct influence upon the masses of mankind. The second were indissolubly connected with the worship, hopes and fears of a vast religious system, that acted at least as powerfully on the most

ignorant as on the most educated. The chief objects of pagan religions were to foretell the future, to explain the universe, to avert calamity, to obtain the assistance of the gods. They contained no instruments of moral teaching analogous to the institution of preaching, or to the moral preparation for the reception of the sacrament, or to confession, or to the reading of the Bible, or to religious education, or to united prayer for spiritual benefits. To make men virtuous was no more the duty of the pagan priest than of the physician.

But it was the distinguishing characteristic of Christianity that its moral influence was not indirect, casual, remote or spasmodic. Unlike all pagan religions, it made moral teaching a main function of its clergy, moral discipline the leading object of its service, moral dispositions the necessary condition of the due performance of its rites. By the pulpit, by its ceremonies, by all the agencies of power it possessed, it labored systematically and unceasingly for the regeneration of mankind. To amalgamate the two spheres of philosophic morality and relationship to the supernatural, to incorporate moral culture with religion, and thus to enlist in behalf of the former that desire to enter, by means of ceremonial observances, into direct communication with Heaven—which experience has shown to be one of the most universal and powerful passions of mankind—was among the most important achievements of Christianity."

It is not relevant here to trace the various conflicting doctrinal opinions which disturbed the early Christian Church, altho a great many of these were questions intimately related to morality; but the development of the monastic system, by reason of the relation it bore to the ancient morality, cannot be overlooked. The Oriental view of asceticism which was noted in Neo-Platonism was eagerly accepted by the Eastern monks, and the life of the hermit and the anchorite became regarded as an especially sacred life. The central conceptions of the

monastic life were the insistence of the meritoriousness of complete abstinence from carnal desires, and the complete renunciation of the world. These, of course, had been foreshadowed in the pagan world by the Vestal Virgins and similar orders, but not even in the gymnosophists, or hermits of India, did asceticism grow to such appalling limits.

"There is, perhaps," says Lecky, "no phase in the moral history of mankind of a deeper or more painful interest than this ascetic epidemic. A hideous, sordid and emaciated maniac, without knowledge, without patriotism, without natural affection, passing his life in a long routine of useless and atrocious self-torture and quailing before the ghastly phantoms of his delirious brain, had become the ideal of the nations. For six months, St. Macarius of Alexandria slept in a marsh, and exposed his body to the stings of venomous flies; his disciple, St. Eusebius, had fastened to his body chains and bars of iron weighing one hundred and fifty pounds; St. Sabinus would only eat corn that had become rotten and nauseous by being left for a month in stagnant water; the cleanliness of the body was regarded as a pollution of the soul, and the saints were most admired who had become one hideous mass of clotted filth. An anchorite once imagined he saw the devil, as he noted gliding before him through the desert, a naked creature black with filth and years of exposure, and with white hair floating to the wind; it was St. Mary of Egypt, who had thus, for forty-seven years, been expiating her sins. But of all the evidences of the loathsome excesses to which this spirit was carried, the life of St. Simeon Stylites is probably the most remarkable. He built successively three pillars, the last being sixty feet high and scarcely two cubits (42 inches) in circumference, and on this pillar, during thirty years, he remained exposed to every change of climate, ceaselessly and rapidly bending his body in prayer, despite diseased conditions of a terrible nature. (Certain details of Lecky's description

are omitted.) From every quarter pilgrims of every degree thronged to do him homage. A crowd of prelates followed him to the grave, and the general voice of mankind pronounced him to be the model of a Christian saint."

With such men, living such a life, visions and miracles necessarily were habitual. In the ghastly gloom of the sepulcher, where amid moldering corpses they took up their abode; in the long hours of the nights of penance, visible forms of lust or terror appeared to haunt them, and strange dramas were enacted by those who were contending for their souls. Most terrible of all were the struggles of young and ardent men, physically incapable of a life of celibacy, the agonies of whose struggles the Lives of the Saints paint with an appalling vividness. St. Benedict, in the desert, is said to have been tortured by the recollection of a beautiful girl he had once seen, and only regained his composure by rolling in thorns. St. John of Lycopolis had not seen a woman for forty-eight years. St. Arsenius, asked for his prayers by a young Roman girl who had flung herself at his feet, replied indignantly "that the only prayer he would make would be to forget her." The monkish historians tell tales innumerable of the saints refusing to see their dying mothers or sisters for fear of the contamination of a woman's presence.

This was, unquestionably, the revulsion from the looseness that had characterized the decline of the Roman Empire, and before pointing out what a moral revolution Christianity worked in this regard, it might be well briefly to present woman's place in the world prior to that time. In savage life, the beauty of the woman has no place, for beauty will not survive the hardships of such life, and the wife is slave to the man merely, and ministers to his desires. The purchasing of wives, thus giving the right of absolute possession, is an early fatal error and its abandonment is ever the first step onward.

In the early Greek poems conjugal tenderness is seen, and the heroic love of Alcestis, the filial piety of Anti-

gone, the fidelity of Penelope, the resignation of Iphigenia, and the joyousness of Nausicaa are all types of excellence. In a later period, however, the wife fell to a life of perfect seclusion, from which she was not expected to emerge, while the foremost and most dazzling type of Ionic womanhood was the hetera or courtesan. This had come about largely by the voluptuous worship of Aphrodite, courtesans being necessarily the priestesses of her temples. In similar fashion the rites of Isis were decadent in the extreme, while at Babylon, Biblis, Cyprus, Corinth, Miletus, Tenedos, Lesbos and Abydos strange schools were reared under the shadow of the temple walls.

The Romans, far less imaginative and responsive to the passions than the Greeks, had a domestic life of a higher order. It was noted by Greek writers as a matter of surprise that a Roman was quite willing to have his mother, wife or sister meet his guests, and the early Republic was almost austere. But the inundation of Eastern luxury and morals and the decadent sensitivism of Greece was fatal to moral purity, and lacking the Hellenic sense of esthetic fitness. Rome, in later years, plunged into the most feverish state of abnormality and uncontrolled openness of immorality.

The natural revulsion from this has been seen in the monkish asceticism, but fortunately this was merely a passing phase of the Church, and aside from its continuance in the form of celibacy as attached to the clergy, practically is now no more. It was some time before the idea of woman as the enemy died out, as for example until quite recently a rule prevailed requiring women to be gloved, lest they should profane the sacrament by receiving it into their hands. The change from this began when the great Arian controversy closed; the Christian philosophers turned from dialectics to devotion and realized that the Christian virtues were those which are more frequently seen in women. Moreover, converts were more easily made in barbarian nations among the women, and the

work of women in aiding the missionaries fanned the fires of zeal for their salvation. The growing reverence for the Virgin Mary was a further factor in elevating and purifying the ideal of woman and softening the manners of men. The Protestant Reformation, taking away from men and women the prop of an infallible Church, and making them both equal in the sight of God, afforded the last religious and moral step of placing woman on the same ethical level as the stronger sex.

The antithesis to this idea of freedom was the doctrine of Augustine (354-430), who pressed the belief of man's incapacity to obey God's will by his unaided moral energy to a point where it was difficult to reconcile it with the freedom of the will. This found little favor with Scotus Erigena (810-877), who, through the medium of Dionysius the Areopagite, was a Neo-Platonist, a disciple of Plato and Plotinus. Abelard (1079-1142) illustrated the effort to harmonize the dialectical effort to obtain satisfaction for the reason in orthodoxy and the mystical effort to find a place therein for religious fervor.

Grotius (1583-1645) is perhaps the first modern original thinker along ethical lines. He declared that Natural Law is a part of divine law that follows necessarily from the essential nature of man, and is therefore as unalterable, even by God himself, as the truths of mathematics. He was opposed by the Cambridge Platonists and by Cumberland, who endeavored to bring out the more social and at the same time the more rational side of human nature.

Out of their position was developed what came to be known as the Moral Sense School, represented by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. "According to these writers," says John S. Mackenzie, "we have an intuitive perception of the distinction between right and wrong, similar to the esthetic perception of the distinction between the beautiful and the ugly, but at the same time this perception is capable of explanation. It depends on the social nature

of man. What is beneficial to society strikes one naturally as good, what is harmful is instinctively regarded as bad."

This school gave rise to three later forms, known as the Intuitionist, the Rational and the Utilitarian. Intuitionism may be described generally as the theory that actions are right or wrong according to their own intrinsic nature and not in virtue of any ends outside themselves which they tend to realize. Thus truth-speaking would be regarded as a duty, not because it is essential to social well-being but because it is right in its own nature. In the narrower sense of the term Intuitionism is understood to mean the doctrine which refers the judgment upon actions to the tribunal of Conscience, understood as a faculty which admits of no question or appeal.

Rationalism finds its strongest exponent in Kant. He argued that bad actions are essentially inconsistent with themselves, or at least that there is an inconsistency in the principle upon which they proceed. The moral action is in this respect exactly similar to the intellectual life. An error cannot consistently be carried out, neither can a sin.

From the Utilitarian point of view, the moral life is conceived as directed toward a definite end, the attainment of pleasure, and more definitely, of the greatest possible pleasure of all sentient creatures. According to this school it is conceivably possible to set forth a true standard of morality, but it is seen that it is not a practical possibility by reason of the number of disturbing factors in the problem. The Utilitarian feels, however, that the net sum of the results of all the tests of human action are summed up in the common sense of mankind and that study will reveal the essential moral precepts.

Most of the writers of the Evolutionist school hold that there is a gradual process forever in operation and that various forms of moral action and moral judgment arise in the course of it, but that it is not possible to give any clear account of the ultimate goal. It must be taken simply

as it is and life must be lived in the best conformity with its observed laws.

But there is a sense of dissatisfaction in all schools of thought that lead nowhither, and as was shown in the chapter on the development of the Moral Conception, an ideal all men have. "Taking the world as it stands," says Mackenzie, "we do not find that it is a homogeneous whole. It is a struggling, developing process, like unto the continual conflict between Light and Darkness. The student of Ethics, from the point of view of Idealism, is not an indifferent spectator of this struggle. He looks for the evidence of the triumph of Light. In what direction this triumph will come, he will hardly undertake to prophesy, but in his study of life and history he is interested to watch not simply the direction in which at any time things are moving, in the swaying to and fro of opposing forces, but rather in trying to bring out the significance of the movement and its bearing upon the gradual unfolding of the idea which it involves."

Thus the History of Ethics reaches back into the past and forward into the future. Without the former it would be empty, without the latter it would be blind. This is the golden link which binds all the stages of ethical development together, which makes Aristotle the exegete of Plato, monasticism the corrective of Roman luxury, Utilitarianism the balance wheel for mysticism and Reason the solvent of Intuitionism. To remember where the race has stood possesses interest, to realize where it stands now holds vast importance, but chiefest of all is to discern whither the world is tending.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORY OF LAW

It is a positive loss to the community that the word "Law" possesses so unpleasing and ominous a sound. Man does not, with any degree of ardor, kiss the rod that punishes, but it is lamentable that the punitive and restrictive thoughts of law should take priority of place in human thought. Of the four learned professions, affection finds a place in three of them. The family physician was often greatly beloved; the parish clergyman was a man "to all the country dear"; the statesman possessed the power of thrilling with patriotic fervor, but the great lawyers awake no responsive chord in the heart; they are respected, honored, esteemed by the people, but never linked in a communion of happy fellowship.

Yet no great department of man's higher thought and activity is more closely connected with his actual life than the law. Because law is that body of customs which are enforced by the community, it is that which regulates man's conduct toward his fellow men, which controls his gross passions and restrains his rude impulses. It renders possible common life. To a great degree, it takes its rise in the demands of trade and it makes that trade practicable. Much of it arises spontaneously with the possession of property and it renders possession possible. In other words, it arises spontaneously in connection with man's social life and its distinctiveness from custom lies only in the fact that Law is so necessary to the existence of society and the common activity that it is enforced by authority.

There is a general sense in which Law may be regarded as the definite setting forth of the will of the whole people, that which Rousseau calls the "general will to do," that which Kant defines as "the totality of the conditions under which the will of one may be united with the will of another according to a universal law of freedom" and which Savigny declares to be "the rule whereby is defined the visible limit within which the existence of each individual gains sure and free room."

In the sense of the earlier relations of man, this determination of Law as being the net sum of his customs is true. The earliest Law in the world was the declaration made by a father of a group with reference to his own comfort. Thus when he bade his wife cook a deer he merely gave a command, when he ordered the woman to prepare all the spoils of his chase he made a domestic law. It became a custom and a household statute. The breaking from the group relation and the gradual importance of the tribe brought to light the truth that increasing complexity of life required increasing complexity of means of sustaining it.

This body of custom, of course, cannot be traced to any inspiration or historical lawgiver. Yet was this custom regarded as binding upon every person in the group. "Furthermore," remarks Guy C. Lee in his 'Historical Jurisprudence,' one of the most useful books on the subject, "that custom was enforced in a rude manner, either by permitting the person injured in its violation to avenge himself as best he could or by depriving the offender of certain rights, such as the aid and society of the members of the group. In such a state Law would be best defined as that body of customs regarded as binding upon the members of a group or class and enforced by their authority.

"This is Law as first discerned in all nations; it is the form in which it constantly appears in the course of history. It is too often confused and intermingled with re-

ligion, art and social problems, especially with morality, and this latter confusion has produced some of the most ghastly pages in the history of mankind. Yet morality has ever guided and stimulated law to a higher and juster conception of its task, while law at the same time has rendered the demands of morality more sharply defined and more exacting."

But it seems clear that there is such a thing as the History of the Science of Law in the development of Jurisprudence. The central stream of this historical development has followed the lines of the Law of Babylon, of Egypt, of Greece and of Rome. The Phenicians are sometimes credited with the giving of laws, whereas they made none, but transmitted from one nation to another. The Jewish law obtained an importance utterly out of proportion to the size or political importance of the nation, an importance largely due to its being indissolubly connected with that religion which formed the foundation of the ecclesiastical system most largely adopted by modern civilization. The Hindu law is also of importance, as it is to-day the law of a vast empire, being enforced by the English authorities, who realize that it possesses certain features especially valuable among the people with whom it found its origin.

The Brehon Law of Ireland is a monument of keen interest, altho it took little place in the development of modern systems. It most completely preserves the Celtic form of the Aryan law, having entirely escaped the influence of the Semitic and Roman systems, but it was most unwisely superseded by the English law. The judges who enforced the demands of the conquerors of Ireland entirely failed to see that a self-grown law was valuable for the people, and not a little of the disastrous mismanagement of Ireland has been due to the fact that the old Brehon Law was set aside.

Babylonian law may be taken as the first system observable after the period of the domination of savagery by

custom had passed by. It bears within itself, moreover, the evidence that it was not an originated system but a developed system, and the complex Babylonian civilization which was built upon the Sumerian and Accadian foundations went back to the early peoples for its law as it did for its literature. Just as a large part of the liturgies of the Babylonian religion were in the Sumerian tongue, just as Sumerian was a classical language in the schools (even as Latin is used in the Roman Catholic Church and is taught in the schools to-day), so did the Babylonians find in Sumerian law the beginnings of their system.

It may be somewhat of a surprise to find that those features of financial life that are regarded as particularly modern should be found in the Laws of Hammurabi (circa 2300 B.C.). Thus banking evidently had reached a high point, and one tablet remains showing that money had been advanced during the harvest, but that on the harvest day it was to be repaid at a rate of 20 per cent. Even the modern "dealing in futures" seems to have been practiced in a measure, and contracts and mortgages were known and understood. The antiquity of the law as a whole is seen in the matrimonial and family relations. A bride was to be purchased with a given sum of money, but she might be readily divorced by the husband, who, however, in such case was to pay her a sum not less than the sum he had paid originally to her father as purchase money.

The Law of Egypt possessed the curious persistence that was characteristic of the ancient kingdom. No portion of this earth's surface has witnessed as many political revolutions as ancient Egypt. It was conquered at various times by barbarous races; it was rent asunder continually by civil war; its successive dynasties possessed capitals far apart from each other and pretenders were innumerable. Later the Persians, Greeks, Macedonians, Romans and Arabs successively held the crown, but in spite of all misadventures a certain national entity remained intact. The principal cause of this was the ease with which crops were

produced with but little labor and the incredibly small cost of living. Trades and professions increased, became settled and rooted, and culture grew to such a point that each successive group of invaders were absorbed by Egypt and were utterly unable to make a barbarian impress upon a nation so absolutely solidified.

These same conditions operated to produce a developed customary law or a body of law which was universally binding and not dependent upon legislative enactment. The small size of the country, the insistence upon the king as being also the chief of religion and even semi-divine made him also the arbitrator of justice. But the facility of writing in Egypt, the close touch secured in a region so densely populated, the rigid division into governed and governing classes led to a most elaborate system of precedents. All the rulings of previous monarchs were written down and compiled, referred to by the judges (who were thirty in number during the greater part of the empire), adjudications made according to this body of law, while a case that did not fall under this ruling was transmitted to the king, who judged it personally and rendered a "decree," which thereupon became a precedent.

One of the most distinguishing features of Egyptian law was the important part played by the child. In Babylon it was no unusual thing for a father to sell his son; among the Hebrews the same practice was not uncommon; a threefold sale was the legal fiction by which a Roman father emancipated his child, but it was far other in Egypt. This was due to the extraordinary form of the marriage contract in which the husband either gave the wife full control of property or at least a share of more than half, and wherein he bound himself to consider her first-born son his heir and provided an extra payment as balm to her wounded feelings should he bring into the house another wife besides her.

Certain aspects of the Jewish law bear thoroly characteristic marks. Thus there was absolutely no distinction

between legitimate and illegitimate children. As long as the father of the house was the father of the child, the mother was immaterial, and a barren woman was glad to have her personal slave bear children to her husband, as by a sort of indulgent fiction they would be deemed her children and she would be freed from the reproach of sterility, which was regarded as a divine curse. From this it is plain to see why adultery dealt only with the invasion of another man's rights in his wife. The woman had no corresponding rights.

Perhaps even better known was the rule that the brother of a dead man must marry the widow, irrespective of his own family, and the child of such a union was the heir. If all the children were girls, then the property was permitted to pass to the girl, but in such a case the Priestly Code provided that she must marry within the tribe, in order to prevent property passing out of the hands of the tribe. The slavery laws also possessed many curious factors, and the idea of freedom from debt and slavery every fifty years (the Jubilee Year) was entirely unique, tho there seems little reason to suppose that it was carried out or that it ever was regarded as more than a Utopian suggestion.

The bitter antipathy to usury is conspicuous in Hindu Law. The Brahman was absolutely forbidden to take interest, but as the form of barter not seldom was cattle, this was modified by the admission that in the case of loan of cattle the milk and sometimes the produce were to be accounted the profit of the lender. In the later laws of Manu the merchant caste was allowed to take interest which was to be not higher than 15 per cent. and interest was compounded. Compounded interest, however, if taken by any other than the merchant caste was a grave sin, with heavy spiritual punishments.

The Law of Greece points clearly back to an inheritance of custom, but it was conspicuous that in its central points there was a marked divergence. The laws of Athens and

Sparta were strongly dissimilar not only in their severity but also in their very point of view. In Athens there was a law of freedom for the individual; in Sparta he was subservient to the state; in Crete as a noble he was a warrior under the invader, but as a commoner he did not exist legally.

The Spartan constitution might be considered democratic in view of the fact that under it all Spartans fared alike and in its palmy days were financially on the same footing. This would be not a little erroneous according to the modern view of democracy. As the Spartans always were a minority in the state which bore their name, it was a class rule of a most rigid order, and they alone possessed the right of franchise and conducted all international negotiations. "The great contribution of Sparta to the jurisprudence of the world," says Lee, "is the clear conception of a customary law, binding upon all, yet not depending either upon a divine revelation or a sacred order."

The Athenian conception of law was very different, even as the characteristics of the two cities were unlike. Its first chief movement was the establishment of the court of the Areopagus to determine between degrees of manslaughter, which crimes were to be considered murder punishable with death, and which justifiable and accidental homicide, to be compensated by money payment. The famous Laws of Draco (620 B.C.), which have become a synonym for severity, were an attempt to check a growing sentiment in favor of a more democratic law than that of the king and the noble-filled Areopagus.

The severity of the Draconian code led to still greater confusion and turmoil, opening the way for Solon (638 B.C.), who took the entire question in hand and dealt with it most ably. Perhaps his chiefest work was that of definitely designating a man's property to be his own and that of his family, making his next of kin heirs at law. But, at the same time, as a prospective citizen, the father lost most of his claims over his son, and the old Aryan

rights of the father were largely set aside. Father and son were individuals and to be treated as such. It is this insistence on the individual which is the foundation of Solon's great work, and its line of influence lay in the fact that it showed law to be the product of human reason and therefore open to amendment and change rather than a divine decree to be adhered to undeviatingly under penalty.

With Roman Law a greater importance appears. To the Roman mind all things must be devoted to utilitarianism, all forces directed to the advancement of Rome. Philosophies amused, religions interested, games excited, but that which should make Rome great really mattered.

The most important event in the history of early Roman Law was the enactment of the Twelve Tables. These ancient laws furnished the text and groundwork upon which was based all subsequent jurisprudence, and when the changing conditions rendered their provisions inadequate the ingenuity of the lawyers was directed to deducing from them such principles as would apply to novel cases. It was compiled 451 B.C., but in reality is the sum of the conclusions of the earlier period. The penalties attached to injury by charms and incantations in itself shows the extreme antiquity of these tables.

The rise of the prætors, or third consuls, gave birth to the substitution of a system of equity for the strict letter of the law. Furthermore, it led to a practice of each prætor announcing, at his appointment, the manner in which he would interpret the law. These statements became during the office of that prætor a bond of honor, and after the conclusion of his term a definite law, thus allowing for constant change and improvement. The first prætor system was begun in 367 B.C., and tho its operation was excellent, yet, confined as it was to citizens, a great injustice was rendered upon aliens, until in 242 B.C. a second prætor was added, with special jurisdiction over those who were not citizens.

The development of the empire was so carefully and heedfully done that not until 300 years after the establishment of the monarchical principle did it become apparent that republican forms had been swept away and that the emperor as the final court of appeal practically was the only court. After the time of Hadrian the right of proposing new legislation became the exclusive prerogative of the emperor. The carrying out of this extended body of law became a task of some difficulty and a great deal of importance, and the legal profession rose to great dignity, all the chief posts in the empire going to trained lawyers, so that in the matter of equity and the equitable interpretation of obligation Roman Law has never been surpassed.

The Justinian Code, compiled after the conversion of the emperors to Christianity, was a marvelous piece of work. The aim of Justinian (527 A.D.) was to diminish the length of the lawsuits, to do away with the confusion in the mass of constitutions prepared with the 200 years preceding by Gregorianus, Hermogenianus, Theodosius II. and others and to declare null and void all that was not contained in the new code. The changes were not radical, except in the case of the child, wherein the father lost all rights of disposal and the child was given a right to life and liberty.

Two other factors remain to be considered in the development to Modern Law—namely, the influence of the Ecclesiastical rulings and the Barbarian codes. The Canon Law of the Church assumed great importance in the Middle Ages, and the stupendous work of Gratian in gathering and arranging all the various Papal and episcopal rulings added to its importance.

The Code Napoleon, which after the Justinian Code is the most influential body of legal doctrine, possessed three sources. The most primitive of these were the 'coutumes,' or customs, which consisted of the feudal decisions of the seigneurs or nobles who found the legal confusion of the Middle Ages impossible in a decentral-

ized government. In 'coutume' days each district had a different set of laws, based upon the personality of the seigneur. The second source, the 'ordonnances,' were monarchical decrees by Louis XIV. and XV., determining the outlines of proposed reforms, of which, however, few were carried out. The third was the Roman Law.

The creation of the Consulate, with Napoleon as the first Consul, gave the impetus to organization, and in 1807 the Code Napoleon was issued. Its influence was far-reaching. It was embraced by most of Europe, and even where a more scientific set of statutes has replaced it, the fundamentals of the Code Napoleon are still there.

The English Law, unlike that of the Continental systems, is not that of a code. Its history is emphatically a record of precedents, and therefore is not to be regarded as the product of specific lawmakers, but the genius of the judges. The first true compiler of cases was Bracton, and his is but the first of a long line of names that has descended through the history of English law.

There are few studies which contain more of the real lives of people than Law, which, both from its individual and its national standpoint, brings to light almost every practical query of the human mind. The strange barbaric customs of semi-civilized nations, as well as the hyper-polished differences of civilized nations, appear in International Law; the half-hidden realization of the ever-lurking threatening powers of Nature, show their head in Maritime Law; the Ultima Thule of human shrewdness appears in Commercial Law; the finest and noblest senses of equity appear in Civil Law; the most amazing evidences of moral disease show their repulsive selves in Criminal Law; indeed, matters of vital interest and importance occupy every nook and cranny of the immense territory of Jurisprudence. It has been well summarized: "And what more is required of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" This is the aim and goal of all Law.

CHAPTER IV

THE HISTORY OF RELIGION

"RELIGION," says Max Muller, in a historic phrase, "is as old as the world we know."

No research however far carried, no analysis however subtly done, no exploration however complete but has shown man in possession of the religious idea. Indeed it could not be otherwise. In man mind operates upon matter, and whenever matter is set in motion independently of man he looks for a cause; neither does he rest content until he has found it. If the cause is readily traceable, he traces it; if it is too distant for his apprehension, he ascribes it to a personal force other than his own, and because incomprehensible to him, greater. If man could explain all things, there would be no need of a conception of God; but as long as there is so vast an array of phenomena which, with Herbert Spencer, must be classed as the 'Unknowable,' so long will a supreme cause be projected.

The first literature of the world was religious literature, the first discernible customs of the world were religious customs, the first ceremonials of the world were religious ceremonials, the first laws of the world were religious laws, the first government of the world was religious government, and culture is declared most emphatically by the consensus of anthropologists to have found its beginnings in religion.

Thanks to the assiduous labors of the men of science

through ages past and in the present, the laws of nature have been laid down with such exactitude, and the modern man fondly thinks himself so wise in the understanding of them that it is at times difficult to conceive a time when of knowledge of natural laws there was none. "And yet to him who knows not the laws of a thing's movements," says F. B. Jevons in his 'Introduction to the History of Religion,' "the thing's behavior is as tho it had no law, for he does not know what it will do next. If, then, we suppose a time when no natural laws had been discovered, all things must have appeared to happen at haphazard, and primitive man's experience must have consisted of a stream of events as disjointed and disconnected as the successive incidents in a dream."

This apparent confusion in circumadjacent nature would be greatly enhanced by the complications that occur in sleep. The primitive man dreams of distant scenes that he visits in his sleep. It is clear, from the evidence of those who saw his sleeping body, that his body certainly did not travel; therefore he or his soul must be separable from the body and must have traveled while his body lay unmoving and unmoved. But he also dreams of those who are dead and whose bodies, he may be aware, cannot be existent in the form that he sees them. Wherefore he argues, not unnaturally, that death does not entirely dissipate them, since they can so appear.

These two concepts form the foundation stones of any history of religion. From them, it would seem, all later religions have evolved, and there is not the most complex and advanced doctrine of scholastic erudition that cannot be traced back to these early ideas of man. This realization of a Superior Being transcending the forces of the Universe would awake all the sentiments of awe, worship and reverence; the desire to propitiate the evil moods and to ingratiate the beneficent moods of that Being or Beings would lead to all forms of prayer, sacrifice and worship; the belief in the continuance of life after death solves the

riddle of existence, reveals a possible adjudication of differences and wrongs sustained here, which even in barbaric communities is a matter of strained interest.

Who can forget the description of the reception of the Christian missionaries in Barbaric England as told by the Venerable Bede? When the new preachers of the doctrines that were to overspread civilization first appeared in King Edwin's hall and questions arose as to whether they should be given a fair hearing or no, an old chief arose in the midst of the hall and said, "O King, as we sit by night around the fire in the hall and make good cheer, it often happens that a little bird flies for a moment into the heat and light; it comes out of the cold and darkness and then it goes out into the cold and darkness; but none can tell whence it comes and none can tell whither it goes. And so is our own life. We come, and the saga men cannot tell us whence; we go, and they cannot tell us whither. Therefore, if there be any who can give us certainty about a future state, in Odin's name, let us hear them."

Thus at the earliest point whereon the subject can be touched, certain definite concepts arising from the two great primal ideas are found already existent. Some slight defining of these perhaps will serve to show how the history of Religion may be said to have begun.

First—The Belief in the Supernatural. This was nothing more than the recognition that a power existed which the individual man could not control; or even further, that there was a force above the power of man to control. This gave rise to Fear.

Second—That the Supernatural was Personal. The primitive man was unable to conceive of force as an abstract conception, wherefore all forms of force must be the result of motion begun by some person or persons. This gave rise to Polytheism.

Third—That the Supernatural possessed both beneficent and malefic attributes; that at times it would assist, at

other times hinder, but that, being supernatural, its processes were hazy, sometimes bad, sometimes good. This gave rise to the classification of gods and demons and led to Dualism.

Fourth—That the Good Spirit could be induced to admit to favoritism a petitioner, and that thereby the Supernatural influence could be secured. This gave rise to Worship.

Fifth—That the Evil Spirit could be partly bribed or propitiated by gifts. As, however, an evil spirit would desire evil gifts, the most horrible self-denials were practiced to win the favor of the demon. This gave rise to Sacrifice.

Sixth—That a multiplicity of gods and demons, each with his preferred system of reverence or propitiation, required the existence of a body of knowledge as to means of approach. This gave rise to various forms of Priesthood.

Seventh—That somewhat, other than the body, continued after death, and that the virtues in life were among the immortal attributes. This led to Ancestor worship.

Eighth.—That the gods and demons possess power not only during life but after death. This led to what may be called the 'justice of the future.'

Ninth—That the wrath of the supernatural powers may be excited by an individual, but that it may affect a whole tribe, and therefore that the tribe was responsible for its safety on the actions of the individual. This led to Taboo.

Tenth—That the protection of the God or the leniency of the demon was fully secured by joining him in the partaking of the sacrifice offered to him, by him indwelt and thus transferred to the partakers. This led to the Sacrificial Meal.

Man, at the time of his first appearance, had a close relation to forest life, and it would be entirely an expected matter if his first objects of worship would be connected with the forest. The forest, however, was a home and was beneficent; but it was infested with dangerous crea-

tures, and of these perhaps the most deadly was the venomous snake. Probably the worships of love and fear arose simultaneously, but the earliest fact in the history of religion shows in operation both the worship of the Tree and of the Serpent.

Tree Worship was a universal rite. "There is little doubt," says C. Fergusson in his 'Tree and Serpent Worship,' "that most if not all races, at some period of their development, have regarded the tree as the home, the haunt, the embodiment of spiritual essence, capable of more or less independent life and activity, able to detach itself from its material habitat and to appear in human or animal form. This belief has left innumerable traces in art and literature, has largely shaped the usages and legends of the peasantry and impressed its influence on the ritual of almost all the primitive religions of mankind. There is, indeed, scarcely a country of the world where the tree has not, at one time or another, been approached with reverence and fear."

Side by side with Tree-Worship is found the worship of the Serpent. Setting aside the question of Dragon worship as being an appendage to the greater scope of Serpent-Worship it is seen that this is of as great extent in antiquity. The serpent mounds of Ohio testify to the extreme antiquity in America and the serpent charms of France to its greater antiquity in Europe; while, if its persistence be sought, to this day Naga or Serpent worship in India claims tens of millions of devout adherents, African voodooism is full of it, and even in Europe, serpent temples were built in Finland with the last century.

Serpent lore has a large place in certain forms of Buddhism. The Upanishads refer to the "Science of Serpents, by which is meant the wisdom of the mysterious Nagas, who are fabulous creatures who occupy a place among the beings superior to man." The serpent was the oracle of the Ionians, and became the Agatha Daemon of a later time. The serpent in Jewish tradition pointed

Adam and Eve to the Sacred Trees, those of Knowledge and Life, and later a brazen serpent formed a means of checking a plague. In Egypt and India, the serpent was the symbol of royal wisdom. Throughout the Eastern world the serpent was regarded as an active force in the creation of the first man, he is called 'father snake' and 'grandfather snake' in a score of tongues and to this day the rulers of Abyssinia account the snake the founder of their dynasty. In Central Africa, if a youth displays unusual powers there is a general belief expressed in the proverb, 'He must have had a snake for his father.'

Both Tree-Worship and Serpent-Worship, moreover, led the way to the worship of the Principle of Life. This Phallic worship was universal, and no early religion seems to have been free from it. The devotees of temples assigned to such worship took most intimate vows, and strange phallic ceremonies were performed in which both the tree and the living serpent—the latter particularly—took a part which would seem strangely lacking in delicacy to the modern conception. Aside from stating definitely that the worship of the principle of Life became the outcome of Tree and Plant Worship, nothing more can be said.

The thought of the worship of the Tree and of the Serpent leads naturally to the question of the use of these as Totems. Totems may either be animal or else belong to the vegetable kingdom, but the essential part of both is that they shall be representative of the god and that in some form or another it will be possible for the worshiper to identify himself with the god and thereby secure his favor. On this basis, it would be felt that a tribe which had a bear for its totem sign would be freed from fear of attacks by bears, and that a tribe which possessed the corn-plant for its totem sign could be assured of good crops no matter what the weather might be or what success and fortune their neighbors had.

As such, it is clear that Totemism originally was a blind groping after supernatural protection, but as it de-

veloped it became a matter of considerable importance in view of the fact that it made a definite tribal link and perpetuated that which previously had been somewhat inchoate. It was inevitable, therefore, that the clan became rigorously confined by its obedience to the totem decrees, and that the initiation of a stranger therein was a matter of extreme difficulty. It had a double effect: the animal became a part of the human clan, but to reciprocate, the human became a part of the animal's clan.

This alliance had remarkable results, one of which, it is suggested, led to the domestication of animals and plants. "In totemism," says Jevons, "we have a cause persistent, world-wide, and adequate to account for the facts. The totem animal, not merely an animal but the whole species, is reverenced, protected, and allowed—or rather encouraged—to increase and multiply over the whole area traversed by the tribe, and the area required for the support of a nomad family is considerable. This treatment is continued for generations, for it is the religion of the tribe. The appearance of the animal is welcomed with rejoicing as the manifestation of the tribal deity, offerings are made to it, and being free from molestation, it discovers the fact, acquires confidence, and if it has the instinct of domestication, ceases to be wild. In a word, the animal becomes tame—which is a different thing from being tamed."

The same process can be noticed in the domestication of plants. It is to be remembered that the essence of all totem allegiance was the sacredness of the object thus totemized. Thus under animal totem conditions it was essential that when such animal was sacrificed, a part thereof should be offered to the gods. In plant-totems this has existed and still exists in an absolutely pure and unchecked form in no less civilized a country than England. It is a custom in many parishes (and is an order in certain dioceses) that a harvest home festival be held at which it is required that the rector or priest of the

parish shall cut the first sheaf of wheat, with appropriate prayers, thus consecrating the first fruits before it is safe for the laity to touch.

The peopling of this world with ghosts—strictly the spirits of those who are dead—knows no exception of time and place. Perhaps a few of the forms this has taken may serve to show its prevalence. To the Old Greek poets the dream-soul is purely that of the savage, as in the case of Achilles' dream of Patroclus; while at the opposite pole of thought, an Australian who has slain his enemy will cut off the right thumb of the body, so that even should the hostile ghost attack him, it will not be able to throw its shadowy spear. Certain of the North American hunting tribes require that a widow be followed for a day by an attendant flapping over her head a bundle of twigs so that the husband's ghost shall be driven away and thus permitting her to marry again, while with kindlier feeling the Congo negroes abstain from sweeping a house for a whole year after a death, lest the dust should injure the delicate substance of a ghost, and to this day it is a custom of German peasants not to slam a door, lest they should pinch a soul in it. But perhaps the most naïve account of the potency of the dead soul and of the need of constant communication is told by Captain Burton. He says: "Whatever action, however trivial, is performed by the king (of Dahomey) it must dutifully be reported to his sire in the shadowy realm. A victim, almost always a war captive, is chosen; the message is delivered to him, an intoxicating draught of rum follows it, and he is dispatched to Hades in the best of humors."

Before touching on the directly historical antecedents of modern religious systems, however, Taboo must be considered. Taboo, in brief, is the doctrine that a certain class of objects are set apart from profane purposes, that they carry with them either a moral infection in themselves (such as in a new-born babe or a corpse) or a moral penalty for infraction (such as a temple, a chief or a

totem plant or animal). It is not to be dismissed with a smile, for it is the whole body of law, of religion, of conduct, nay of life itself to hundreds of millions of people. The terror which untoward circumstances bring out in civilized people cannot be compared to the wild and panic-stricken fear of the violator of a taboo. There is only one thing to the savage mind that is sure about Taboo, and that is that it must not be broken. It is a categorical imperative.

The real advance that has been made by civilization over the savage state is that of shaking off this bond. Instead of trembling fear owing to an exaggeration of the Law of the Association of Ideas, he now seeks a rational instead of a mechanical explanation of things. "As soon as a Taboo is taken up by a religion, its character is changed; it is no longer an arbitrary fact, it becomes the command of a divine being, who has reason for requiring obedience to his ordinances. When the taboos which receive the sanction of religion are regarded as reasonable, as the commands of a being possessing reason, then the other taboos also may be brought to the test of reason, and man may gradually learn to disregard those which have become manifestly unreasonable. Hence, all the elaborate precautions which are taken by the savage to prevent his food from becoming tabooed dwindle down to the etiquet of the dining table, the removal of a garment, lest it should be tabooed by the glance of a superior, is etiolated into civilized man's form of salutation and prohibitive ostracism from the tribe lives only in the cut direct."

One of the links from savagery with its Totemism and Taboo is found in the Quichuans of Peru (often called the Incas). Their religion was polytheistic, altho Tupanqui, or Pachacamac or Viracocha, as he was variously termed, was the Creator. The chief object of worship was the sun, and at the great central temple at the capital Cuzco, the emperor himself was high priest. "Many llamas were sacrificed, and in Cuzco," says J. H. Hittell, "six hundred

on one day. The sacrifice was followed by a feast, in which the meat of the victim was eaten, and a small portion of the consecrated food was distributed to everybody in the city, to the common people as well as to the nobles." Here is the totem feast with the consequent sacrificial feast in its entirety.

The Aztec religion, in which the general morality of its precepts was on a higher plane, was marked by the extensiveness of its human sacrifices. "At the chief annual festival of Huitzilopochtli, a large cake mixed with the blood of a child, who represented the divinity, was divided among the people." From this it seems a far cry to the requirement that every member of the Aztec faith should make a confession of his sins, once in his life, to a priest. He was given penance (usually severe) and then absolution, but sins committed after this solitary opportunity for confession could not be forgiven.

Totem worship appears strongly in the religion of Egypt. "Every god had a favorite or sacred beast. Thus the bull was sacred for Osiris, the cow for Isis, the lion for Ra, the ibis for Thoth, the hawk for Horus, the jackal for Anubis, the asp for Knumis, the scarabaeus for Ptah, the vulture for Neith, the viper for Amon, the goat for Mendes and the crocodile for Shebak. Each province had its local divinity and its sacred animal, which latter must never be eaten, purposely injured or killed in the province."

But Greece seems to stand out in especial manner through the poetic value of her mythology. To the Greek, suggests Mahaffy, "all things were alive, most things were conscious beings, and all the phenomena of the universe were but the actions of these personal agents. If, in the clear heaven, the big drops fell from the suddenly gathered clouds, these were the tears which Zeus wept for his son Sarpedon. Thus the stars and the clouds were the exulting dancers who clashed their cymbals round the cradle of Zeus; the sun was the hero compelled to go

his weary round for the children of men, or crucified daily on his blazing wheel, or condemned to heave to the summit of heaven the stone which thence rolled down to the abyss." But Greece in later times learned to regard these as mere stories, rich with charm and true in a measure, but only in a measure, and there is a wistful regret in the later writers of Greece to the days of the heroes "when all the world was new."

The theocracy of the Jewish nation stands out on the pages of history like an illuminated initial on a missal. Never was so historically uninfluential a people the bearer of so pervading an ethical message. Throughout its entire life-history, (a singularly long one) Jewish ethics have been remarkably practical and astonishingly free from the concomitants to be expected from its localization. Although a religion of bloody sacrifices, the transition from Temple worship to synagogue prayer was made without the slightest break in the continuity of Jewish tradition, and Israel continued throughout her centuries of persecution with a dogged courage and an unflinching determination to remain true to an ethical ideal that has never been surpassed.

Prior to the development of the Hellenic philosophy Judaism was a rigidly self-controlled religion. To pagan philosophy it presented a determined independence. But the triumphant onsweep of Greek civilization caused the Jews, as all other nations, to query the reason for the faith that was in them, and Philo of Alexandria undertook on a grand scale the fusion of Hellenism and Hebraism. In their mutual interaction, the Hebraic element received enlargement and a new intellectuality, it embraced such a part of Greek concentration and spiritual inwardness as it needed, but Judaism remained Judaism in spite of Philo's effort to Hellenise it. The destruction of the Temple, twenty-one years after Philo's death, had a potent effect upon Judaism, leading to the development of an inward piety and a humanitarian aspect toward mankind.

Greek culture, Hebraic morality and Christian religiosity, are the three main forces in the progress of that part of ethics which pertains to the history of religion. In these three the one and essential difference is the attitude they bear to the relationship btween this life and a possible future life. Greece urged the beauty of this life for its own sake; Judaism predicated the necessity of enduring this life because of a supra-mundane mandate; Christianity (like Egypt) regarded this world as a mere probation for a better life to come.

In speaking, even in a brief and cursive manner of the history of Christianity, it is necessary to determine what in this Christianity of which the history is to be traced. All definitions are arbitrary, but the writer would postulate a definition of Christianity in somewhat the following terms:

Christianity is a religion and an ethical system based upon belief in a Supreme Being, disobedience of the commands of whom brings retribution; which retribution having been hereditarily transmitted required atonement, which expiation was accomplished by the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ, belief in whom coupled with worship of the Supreme Being, and obedience to His commandments ensure salvation from the eternal retribution necessarily consequent upon a life of imperfect holiness. It furthermore predicates the continuing interest of God in His church and rules that an understanding of divine commands may be secured either from the Bible itself or from the instruction of a sacred order of priesthood possessing historic continuity.

Such a definition, it will be observed, includes all forms of Catholicism and all forms of Protestantism. In religion much depends upon the personality of the Founder, and in Eucken's words, "In Jesus there appears united with homely simplicity, an unfathomable profundity, united with a youthful gladness, a great seriousness; and united with the most perfect sincerity of heart and ten-

derness of feeling, a mighty zeal for holy things and an invincible courage for the battle with the hostile world. Trust in God and love of man are here bound together in an inseparable unity; the highest good is at once a secure possession and an endless task."

In the definition of Christianity which has been given, it is evident that the seeds of ecclesiasticism are planted. Through the "mystery of the sacraments," arose a priesthood which should dominate the laity by its exclusive access to God. In Greek times, this might have become a philosophical school; in Roman times it could not but follow the spirit of the age and become an dogmatic organization. The sacrificial aspect became more and more emphasized as the sacerdotal bond strengthened and with the adoption of Christianity as the state religion, this organization secured a recognition which, little by little, enabled it to demand supreme control.

Following upon the establishment of a rigid hierarchy in Rome, and in Constantinople, came the great movement of Mohammedanism, a power as potent in the eastern world as Christianity in the west. It spread throughout the Orient the knowledge of both Judaistic and Christian ethics, colored with its own interpretation. A thoroughly monotheistic religion, as bitterly opposed to idolatry as Judaism, as strenuously adverse to self-indulgence as Christianity, the doctrines of Mohammed played an all-important part in the religious history of the world. Their influence has held fast to the present day and Modern Christianity has not escaped their permeative character.

The early Middle Ages find the influence of Judaism upon Christianity constantly becoming more marked. Abelard (1079-1142) does not bow before the magic and the mystery of religion; he challenges every dogma and brings his brilliant dialectic to bear upon the most sacrosanct of topics. It is noteworthy that in his most famous treatise, the Jew, the Philosopher, and the Christian are selected as the three types of thought. Abelard, himself, is seen

as a moralist, believing that the essential things of religion are moral rather than spiritual, and even goes so far as to demand a rationalistic ground for faith and to insist that Christianity cannot rest upon the past in inaction, but must ever proceed to newer and larger understandings of God.

The thirteenth century, like the sixteenth and the nineteenth, was epochal. The crusades were coming to an end and this effort, long believed to be a divine mission, had failed. To an age believing that success came from God, this was a severe shock. Again, the mendicant orders had made Christianity a religion of the home as well as of the cathedral, and they found their power in a social counter-movement in the Holy Wars. In that century, also, came the vast intellectual rediscovery of Aristotelian philosophy *via* the Mohammedan world and Spain. When Aristotle's writings reached the Christian Church in the thirteenth century, they shook tradition to its foundations, the more so because Averroës, the most forceful figure among the Mohammedan Aristotelians, formulated the relation between knowledge and faith in a manner wholly unacceptable to Christianity.

At this critical point arose Thomas Aquinas (1227-1274) who cut the Gordian Knot by formulating a Christian Aristotelianism, made easy by the fact that Aristotle's philosophy had been modified in Neo-Platonic form by the transmission through Arabic channels. According to Thomas, the existence of God, the foundations of the world in Him, the immortality of the soul, are demonstrable by mere reason; on the other hand, the doctrines of the Trinity, the temporal creation of the world and the resurrection of the body, derive their authority from the Christian revelation. Above the realm of historic revelation lies the higher stage of the union with God that mystic vision confers—the spiritual ecstasy. Duns Scotus (1240-1308) opposed Thomas Aquinas, and defended the Augustinian theology, restricting the do-

main of rationalism. According to Thomas Aquinas, God commands the good because it is good; according to Scotus, the good is good because God commands it. The mediæval attitude closes with Thomas à Kempis' "Imitation of Christ" as its swan-song, a devotional work whose scale of values is measured by detachment from the world, and a consequent greater attachment to the personality of Jesus.

"The Protestant Reformation," says E. C. Moore, "marked an era both in life and thought for the modern world. It ushered in a revolution in Europe. It established distinctions and initiated tendencies which are still significant. They are essentially modern principles. They are the principles which, taken together, differentiate the thinker of the nineteenth century from all who have ever been before him."

It is not possible to analyse with too keen distinctions the various forms of Protestantism, but there is one factor to which all Protestant churches would agree: That the Reformation sought to bring religion closer to the individual by subjecting it to the personal standard; that deliverance through the acceptance by the individual of divine grace might supersede the acceptance by God of the individual through the intervention of the church. Protestantism brought the feeling of freedom—whether truly or not, it would be controversial to discuss. The point remains that the Protestant Reformation brought into effect the so-called right of private interpretation. This is necessarily a disruptive factor, and the History of Protestantism is a long record of dissensions, of strife, of constant misunderstandings, of numberless sects and sub-sects, and, in the twentieth century, of a letting down of denominational loyalty and partizan unity.

Religious controversy is a Slough of Despond which it is wise to avoid, but only cowardice would warrant one in assuming its non-existence. The Reformation—though the word is not accepted by Roman and Greek Catholics—

actually happened, and a large section of Europe lapsed from under the authority of Rome and Constantinople. It might be said, with some degree of truth, that the Reformation is still going on, that it is always going on, that there was no need for schism since the Church herself would purge herself of any human error that would creep in. But we should deal with the present. It seems, therefore, that the history of religion should today find its greatest importance in giving the historical approach between faith and modern life as it would be expressed by authorities of the great religious movements of the present time.

Speaking for the Roman Catholic church along this line, the approach between Science and Faith is thus worded:

"Assuming that Christianity was a revelation of spiritual truth, the interests of truth are best guarded by an institution which does act to some extent as a drag on the just adoption of speculations advanced in the name of science and criticism. The imagination becomes overpowered by the kaleidoscope of irresponsible speculation. The faculty whereby religious truth is grasped is confused by the overcrowding of the mind. Its grasp is relaxed. Faith may be killed never to return.

"Hence the suspiciousness on the part of the guardians of dogma of any novelty which affects the statement or exposition of dogma. It is no question of hostility to science as such, but of the jealous guardianship of the deposit. No one acquainted with Rome can deny that there is in the appointed rulers this deep traditional sense that it is their business to guard the 'deposit,' and that to fail in this is the one great crime compared to which injustice to secular science is a small matter—for it is to fail in the principal duty of their office.

"A representative body which professes, through good and evil repute, to hold fast to the Christian message to assert it, to defend it to the death, is essential if Chris-

tianity is to last in any true sense in the modern world of ever-changing intellectual theories, amid the irregular and uncertain advances towards scientific conclusions, through fanciful and delusive speculation. Such a body does not aid science directly in its own domain. That is not its object or its business. But it does preserve one of the elements in the desired synthesis, which, without such a body to fight its battles would gradually dwindle to nothing and lose its influence. If Christianity is to assimilate what is true in science, without itself becoming utterly diluted and losing its distinctive genius amid the inevitable intellectual changes, I see no other machinery which will, in the long run, accomplish this work, except the organic coöperation of defenders of the various truths and interests concerned, the machinery for which is to be found in the constitution of the Catholic Church."

This is a clear pronouncement. Equally clear statements from the Protestant side are harder to find. Perhaps one of the most thoroughly well poised Protestant thinkers was the late Professor Candish. Speaking of "some mysterious force keeping science and religion apart," he wrote:

"By many the need is felt of more thoroughly carrying out the principles of the Reformation than was done in the succeeding age, so as to place the dogmatic system on a surer basis. . . . By a large number of divines it has been felt to be unsatisfactory to base, as was done formerly, the whole system of theology on the one doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture; and a broader foundation, as well as a more living conception, has been sought for it, by recognizing as its subject matter, not merely the sayings of Scripture, but that living Christianity which it is the direct object of the Bible to produce and reveal."

Dr. John Kelman, speaking for strict upholders of the Bible in the terms of modern culture suggests: "One

point at least has been conceded by the vast majority [of Protestants] viz., that the Bible is no longer to be viewed as a scientific text-book but as the record of a spiritual revelation. . . . The scientific ideas of any part of the Bible are simply those of the age when that part was written—neither more nor less accurate than the rest of contemporary science. The battle between science and scripture is one thing; the battle between science and religion is a very different thing; yet half the controversies of the past have arisen from confounding these two. When the scientific authority of Scripture is surrendered, science is set free to work out its own results; and the doctrine of inspiration, by giving up the claim of the Bible to teach science, has saved its power to teach religion."

The pure twentieth century scientist is not less a religionist than either Catholic or Protestant. Sir Oliver Lodge declares the position with force and fervor:

"This is the lesson science has to teach theology," he says, "to look for the action of the Deity, if at all, then always; not in the past alone; nor only in the future, but equally in the present. If this action is not visible now, it never will be, and never has been visible. . . . Shall we hope to see the Deity some day step out of himself and display His Might or His Love or some other attribute? We can see Him now if we look; if we cannot see, it is only that our eyes are shut. The region of Religion and the region of a completer Science are one."

In order to portray in the most unbiased form the later and modern history of Christianity, the churches most strongly represented in America will be described hereinafter, alphabetically listed, with their history, tenets and polity, in as condensed a form as possible:

Adventist Bodies. Protestant. *History:* The Advent Movement originated with William Miller (1812-1849). He set the period March, 1843-1844, as the period for the Second Advent of Christ. When this failed to come to

pass, the followers of Miller organized a church in 1845. *Tenets*: That Christ is to be expected hourly in personal character. That eternal life is only for the redeemed. That the millenium is the thousand years intervening between the first resurrection and the rest of the dead. *Polity*: Congregational.

ARMENIAN CHURCH. Catholic. *History*: The Armenians claim the honor of being the first Christian nation, Christianity having been made the state church in 285 A.D., over thirty years earlier than the edict of Constantine. *Tenets:* The Nicene Creed (eastern form), canons of the first three œcumenical councils. Holy Communion is administered in both kinds, even to infants. *Polity*: Democratic in selection of church officers, hierarchical in ordination.

BAPTIST BODIES. Protestant. *History:* Anabaptists were among the earliest Protestants. In America the church was established by Roger Williams, in 1639. *Tenets*: Modified Calvinism. That religious liberty is an inherent right of the human soul. That infant baptism is not only not taught in the Scriptures, but is fatal to the spirituality of the church. That the final court of appeal in matters of faith is the Bible. *Polity*: Congregational.

BRETHREN (PLYMOUTH). Protestant. *History:* An independent movement of Christians who believed that there should be no human-ordained ministry, no creeds, no sacramental mysteries. The first permanent meeting was in 1829. *Tenets*: That the Bible is the only guide to salvation, that believers are eternally secure, that the punishment of the unregenerate will be eternal, that all church organizations are unscriptural. *Polity*: An invisible theocracy, no ecclesiastical organization and no ministry.

CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC. Catholic (irregular). *History*: Two denominations were organized in the second quarter of the nineteenth century to teach that all baptized persons are members of this church and that the same spiritual powers are possible today as were manifested in the

early ages of the Christian Church. *Tenets:* The Creeds and the Seven Councils. The absolute indissolubility of marriage. The continuance of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, such as tongues and prophecy, by the laying on of hands. *Polity:* A twelve-fold apostleship, in whose power lies the call as well as the consecration of bishops, priests and deacons.

CHRISTIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN ZION (DOWIEITES). Protestant. *History*: The denomination was started in 1888 by John Alexander Dowie, who in 1901, assumed the title of John Baptist II and Elijah the Restorer. He established a religio-industrial community in Illinois, since abandoned. *Tenets*: The infallibility of the Bible. That disease is caused by demoniacal possession, which may be cured by prayer. *Polity*: Personal.

CHRISTIANS (CHRISTIAN CONNECTION). Protestant. *History*: In 1800 the "Great Revival" swept the Cumberland Valley and the evangelical spirit continued. *Tenets*: Christian character to be the only test of church fellowship, the Bible the rule of life. *Polity*: Congregational.

CHURCH OF CHRIST SCIENTIST. Personal. *History:* Founded by Mrs. Mary Baker Eddy in 1867, when the first school of Christian Science mind healing was opened in Lynn, Mass. *Tenets*: "There is no life, truth, intelligence, nor substance in matter. All is infinite mind and its infinite manifestation for God is all-in-all. Spirit is immortal truth, matter is mortal error." Thus evil does not exist, pain does not exist, and the apostolic healing of Jesus may be carried on today to heal the sick as well as to save the sinful. *Polity*: Partly a centralized organization, partly congregationally independent, no pastorate.

CHURCHES OF GOD IN NORTH AMERICA. Protestant. *History*: Founded in 1829 by John Winebrenner, a Reformed Church pastor. *Tenets*: Arminian. The Word of God to be the only rule of faith and practice. Strongly evangelical. *Polity*: Presbyterian.

CHURCHES OF THE LIVING GOD. Protestant. *History*:

Founded in 1899 by William Christian, a Baptist pastor. *Tenets*: Same as Baptist bodies. *Polity*: Same as Methodist bodies.

CHURCHES OF THE NEW JERUSALEM. Christian, Mystic. *History*: Founded by followers of the doctrines of Emanuel Swedenborg (1719-1772), especially as set forth in his works "Arcana Cœlestia," "True Christian Religion" and "Apocalypse Revealed." *Tenets:* That the Bible was plenarily dictated by the Lord Himself, and inspired as to every word and letter, and like Nature itself, is a divine symbol. *Polity:* Episcopacy modified.

COMMUNISTIC SOCIETIES (SHAKERS) (AMANA). Christian socialism. *History:* The 'Shakers' began as a reform movement among the Quakers in the eighteenth century and was founded in the United States by Mother Ann Lee, the pioneer of all woman's rights movements in America. The Amana Society was founded in America by Christian Metz in 1842. *Tenets:* Shakerism lays stress on purity, non-resistance, brotherhood and community of goods; freedom from debt and from marital bonds are among the conditions of membership. The tenets of the Amana Society add to the inspiration of the Bible, the prophecies of inspired leaders (there has been none since the death of Barbara Heineman in 1883). *Polity:* Communistic in both societies.

CONGREGATIONALISTS. Protestant. *History:* This church was an outgrowth of the Separatists of the sixteenth century in England. First emigrating to Holland, then to America, the Pilgrims established the first Congregational Church at Plymouth, Mass., in 1620. When the Puritans came, later, the two united. The "Great Awakening" and the Trinitarian controversy led to the separation of the Unitarians from the Congregational body. *Tenets:* Generally evangelical, but congregational variance is permissible, even on matters of faith. *Polity:* Congregational.

DUNKERS. Protestant. *History:* The Dunkers are the direct descendants of the Pietists of Germany, who vivi-

fied Protestantism at the close of the seventeenth century. *Tenets:* The strict following out of the regulations of the primitive Christians, *e.g.,* plain attire without jewelry, refusal to take oaths, total abstinence, etc. *Polity:* Presbyterian modified.

Eastern Orthodox Churches. Catholic. *History:* The Russian, Greek, Syrian and Servian churches are the modern representatives of the church of the Byzantine empire. The split between East and West in the Christian Church occurred in 1054, when the Patriarchate of Rome was separated from the other four Patriarchates. *Tenets:* Creeds (Eastern form) seven œcumenical councils. *Polity:* Hierarchical.

Evangelical Bodies. Protestant. *History:* These associations were founded by Jacob Allbright in the early part of the nineteenth century to carry on the spiritual awakening of that time of the German communities in Pennsylvania. *Tenets:* Generally resembling Methodism, and strongly infused with the missionary spirit. *Polity:* Modified Methodist form of episcopacy.

Society of Friends (Quakers). Christian mystic. *History:* The Society was founded early in the seventeenth century by George Fox. Owing to conscientious objections to taxation, to abstention from warfare, and to unfamiliarity of their teachings they were severely persecuted in England and elsewhere until they found a haven in Pennsylvania under William Penn. *Tenets:* The necessity of divine power within the man to enable him to live according to the will of God, the direct communication of this will to the individual believer in Christ and the necessity of a perfect consistency between the outward life and the religious profession. *Polity:* Democratic.

German Evangelical Protestant Bodies. Protestant. *History:* Founded in 1885 for mutual encouragement. *Tenets:* Unitarian. *Polity:* Congregational.

Jewish Congregations. Jewish. *History:* The first congregation in America was founded in 1655. *Tenets:*

Judaism, orthodox and reformed. *Polity:* Traditionalistic and congregational.

Latter Day Saints (Mormons). Mormon. *History:* Founded by Joseph Smith in 1830, following upon the declarations of visions from Heaven and the statements in the "Book of Mormon." He led a general migration of believers to Salt Lake City, Utah, then a wilderness. *Tenets:* The Book of Mormon and a Mormon translation of the Bible and standards of faith. The organization of the primitive church and a full gift of tongues, revelations, prophecy, etc., continue. Celestial and plural marriages were permitted, but this permission has been withdrawn. *Polity:* Hierarchical.

Lutheran Bodies. Protestant. *History:* The first independent colony of Lutherans in America was a Swedish group on the Delaware in 1638. In 1872, Henry M. Mühlenberg organized the first synod. *Tenets:* Lutheran. *Polity:* Congregational and Presbyterian.

Mennonite Bodies. Protestant. *History:* The Mennonites are characteristic protestants against forms and ceremonies, always seeking simplicity. When Penn acquired Pennsylvania he offered homes to the Mennonites and the first colony was formed at Germantown, Pa., in 1683. *Tenets:* Simple and rigorous evangelical orthodox Protestantism. *Polity:* Congregational.

Methodist Bodies. Protestant. *History:* The Methodist movement began as a search for holiness by John and Charles Wesley and George Whitefeld, ordained ministers of the Church of England. Wesley visited America in 1733. *Tenets:* Arminian. Discipline modified from Church of England Articles of Religion. *Polity* (in America): Modified episcopacy.

Moravian Bodies. Protestant. *History:* The first bishop from this pre-Lutheran stronghold of Protestantism came to Georgia in 1736, and several typical Moravian villages were founded in Pennsylvania in 1741. *Tenets:* Evangelical. *Polity:* Modified episcopacy.

New Thought. Mystic. *History:* A general movement, beginning at the end of the nineteenth century simultaneously in several centres in America. *Tenets* (not definitely formulated): "The reincarnation here until we learn the lessons of this plane, then on the various planes with which we relate." "Everything on the material plane begins and ends in the thought world." *Polity:* Associative.

Polish National Church. Protestant. *History:* The formation of this church in 1904 was a protest against the Roman Catholic administration of Polish congregations, begun simultaneously by Francis Hodur and Anton Kozlowski. *Tenets:* Evangelical, but with the interpretation of the first four œcumenical councils. *Polity:* Synodal.

Presbyterian Bodies. Protestant. *History:* The features of the Reformation emphasized by Calvin are continued in the Presbyterian Church. In 1706, the first American presbytery met, but there had been congregations for several years earlier. *Tenets:* Calvinism, the Westminster Confession of Faith and the Larger and Shorter Catechisms. *Polity:* Presbyterian.

Protestant Episcopal Church. Modified Catholic. *History:* The earliest English voyages of discovery carried the Church of England to America. The first service was held by Robert Hunt in 1607. *Tenets:* The Creeds and the seven œcumenical councils officially, but a large proportion of the members are evangelical protestants with a liking for liturgical forms. *Polity:* Episcopacy.

Reformed Bodies. Protestant. *History:* The Zwingtian and Melanchthon groups of the Reformation continue in America as the Reformed Church. *Tenets:* Calvinism, the Heidelberg Catechism. *Polity:* Presbyterian.

Reformed Episcopal Church. Protestant. *History:* This branch separated from the Protestant Episcopal Church in 1873 on a question concerning ritual. *Tenets:* Episcopalian save for denial of Eucharistic sacrifice and regeneration in baptism. *Polity:* Episcopacy.

ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. Catholic. *History:* The entire Western branch of the Christian Church prior to and since the separation from the Eastern churches in 1045 has continued in unbroken succession to the present time. The first Roman Catholic congregation in the United States was founded at St. Augustine, Fla., in 1565. *Tenets:* The Creeds (Western form), the œcumenical councils and the ex-cathedra utterances of the Pope as head of the church constitute the grounds of the Rule of Faith. *Polity:* Hierarchical.

SALVATIONISTS. Protestant. *History:* The Salvation Army was founded by William Booth in open-air meetings in 1865. It began as a movement supplementary to the churches, but grew so largely as to become a force of its own. The American Salvation Army is more truly a church. *Tenets:* Primarily moralistic, its doctrines are Arminian, and the sacraments have only a spiritual significance. *Polity:* Military democracy.

SPIRITUALISTS. Mystic. *History:* The Spiritualistic organization dates its origin to the writings of Andrew Jackson Davis, whose work, "The Principles of Nature," was published in 1845. *Tenets:* "We believe in Infinite Intelligence; and that the phenomena of Nature, physical and spiritual, are the expressions of Infinite Intelligence. We affirm that a correct understanding of such expressions, and living in accordance with them, constitute the true religion; that the existence and personal identity continue after the change called 'death'; and that communication with the so-called 'dead' is a fact scientifically proven by the phenomena of Spiritualism." *Polity:* Congregational.

THEOSOPHICAL SOCIETIES. Mystic. *History:* The original Theosophical Society was founded in American by Mme. Blavatsky. *Tenets:* That the Universal Principle is not finitely comprehensible. That there is a cycle of incarnation, in many cases causing reincarnation, which is the return of the higher nature to physical life. That

there is a moral law of unerring justice (Karma) to which all other laws are subject. *Polity:* Associative.

UNITARIANS. Protestant liberal. *History:* The Congregationalists who were on the Unitarian side of the Trinitarian controversy withdrew in 1819 when William Ellery Channing preached a sermon known as the "Unitarian Declaration of Independence." In 1825, the American Unitarian Association was formed. *Tenets:* Congregationally variant, but generally determinative of personal morality and humanitarianism by the exemplar of Christ. *Polity:* Congregational.

UNITED BRETHREN BODIES. Protestant. *History:* In 1726 Philip William Otterbein came from Germany to the Reformed Churches in America. A personal religious experience which he found Martin Boehm, a Mennonite, had shared, led him to an evangelistic campaign. *Tenets:* Arminian. Personal sanctification is the central doctrine. *Polity:* Modified Episcopacy.

UNIVERSALISTS. Protestant liberal. *History:* The Universalist denomination, as such, dates from the arrival in Good Luck, N. J., of John Murray in 1770. The second Philadelphia convention, in 1793, drew up the Universalist profession of faith. *Tenets:* The universal fatherhood of God, the final harmony of all souls with God, *i.e.*, that punishment for sin is not eternal. *Polity:* Congregational and synodal.

This brief purview shows how largely, how overpoweringly, Christianity grips the religions of America. That the number of its variations is no clue to America's spiritual condition is well known. That Christianity as we know it to-day is the ultimate word of religion is impossible, for as age passes into age, new concepts are born, new needs arise, new problems are to be faced. The History of Religion points but one thing clearly—that in all ages men "are seeking after God, if haply they might find Him."